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Abstract
Bodary, Michael J. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2011. “Technical
Communication and the Development of a Request For Designation (RFD) Submission
to the U. S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).” Emily Thrush, Ph.D.

In this dissertation, I use autoethnography to retrospectively examine the
development of a document submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Specifically, I retrospectively examine my perceptions of the corporate history and
corporate culture surrounding the development of the biotech product, how the history
and culture influenced the company’s development of a Request For Designation (RFD)
FDA submission, and how the RFD affected subsequent events in the company.
RFDs are a relatively new type of FDA submission designed specifically for a
newly added division within the FDA—the Office of Combination Products (OCP)—
formed to evaluate combination products. Combination products are biotech products not
easily classified as being solely a biologic, device, or drug. The OCP reviews a
combination product’s RFD to assess if a biotech product achieves its primary mode of
action (PMOA) through physical (device), chemical (drug), or organic (biologic) means.
The purpose of the RFD is to persuade the OCP reviewer to classify the product as per
the sponsor’s preferred recommendation—assuming the sponsor can build a sufficiently
viable argument supporting the sponsor’s recommended PMOA. The OCP’s
determination of PMOA directly affects the development time and expense involved in
obtaining clearance from the FDA to market a new biotech product.
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Although a maximum of only 15-pages in length, an RFD can determine the fate
of a new biotech product or the company sponsoring the product. Considering the critical
nature of an RFD, it seems natural that hiring a technical communicator to assist in the
development of a persuasive-yet-factual RFD should be paramount to a biotech company.
However, there is currently little or no discussion of the roles technical communicators
play in the development of RFDs and other FDA submissions.
By documenting my experiences and observations, it is my intent to objectively
share my discoveries and thoughts on developing an RFD (and tangentially other FDA
submissions) with other technical communicators so as to provide insight into this new
area of exploration within the discipline.

vi

Table of Contents

Dedication .............................................................................................................. iii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ iv
Abstract ................................................................................................................... v
Table of Contents .................................................................................................. vii
List of Tables .......................................................................................................... xi
List of Figures ....................................................................................................... xii
Keys to Abbreviations .......................................................................................... xiii
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................... 1
Chapter overview ................................................................................................ 1
What is the FDA? ................................................................................................ 2
What is a combination product? .......................................................................... 4
What is a Request For Designation (RFD)? ...................................................... 10
The high cost of an undesired classification ..................................................... 12
Can technical communicators help companies obtain FDA approval?............. 14
The FDA’s opinions on writing quality in FDA submissions........................... 18
About this dissertation....................................................................................... 22
Chapter 2: Methodology........................................................................................ 25
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 25
Developing a research question......................................................................... 29
Coming to a methodology ................................................................................. 30
Methodology shortcomings ............................................................................... 42
vii

Conclusion......................................................................................................... 48
Chapter 3: Corporate history, culture, and collaboration ...................................... 50
Chapter overview .............................................................................................. 50
History of a small biotech ................................................................................. 51
Madison Technologies’ corporate culture ......................................................... 80
Collaboration and Madison’s RFD ................................................................. 103
Chapter conclusion .......................................................................................... 128
Chapter 4: Developing the Request For Designation (RFD) Submission........... 132
Chapter overview ............................................................................................ 132
Cover letter ...................................................................................................... 136
Contact Information ........................................................................................ 142
Product Name .................................................................................................. 145
Prior Approvals and Agreements .................................................................... 150
Chemical, Physical or Biological Composition .............................................. 153
Developmental Work and Testing................................................................... 158
Manufacturing Information ............................................................................. 164
Proposed Use or Indications............................................................................ 167
Modes of action ............................................................................................... 172
Schedule and Duration of Use ......................................................................... 180
Dose and Route of Administration .................................................................. 182
Related Products .............................................................................................. 186
Other Relevant Information ............................................................................ 190
Sponsor’s Recommendation............................................................................ 193

viii

RFD’s Appendix ............................................................................................. 196
Conclusion....................................................................................................... 203
Chapter 5: Madison’s history after the RFD submission .................................... 218
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 218
RFD submission results and evaluation .......................................................... 219
Madison’s history after Progenix’s FDA approval ......................................... 222
Conclusion....................................................................................................... 252
Chapter 6: Ethics, the FDA and Industry, and Technical Communicators ......... 257
Chapter overview ............................................................................................ 257
Ethics, Industry, and the FDA ......................................................................... 258
Ethical situations during the RFD submission’s development........................ 278
Ethical situations before and after the RFD submission’s development ......... 288
Conclusion....................................................................................................... 309
Chapter 7: Observations and Conclusions .......................................................... 319
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 319
Business advice and the future of the OCP and RFDs .................................... 321
Ethical considerations for technical communicators working for biotechs .... 329
Quality systems and technical communicators ............................................... 330
Observations and advice for developing FDA submissions............................ 333
Areas for future research ................................................................................. 342
Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 344
Appendix A: OCP’s RFD Guidance Document .................................................. 362
Appendix B: Federal Register PMOA definitions .............................................. 371

ix

Appendix C: Progenix RFD ................................................................................ 386

x

List of Tables
Tables
Table 1-1: Comparison of FDA medical product development times, costs,
and success rates
Table 1-2: Poll results for CDER reviewers’ opinion of the quality of
writing in new drug submissions.
Table 2-1: OCP reviewer’s possible responses and assumptions of RFD
effectiveness
Table 2-2: Methodology shortcomings and strategies to minimize them
Table 3-1: Madison’s historical events timeline
Table 3-2: Overview of Madison’s Four Cliques
Table 3-3: Comparison of basic management styles
Table 3-4: Madison’s mistakes in dealing with the FDA
Table 4-1: Draft table for chemical, physical, biological composition section
Table 4-2: Indications for use versus intended use
Table 4-3: Change in the FDA’s MOA definition†
Table 4-4: Change in the FDA’s PMOA definition†
Table 5-1: Timeline for Madison Technologies post-RFD submission
response
Table 5-2: Contrasting the main goals of the Executives and R&D
Table 5-3: Contrasting the initial HCPCS submission for Progenix with the
subsequent appeal letter to HCPCS
Table 6-1: Pre-history of the FDA
Table 6-2: History of the FDA
Table 6-3: Top 10 clinical trial pitfalls and Madison’s European clinical
trials
Table 7-1: Comparison of FDA medical product development times, costs,
and success rates—including RFD submissions
Table 7-2: OCP assignment of primary jurisdictions, 2003-2008

xi

Page
13
20
40
43-44
53
82
99
129
155
168
173
174
223
226
240
260-262
263-266
294
324-325
327

List of Figures
Figures
Figure 1-1: FDA’s organizational chart (emphasis added for the OCP,
CBER, CDER, and CDRH).
Figure 2-1: Using a communication triangle as a tool for analyzing
Madison’s RFD
Figure 3-1: Office Layout (1997)
Figure 3-2: Office Layout (2001)
Figure 3-3: Office Layout (2003)
Figure 4-1: Progenix’s cover letter section
Figure 4-2: Progenix’s contact information section
Figure 4-3: Progenix product name section
Figure 4-4: Progenix’s prior approvals and agreements section
Figure 4-5: Progenix’s chemical, physical, or biological composition
section
Figure 4-6: Progenix’s developmental work and testing section
Figure 4-7: Progenix’s manufacturing information section
Figure 4-8: Progenix’s proposed use or indications section
Figure 4-9: Progenix’s modes of action section
Figure 4-10: Progenix’s schedule and duration of use section
Figure 4-11: Progenix’s dose and route of administration section
Figure 4-12: Progenix’s related products section
Figure 4-13: Progenix’s other related information section
Figure 4-14: Progenix’s sponsor’s recommendation section
Figure 4-15: Progenix’s appendix
Figure 6-1: Relationships among the FDA, Industry, and Congress

xii

Page
9
39
61
65
71
141
145
150
153
158
163
166
172
179
182
185
189
192
195-196
201-203
310

Keys to Abbreviations
510(k)
CBER
CDER
CDRH
CRO
EPA
FDA
FOIA
HCPCS
HDE
IND
IPO
ISO
MBA
MOA
NDA
OCP
OD
PMA
PMOA
QMS
QS
R&D
RFD
SME
SOP
USPTO

A reference to the Code of Federal Regulations’ section describing
requirements for a substantially equivalent medical device.
Center for Biologicals Evaluation and Research
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
Center for Devices and Radiological Health
Contract Research Organization
Environmental Protection Agency
Food and Drug Administration
Freedom of Information Act
Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
Humanitarian Device Exemption (medical device)
Investigational New Drug
Initial Public Offering
International Organization for Standards
Master of Business Administration
Mode of Action (see also PMOA)
New Drug Approval
Office of Combination Products
Orphan Drug
Premarket Approval (medical device, non-generic)
Primary Mode of Action (see also MOA Quality Management System (see
also QS)
Quality Management System (see also QS)
Quality System (see also QMS)
Research and Development
Request For Designation
Subject Matter Expert
Standard Operating Procedure
United States Patent and Trademark Office

xiii

Chapter 1: Introduction
“Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language have
so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with
little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for
deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade
either those who speak or those who hear them, that they are but the covers
of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge.”
—John Locke, “English: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”

Chapter overview
“The Well-Fed Writer,” an online blog produced by freelance commercial
writer Peter Bowerman, bluntly states the following:

[When] a company that wants to stay competitive knows that its people can’t
write to the required level to maintain that competitiveness, chances are good
they’ll turn to those who can. I’ve said this forever: writing skills [are terrible]
in the business world, and that can only bode well for those of us who have
the skills.

Good writing skills are critical to the biotech sector of the business world.
Biotech companies in the US, if they wish to market a new healthcare product, must
first obtain FDA clearance. To obtain FDA clearance, these biotech companies must
write and submit detailed technical documentation, which one or more FDA
reviewers will heavily scrutinize. The FDA’s reviewers will then make a decision,
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based upon the technical document provided by the business (or “sponsor”), as to
whether or not a new biotech product will be cleared for sale.
Despite the rigorous review FDA submissions must undergo, some biotech
companies do not have a technical communicator (either on staff or as a consultant)
assisting in the development of these FDA documents. In light of Bowerman’s
comments about how writing skills within the corporate world are on the decline and
how businesses must be able to produce well-written documents to be competitive, it
logically follows that biotech firms submitting critical documents to the FDA could
substantially benefit from the skills and experiences technical writers can bring to
their companies.
This dissertation examines my perception of how a small, start-up biotech
firm struggled to develop documentation for the FDA approval process of a new
medical product. Specifically, this research examines the development of a document
that underwent a review by the FDA, the factors that influenced the development of
the document, the design and rhetorical strategies used to persuade the FDA reviewer,
and the potential advantages a technical communicator might bring to a biotech
company in submitting documents to the FDA—as well as useful functions technical
communicators can provide to a biotech company before and after an FDA
submission.

What is the FDA?
The FDA (The United States Food and Drug Administration) is an agency
within the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The FDA is
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responsible for ensuring the foods and drugs available to Americans are safe to use,
and the agency’s mission statement provides further insight into the breadth of the
agency’s areas of responsibility:

The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety,
efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products,
medical devices, our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit
radiation. The FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by
helping to speed innovations that make medicines and foods more effective,
safer, and more affordable; and helping the public get the accurate, sciencebased information they need to use medicines and foods to improve their
health. (“What We Do”)

As evident by their mission statement, the “Food and Drugs” portion of the
Food and Drug Administration’s name can be a little misleading: the FDA is clearly
responsible for much more than just food and drugs. With respect to the “Food”
aspect of the agency’s name, the FDA originated from within the U. S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA). Nowadays, the FDA is generally only responsible for processed
and canned foods (ice cream, canned beets, potted meat, etc.), which accounts for
approximately 80% of the US food supply, while the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for the remaining 20%, which is largely
unprocessed foods and uncooked cuts of meat (H.R. 875 3-4). With respect to the
“Drugs” aspect of the agency’s name, the FDA is responsible for drugs, biologics
(vaccines, transplants, stem cells, etc), medical devices (pacemakers, bandages, x-ray
machines, etc.), cosmetics (mostly ingredients and label claims), and non-medical
radiation-emitting devices (microwaves, televisions, lasers). The reason “Food and
Drugs” covers so many things that are not actually food and drugs goes back to the
FDA’s inception in 1906, when the agency was formed to protect the public’s health
3

but did not, at the time, have such a broad range of authority and influence—nor
advance knowledge of all the medical innovations to come over the next hundred
years (Hawthorne 35-65).
Over time, even though the FDA’s name has not changed, the agency has
assumed more health-related responsibilities as the need for more or better regulation
of products arose and as researchers discovered previously unknown therapeutic
innovations that fell within the FDA’s jurisdiction. The FDA’s range of influence
continues to dynamically grow and adapt to new regulatory and safety challenges as
new commercially viable biotechnologies emerge. One of these new challenges is an
industry trend of combining two or more medical products to make a singular new
product, called a combination product.

What is a combination product?
Combination products are a relatively new regulatory concept for both the
biotech industry and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Prior to the
FDA’s establishment of the Office of Combination Products (OCP) in late 2002, the
FDA’s organizational structure required developers to classify their new medical
products as a device, drug, or biologic; and then send their FDA submission for the
product to the relevant agency within the FDA. One of three centers within the FDA
would then process the submission and reject or approve the new product. The Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) would review submissions for drug
products, which interact chemically with the human body. The Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research (CBER) would review submissions for biologically derived
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products, which have a biological origin (i.e., surgical grafts, vaccines, or stem cells).
The Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) would review submissions
for medical devices, which interact physically with the human body. With such an
intuitive system, the FDA relied upon biotech companies to direct their submissions
to the appropriate agency, and any misdirected submission could be redirected to the
proper agency by the agency that initially received it (Parisian 533-537). The FDA’s
means of dividing regulatory submissions among these three centers was efficient and
intuitive—at least superficially and for the majority of uncomplicated biotech
products.
However, innovations within the biotech industry gave rise to hybridizations
of two or more medical technologies: these hybridized products are called
combination products. One of the FDA’s favorite examples of a combination product
is a drug-eluting vascular stent, which combines the physical benefits of a vascular
stent (which helps to structurally support a major blood vessel) with the chemical
benefits of a blood-thinning drug (which helps to prevent blood clots from forming on
the stent implanted inside the blood vessel). The stent physically supports the blood
vessel, which means it has a physical mode of action and would normally be
reviewed by CDRH; but the stent is also impregnated with a slow-release chemical
compound designed to prevent blood clots from forming, and drugs are reviewed by
CDER. A drug-eluting stent is clearly a useful biotech product, but should a drugeluting stent be reviewed by CDRH, CDER, or both CDRH and CDER to ensure the
product works and is safe for human use (Department of Health and Human Services
22156-22157)?
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Dr. Suzanne Parisian, formerly the Chief Medical Officer for CDRH, wrote
the following about processing combination products at the FDA, and her language
clearly indicates the problems the FDA (and industry) experienced in the past with
combination product submissions:

Combination products will have ONE [emphasis is Parisian’s] lead center
primarily assigned for review of the application with other centers assisting.
The manufacturer must deal with only one center, not two. This is intended to
make it easier for the MANUFACTURER [emphasis is Parisian’s] (sponsor)
since the requirements of different FDA centers can VARY [emphasis is
Parisian’s]. It is hard enough for sponsors to get an application through one
center no less TWO [emphasis is Parisian’s]. (552-553)

Drug-eluting stents and other combination medical products were clearly
presenting a challenge to the FDA and the biotech industry: these products did not fit
within the FDA’s existing flowcharts and organizational structures, and combination
products were proving to be difficult for the FDA to consistently process and review.
“If a product overlaps jurisdictions [within the FDA], the bureaucratic-cultural
differences [among CBER, CDER, CDRH] can create some crossed wires”
(Hawthorne 130). As a result of these jurisdictional disputes—as well as
communication problems and disputes among the FDA’s centers—combination
products were consistently being relegated to lower priority status (Hawthorne 317318). How should the FDA handle the regulatory approval of a biomedical product
that might fall into the jurisdiction of two or even three divisions within the FDA,
especially considering how CBER, CDER, and CDRH have review processes that are
different from one another? Because combination products did not fit within the
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FDA’s simple “drug-or-device-or-biologic” classification system, the FDA needed to
find a way to handle the following four types of combination products:
•

Biologic + device (i.e., a cultured skin graft grown on and reinforced by a
gauze backing)

•

Biologic + drug (i.e., a cultured skin graft with an analgesic coating)

•

Device + drug (i.e., a gauze dressing with an analgesic coating)

•

Biologic + device + drug (i.e., a layered dressing consisting of a cultured
skin graft, grown on and reinforced by a gauze backing, and coated with an
analgesic)

The FDA opted to not create four new divisions to handle the four possible
combination product permutations, or one new division with four subdivisions within
it. Instead, the FDA chose to process all possible types of combination products
through a single, newly formed group within the Office of the Commissioner (the
executive branch of the FDA): the Office of Combination Products (OCP) (“FY 2003
OCP Performance Report”).
The OCP’s role within the FDA is to evaluate a combination product (or
potential combination product); determine if the product is primarily a biologic,
device, or a drug; and then assign just one of the medical product reviewing centers
within the FDA (CBER, CDER, or CDRH) as having primary jurisdiction over the
evaluation of the new product’s regulatory submission (“About the FDA Organization
Charts”) (Fig. 1-1). In addition to determining if CBER, CDER, or CDRH has
primary jurisdiction over a combination product’s review process, the OCP can also
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specify what other FDA division(s) may provide secondary input on the submission
and/or be asked to assist the center with primary jurisdiction. Establishing a crosscenter leader allows for greater cooperation between two or more of the FDA’s
review centers while simultaneously establishing which one of the centers is
ultimately in charge of the approval process for each individual combination product
submission. Additionally, each combination product’s manufacturer needs to
communicate with just the one center with primary jurisdiction, not all of the relevant
centers and/or reviewers that may be reviewing the product’s documentation: the
center with primary jurisdiction is responsible for ensuring that all participating
reviewers receive communications from the sponsor, further reducing confusion that
previously plagued intra-center communications for combination products (Parisian
552-553).
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Black-shaded boxes are the only ones relevant to this organizational chart. Executive
offices are at the top and legislative/judicial offices are at the bottom.
Figure 1-1: FDA’s organizational chart (emphasis added for the OCP,
CBER, CDER, and CDRH).

The OCP thus serves as an executive office designed to foster interdepartmental communication within the FDA, where there had historically been
problems with interdepartmental communication and cooperation among CBER,
CDER, and CDRH during combination product reviews. The OCP also resolved the
prior issues in establishing which center had the ultimate authority for handling each
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individual combination product submission (partially by virtue of being within the
executive office of the FDA and thus having more bureaucratic clout than CBER,
CDER, and CDRH) and the final decision in rendering the approval or rejection of a
combination product (“Jurisdictional Information”).

What is a Request For Designation (RFD)?
Primary jurisdiction (assessing which center of the FDA—CBER, CDER, or
CDRH—is in charge of a new product’s submission for marketing clearance) is
determined from a single document, written and submitted by the product’s sponsor,
and scrutinized by a reviewer from the OCP. This crucial document is called a
Request for Designation (RFD). An RFD is 15 pages long (or less) and is used by the
OCP reviewer to assess whether the product in question is or is not a combination
product. If the OCP reviewer determines the submission is not a combination product,
the reviewer directs the sponsor to submit the product to CBER, CDER, or CDRH as
appropriate. If the OCP reviewer determines the submission is a combination product,
the reviewer uses the information within the RFD to evaluate the product and
designate which one center within the FDA (CBER, CDER, or CDRH) will have
primary jurisdiction and which other center (or centers) can be asked to provide
additional input during the review process (“RFD Process”).
The OCP reviewer determines a combination product’s primary jurisdiction
by assessing which aspect of the product contributes the most to its indication for use
(IFU). IFUs are written by the sponsoring biotech company, describe what the
product is designed to accomplish, and must be supported by evidence. The aspect of
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the product that most contributes towards its IFU is called the primary mode of action
(PMOA). In writing an RFD, the company must explain to the OCP reviewer what
the PMOA is and why the PMOA justifies the OCP giving primary jurisdiction to
CBER, CDER, or CDRH as recommended by the submitting company (“RFD
Process”). Using the drug-eluting vascular stent as an example again, if a company
believes the stent contributes more than the drug, then the company would create an
evidence-based persuasive argument in the RFD to support its claim that the physical
properties of the stent are more important than the product’s drug component, state
that the physical properties of the stent were the PMOA, and that CDRH should
review the product because the PMOA is that of a device. (Obviously, counterarguments could be made to claim the drug is more important than the stent, thus
indicating a drug-based PMOA where CDER would be given primary jurisdiction,
and the sponsor must address this opposing view in the RFD.)
Any decision the OCP makes while reviewing an RFD has very direct and
substantial consequences to businesses attempting to obtain FDA approval for their
products. When the OCP reviewer assigns primary jurisdiction to CBER, CDER, or
CDRH; the reviewer is also indirectly determining the cost to gain approval, the time
to obtain approval, the amount of research needed to acquire approval, and the overall
probability of a successful new product approval. However, the time, money,
research, and risk involved are not the FDA’s responsibility; they are the
responsibility of the business attempting to bring a new medical product to market.
The consequences stemming from how the OCP reviewer classifies a combination
product extends beyond the product’s approval process. When a combination product
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is classified as being primarily a biological, drug, or device; the decision also
determines the marketing claims, manufacturing conditions, and post-approval
regulations the product must adhere to in order to pass subsequent FDA audits—all of
which affect a company’s cost to bring a new biotech product to market. (See Table
1-1.)

The high cost of an undesired classification
Table 1-1 provides a quick and generalized overview of the typical
development cost, development time, and success rate for FDA submissions based
upon how a (non-combination) product is classified. For a multi-billion dollar biotech
company with numerous product lines (such as Pfizer, Merck, or Johnson &
Johnson), obtaining a favorable RFD decision means a reduction in research and
development expenditures, an expedited timeline on one of their many product lines,
and perhaps a slight increase in the company’s stock price corresponding with a
“good news” press release. For a small, start-up biotech company with only one or
two products in the development pipeline, the risks and rewards are substantially
greater: the OCP reviewer’s classification of the RFD submission could easily mean
the life or death of the entire company—and whether the medical technology is ever
made available to the public. Clearly the most desirable outcome for a combination
product is to have the OCP classify it as being primarily a device with any
drug/biologic components being secondary to the device aspect: a device-drug or
device-biologic combination minimizes the development costs, the development
times, and the probability of failure during the FDA’s review process.
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Table 1-1: Comparison of FDA medical product development times,
costs, and success rates

Development cost
(in millions)
Total development
time (in years)
Probability of
successfully gaining
FDA clearance†††††
Approvals/year
Post-approval
regulation

New drug
product
(IND) †
$8021

New
biological
product†
No data††

Medical devices
New device
Generic device
(PMA)
(510(k))
$1102
$22

12.53

11.53

3.252

1.652

21%1

30%4

No data
available†††

95%2

195
125
98735, ††††
21 C.F.R.
21 C.F.R. 21 C.F.R. Part
21 C.F.R. Part
Parts 210
Parts 600- 820
820
and 211
680
Reviewing agency
CDER
CBER
CDRH
1
DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski.
2
Lawyer, Andrew, Gjaja, and Schweizer.
3
Reichert.
4
DiMasi and Grabowski.
5
Moses, Dorsey, Matheson, and Their. Averages derived from the number of
approvals between 1998 (after the implementation of the FDA Modernization
Act of 1997) and 2004 and rounded to the nearest whole number.
†
The table includes new and generic devices, but only new drugs and new
biologics (no generics) as these are not relevant to this dissertation and data is
not readily available.
††
Because biologics encompass an extremely broad range of products, it’s
misleading to provide an average cost, and no data on price ranges are readily
available to the public.
†††
PMAs require more safety and efficacy testing (and thus more costs) than
510(k) submissions (which are generics of existing devices), so it can be
assumed that the chances of a PMA gaining FDA approval are less than the
95% success rate of 510(k) submissions but likely greater than the 21% and
30% success rates of drugs and biologics (respectively).
††††
No data available to differentiate the number of approved 510(k) devices from
the number of approved PMA devices between 1998-2004, but the bulk of
approvals would obviously be attributable to the cheaper, easier to approve
510(k) devices.
†††††
Success rate is based upon products that already passed safety and efficacy
testing prior to entering this phase of FDA approval, so overall beginning-toend success rates are much lower—possibly even 1/5th of the figures listed on
this table (Helms, Helms, and Kessler 6).
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Given the high stakes involved with an RFD submission, it follows that a
biotech company, be it large or small, could benefit greatly from employing a skilled
technical communicator to aid in the development of an RFD. At the very least, an
RFD should be written using organization techniques, design concepts, and rhetorical
strategies that technical writers are readily familiar with so as to maximize the
possibility of obtaining a favorable outcome from the OCP reviewer while
simultaneously providing factual and accurate information about the product under
review.

Can technical communicators help companies obtain FDA
approval?
Albert Einstein once said, “Not everything that can be counted counts, and not
everything that counts can be counted.” Such is the dilemma facing technical
communicators and the potential value they could bring to biotech companies
working to develop FDA submissions. Even though most everyone who has worked
with a technical communicator will vouch for the value a technical communicator can
bring to a company and its products, quantitatively demonstrating this added value
has vexed the profession for some time. Technical communicators have produced
numerous articles showing how, in specific situations, they helped to reduce expenses
and brought value to their employers (Hackos; Mead; Reddish; Spencer and Yates; et
al.). Despite these efforts, there is no metric or formula that can quantitatively
demonstrate the value a technical communicator can bring to a given business
scenario. Unfortunately, there probably never will be an easy, universal means of
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calculating the fiscal value a technical writer can bring to businesses. Each unique
business situation must be assessed on an individual basis to determine if a technical
writer’s presence may—or may not—provide added value in a given scenario.
However, when considering the process of writing an FDA submission, if it is
taken as a given that a technical communicator can enhance a document above and
beyond that of a document that has not been assembled, reviewed, and edited by a
skilled writer, then even a modest improvement in a finished document could easily
result in a cost savings of millions—or even hundreds of millions—of dollars (see
Table 1-1). With small biotech companies with just one or two products in the
pipeline, the decision to involve a technical communicator in the development of an
FDA submission is even more critical: good writing might make the difference
between a small company’s eventual success or abrupt demise. In producing
regulatory documents for the FDA, well-written documentation should theoretically
equate to added value for the submitting company.
For example, drug patents are typically good for only 20 years, and the
average drug takes approximately 12 years to transform from a patented concept into
an FDA approved product capable of entering the market (DiMasi, Hansen, and
Grabowski 165). This typical drug development timetable leaves an average of eight
years on the drug compound’s patent for a biotech company to recover its initial
investment—an average of $800 million in expenditures for a new drug (see Table 11). After these eight remaining years of patent life expire, generic competition, which
accounts for roughly one-third of prescriptions written in the US, begins undercutting
the developing company’s profit margin (Cohen 276-277). If we assume that $800
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million investment must be regained in eight years just to break even with a drug’s
research and development costs, then each day a product is delayed from being on the
market costs a drug company approximately $275,000. The true cost of a delay is
certainly greater than $275,000 per day because most pharmaceutical companies do
not operate on the principle of merely breaking even with their development costs:
they need to generate a profit. A technical writer’s ability to coordinate company
communications, guide readers, and effectively organize information could shorten
document development times, shorten a drug’s review process at the FDA, and
require fewer requests for clarification from FDA reviewers (who may take weeks or
months to respond when given new information). These reductions in time could save
biotech companies a surprising amount of money by simply getting products onto the
market faster.
The stakes can be substantially higher for a company with a combination
product, because an OCP reviewer will use a single document to determine how to
classify the hybridized product and which center within the FDA will obtain primary
jurisdiction. Referencing Table 1-1 and returning once more to the example of a
company that makes a vascular stent (device) that releases an anti-clotting chemical
compound (drug), this combination product could be classified as having a drug or a
device PMOA by the OCP’s reviewer. If the reviewer determines the combination
product is primarily a drug and gives primary jurisdiction to CDER, the submitting
company will have a substantially lower probability of gaining FDA clearance and
will have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars undertaking extensive clinical and
safety testing. On the other hand, a persuasively phrased, logical argument that the

16

product is more of a device than a drug could push the product into a new device
(PMA) classification with CDRH having primary jurisdiction. A favorable device
PMOA decision would save the company hundreds of millions of dollars, improve
the probability of the product being cleared by the FDA, and hasten the approval
process by roughly 9.25 years. Also, a shortened approval process means more time
on the market without contending with generic competition, translating into a
substantial profit that might otherwise never have been realized. From a regulatory
and a business standpoint, it is clearly better to have a combination product classified
as a device with a drug component instead of a drug with a device component.
(Likewise, similar benefits can be realized with a combination biologic-device
product if it is classified as a device with a biologic component instead of a biologic
with a device component.)
While it may be difficult to assign a value to good writing, it is quite logical to
assume businesses with better-developed documentation tend to fare better than those
with lackluster documentation. Employing technical communicators may give
businesses a competitive edge over their rivals, and technical communicators might
also correspondingly enhance the quality of collaborative projects (such as FDA
submissions) within individual businesses. A study conducted in 2003, examining
267 companies, found that businesses with high levels of communication
effectiveness benefited in the following ways (Vogt):
•

Higher (31%) return on shareholder investments (when comparing firms
with the most effective communication to the firms with the least effective
communication).
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•

More efficient employee assimilation into the corporate culture.

•

Lower employee turnover.

•

Greater employee awareness of how their individual actions support the
business, thus making employees feel more connected to the business.

•

Faster company adjustments to changing market conditions.

In summary, for a small biotech with all of its hopes pinned to one product’s
successful approval, the edge a technical communicator provides to a business could
mean the difference between the small company succeeding or failing. For a large
biotech firm, a technical communicator can help bolster and protect the company’s
bottom line. Of course, any possible benefits from a biotech hiring a technical
communicator to participate in developing FDA submissions are completely
dependent upon whether or not FDA reviewers appreciate good, organized, readable
writing in regulatory submissions.

The FDA’s opinions on writing quality in FDA submissions
In February of 2007, I attended an AdvaMed seminar for submitting
substantially equivalent (generic) medical devices (commonly referred to within the
biotech industry as 510(k)s). The seminar was titled 510(k) Submissions 101: “THE
COURSE” for Regulatory Affairs Professionals for Preparing a 510(k). A couple
guest speakers at the event were FDA reviewers from CDRH. What follows is a
sampling of the various comments made by these CDRH reviewers. These comments
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clearly underscore how the FDA reviewers value good writing in FDA submissions
and their past encounters with FDA submissions that were of poor quality.
•

“If a simple little thing such as pagination is left out, it can annoy a
reviewer—especially when the reviewer needs to ask a question.”

•

“Don’t let the next aspiring author for War and Peace write your
510(k).”

•

“Plan for information to come in as soon as possible so that there is
time to organize it.”

•

“Don’t send reviewers on a scavenger hunt through your document.”

•

“Hypertext linking is useful in preventing reviewers from having to
flip around in a document—if you submit via e-filing.”

•

“However you phrase your indications for use, make sure it is exactly
the same throughout the document. Every word. Every period. Every
comma. Because the reviewer will notice.”

•

“We’re all individuals at the FDA, but the one thing we all have in
common is that we are all obsessive-compulsive.”

•

“More is not always better.”

•

“If you omit something you know we’ll be looking for, let us know
why so it doesn’t look like you just overlooked it or were negligent.”

•

“You want your reviewer to have a positive reading experience.”

In addition to these quotes from CDRH reviewers, consider this statement
from a former head of the FDA, Dr. James Goddard, made during the 1960s:
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I can say I have been shocked at the quality of many submissions to [the
FDA]. The hand of the amateur is evident too often for my comfort. So-called
research and so-called studies are submitted by the cartonful and our medical
officers are supposed to take all this very seriously. I cannot, however. As
their chief I have told them that inprofessional [sic]… [regulatory
submissions] should be cancelled immediately. If the sponsoring company is
imprudent enough to waste stockholders’ money on low quality work, then
that company must bear the consequence of such waste. The Food and Drug
Administration will not waste public money reviewing it. (Hilt 168)

Despite the poor writing that was clearly present in these biotech submissions
from decades ago, and the FDA’s adopted stance on rejecting poorly written
submissions, has the quality of writing in biotech submissions improved? In
Pharmaceutical Executive magazine, a poll of FDA CDER reviewers (see Table 1-2)
taken in the 1990s revealed that poor writing in new drug submissions continues to be
an ongoing problem (Hilts 315).

Table 1-2: Poll results for CDER reviewers’ opinion
of the quality of writing in new drug submissions.
Submission quality
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

Percent
7%
30%
42%
21%

With FDA reviewers claiming that only 37% of FDA submissions have
“excellent” or “good” writing quality, and that 63% of FDA submissions have “fair”
or “poor” writing quality, FDA reviewers are clearly accustomed to seeing regulatory
submissions with a terminal case of bad writing. Bad writing could be killing more
FDA submissions than haphazard research or the discovery of harmful side effects.
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The cause—or causes—of these poorly written FDA submissions could come from
any number of sources:
•

One or more lead researchers on the project (and/or FDA reviewers) might
be non-native speakers, leading to miscommunication or the appearance of
not being fully competent (Vasconcelos; Man; Victoria and Moreira; et.
al.).

•

Overall business-writing skills in the workplace might be in a general state
of decline, potentially stemming from the frequency and lax nature of
emails, instant messaging, and phone-based text messaging (Dillon and
Bowerman).

•

Generalized shortcomings in teaching writing skills at schools and
universities (Williams; Modu and Wimmers; Copperman).

•

Cooperatively written and assembled documents may not be cohesive and
may not have a common focus or voice (Bernhardt and McCully, Rice and
Waller).

Whatever the cause the ongoing poor writing quality in FDA submissions,
employing technical communicators—who specialize in producing precise, clear, and
accurate communication—in the assembly of biotechs’ documentation could improve
the quality of communication between industry and the FDA, leading to expediting
product reviews at the FDA and cost savings for industry.

21

About this dissertation
This dissertation is predominantly an autoethnographic account chronicling
my experiences working as a technical communicator at a small, start-up biotech
company (originally named Madison Pharmaceuticals but later renamed to Madison
Technologies), where I assisted in collaboratively developing documentation needed
to support a new biotech product (originally named QuickHeal but later renamed to
Progenix) that was eventually classified as a combination product. As part of the
approval process, Madison collaboratively developed a critical document that would
determine the fate of the company: an RFD for QuickHeal/Progenix. Madison’s RFD
was developed with the intent of obtaining primary jurisdiction under CDRH as a
medical device (wound dressing with an ointment) containing a drug compound (salt
compounds that made up 1% of the ointment’s composition) instead of obtaining
primary jurisdiction under CDER as a drug with the physical dressing being classified
as a drug delivery system (of lesser importance than the drug compound).
Although Madison submitted its product twice to the FDA as a 510(k) medical
device (once before the RFD as QuickHeal and once after the RFD as Progenix), I
have opted to focus predominantly on the RFD’s development rather than all the
documents involved in the new product’s FDA-approval process. The RFD is
substantially shorter and less involved than the earlier QuickHeal 510(k) submission
and the later Progenix (510(k) submission, and examining all of the documents
submitted to the FDA in order to obtain approval for this one product goes well
beyond the scope of a single dissertation. I focus predominantly on the RFD
submission because it is the most interesting, pivotal, and compact aspect of the
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larger FDA approval process for QuickHeal/Progenix. Also, the OCP is also the
newest group within the FDA, combination products are still relatively new and rare,
and the OCP might eventually become the entry point for all new FDA
submissions—ensuring that new biotech product submissions are evaluated and then
assigned to the proper Center within the FDA for review.
There is currently no published academic research into technical
communication and FDA submissions, meaning this dissertation would be the first to
explore the FDA approval process from the perspective of a technical communicator.
In particular, there appears to be nothing (other than an FDA guidance document)
currently available regarding RFD document development and submission. My
observations and conclusions could be useful in crafting future FDA submissions that
are easier for reviewers to process while simultaneously presenting information in a
more persuasive, organized manner that could help to obtain a more favorable
outcome for the biotech product’s manufacturer. This dissertation should also help
technical communicators who have no prior experience with FDA documentation to
better understand the magnitude and complexity ofg an FDA submission, as well as
serve as a source of guidance and background for additional research others might
wish to later conduct into the FDA submission development process.
My intent with this dissertation is to provide an industry insider’s glimpse into
a small biotech company’s evolution and corporate culture, demonstrate how these
factors and tensions affected the writing process in one critical document, and show
how technical communicators may prove to be beneficial to biotech companies
attempting to enhance the quality of FDA submissions (and thus obtain competitive
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advantages over biotech companies who do not employee technical communicators or
otherwise fail to place an emphasis on developing FDA submissions with good
writing). Also included is a brief discussion about ethics as pertains to the FDA,
biotech industry, and technical writers; and I briefly discuss a few situations that
arose while developing Madison’s FDA documentation. Finally, I summarize my
observations and insights into the additional writing-intensive projects biotechs must
undertake to maintain FDA compliance for products after obtaining FDA approval—
and how technical communicators can continue to be of substantial assistance to
biotech companies in coping with these post-approval documentation requirements.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
"To hate is to study, to study is to understand, to understand is to
appreciate, to appreciate is to love. So maybe I'll end up loving your theory."
— John Archibald Wheeler, Manhattan Project Physicist

Introduction
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated the vast amount of time and money
required to develop FDA-approved biotech products (see Table 1-1) and how poor
writing continues to plague FDA submissions (see Table 1-2), undoubtedly resulting
in delays in the approval of new products and the loss of hundreds of millions of
dollars each year (if not more). Writing submissions for the FDA certainly appears to
be an exciting area for technical communicators, and high-quality documentation is
clearly valued by both the biotech industry and the FDA; but how do we begin
conducting research into this unexplored area of the technical communications
discipline? The vastness and complexity of examining the large volume of
documentation required for developing, submitting, and realizing a new biotech
product—from conception to FDA approval to market—far exceeds the scope of a
single dissertation. Biotech companies, largely because of the threat posed by
competitors, have cloaked their internal workings and product development processes
in secrecy, making it virtually impossible to make cross-company and cross-product
comparisons. The resources (time, money, and people) required to develop an FDA
submission are prohibitive to businesses dedicated exclusively to these tasks, so it
would be wildly impractical for an individual researcher to create an artificial,
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controlled scenario where two FDA submissions (one produced with a technical
communicator and another without) written for an identical product could be
compared and contrasted directly against one another. Because of all these factors,
there has been negligible research into technical communication and FDA
submissions: it is unlikely that any research in this area will occur unless a technical
communicator interested in doing research into this area becomes an industry insider.
While attending graduate school, I was also working as a consultant for
several businesses. Through sheer serendipity, one of my employers was Madison
Pharmaceuticals (an alias). Madison Pharmaceuticals was a small biotech start-up
company intent on raising venture capital so it could finance the research,
development, FDA approval, and product launch of a medicated wound dressing
(initially called QuickHeal but later renamed to Progenix) in the US. After assisting
Madison Pharmaceuticals with writing and designing their shareholder relations
materials and business plan, Madison hired me as a full-time employee to assist in
their research and development (R&D) division. One of the many projects I assisted
R&D with was the collaborative development of a variety of documents required by
the FDA to obtain clearance to market QuickHeal/Progenix. Progenix would
eventually become Madison’s first FDA-approved product. Happenstance provided
me with the rare opportunity to be involved in the development of a new biotech
product, the submission of FDA documentation, and the subsequent manufacturing
and support of an FDA-approved biotech product.
As Madison Pharmaceuticals began developing its first FDA submission, I
suspected the experience might yield materials useful for a dissertation. I also
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suspected there had been little or no research into technical communication and the
development of FDA submissions. I was correct. My literature searches yielded no
publications directly related to FDA submissions within the technical communication
discipline, and there were only a handful of tangentially related publications. With no
prior experience and no direct research to draw upon as guidance, I had no idea what
to expect as Madison embarked upon its journey towards obtaining FDA approval.
Complicating matters, I was not alone in my ignorance as to how to write a
good FDA submission. All of Madison’s other employees had no prior experience
writing FDA submissions. As a company, we had no sample FDA submissions to use
as an example/template for Madison’s upcoming FDA submission. We also did not
know what to expect during the development of Madison’s first FDA submission,
what roles employees would play in developing the required FDA documentation,
what rhetorical strategies would be used, what information would and would not be
important, or what ethical quandaries might arise over the course of developing,
revising, and negotiating the submission’s content. We did not realize the magnitude
of what would eventually become a Herculean undertaking for a small group of
inexperienced people to accomplish.
Everyone working at Madison was keenly aware of one thing: there were just
two possible outcomes for our attempt to gain clearance from the FDA to market a
new biotech product—approval or rejection. We would either emerge with FDA
clearance to market a new biotech product in the US, or we would fail to obtain FDA
approval. If we failed, Madison (and our jobs) would almost certainly cease to exist.
The stakes were indeed high, but as a company we believed success would result in
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windfall profits for Madison’s shareholders; better quality of life for consumers who
used Madison’s product; resources needed to support Madison’s ongoing
manufacturing and marketing; and support for research into new product
developments.
These combinations of factors—my own (and Madison’s) inexperience with
the FDA, the pivotal nature of the documents submitted to the FDA, and the paucity
of technical communication research into FDA submissions—prompted me to
question what kind of research I could undertake to capture my experiences in a
dissertation. It was my hope the resulting research would prove to be useful should
other technical communicators find themselves participating in developing an FDA
submission. Additionally, I hoped to demonstrate to the biotech industry the value
that hiring a technical communicator might bring to their companies—thus providing
new employment opportunities for technical communication practitioners and
broadening the discipline’s range. What I lacked was a framework for conducting the
research as events unfolded. What would be important and what would not? What
would be feasible and what would be impractical?
Rather than blindly crafting a methodology prior to engaging in the
development of an FDA-approved medical product, I focused instead on collecting
information and documents for later examination. My workplace experiences, along
with an archive of the documents I generated as a part of these workplace
experiences, would enable me in using retrospective analysis to review and evaluate
the overall process of developing and submitting materials to the FDA. Because of
the tremendous amount of time and money involved in developing just one FDA
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submission (see Table 1-1), a retrospective autoethnographic account was clearly the
most pragmatic approach to understanding the overall experience and gaining an
initial foothold into this largely unexplored area of the technical communications
discipline.
In this chapter, I discuss the difficulties I faced in defining a research
question, how I decided upon a methodology, the shortcomings of the selected
methodology, and how I’ve attempted to address each of these shortcomings as they
apply to this research project.

Developing a research question
The process of getting one product approved by the FDA required that
Madison file three formal FDA submissions (as well as shorter back-and-forth
negotiations with FDA reviewers):
1. a 510(k) medical device submission for QuickHeal
2. an RFD submission for QuickHeal/Progenix
3. a significant rewrite of the original 510(k) submission reflecting
textual/descriptive changes made to the product in the RFD

Conducting a detailed examination of all of the documentation exchanged
between Madison and the FDA (well over 400 pages) is beyond the scope of a single
dissertation. Logistics mandated that a smaller segment be scrutinized.
Ultimately, I felt there were two aspects of the entire approval process that
were the most interesting and most useful to others interested in the development of
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FDA submissions: (1) the history and corporate culture of a small biotech and (2) the
development of the Request For Designation documentation. By narrowing my focus
to these two areas, the data set would be far more manageable, focused, and suitable
for a dissertation. Also, prior to discussing how Madison developed its RFD, it is
necessary to provide the background context of the history and environment the RFD
was created in. Establishing this background context requires a discussion of
Madison’s history and corporate culture as it pertains to the evolution of its
QuickHeal/Progenix product.
With my area of study focused on the development of the RFD submission
and Madison’s corporate history and culture, I was finally able to develop a research
question: “How might technical communication practices and practitioners be of use
in the development of FDA submissions, and what challenges might technical
communicators face in creating FDA submissions?” With my area of study narrowed
and a research question formulated, I now needed a methodology.

Coming to a methodology
In varying capacities and under various job titles, I spent nearly nine years
working with Madison to bring its QuickHeal/Progenix product from a concept to an
FDA-approved product able to be sold in the United States. Initially I was
sporadically employed as a technical communications consultant (mostly assembling
newsletters and investor relations materials), then as a full-time employee for
Madison (during QuickHeal/Progenix’s FDA approval processes), and finally as one
of Madison’s vice presidents (supporting the FDA-approved product and all its
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manufacturing and quality control documentation). Because of the time involved and
my participant-observer status during the nine years spent doing product research,
development, and realization of an FDA-approved combination product;
autoethnography appeared to be the most promising methodology for capturing these
experiences.
Autoethnography is a methodology used to examine individuals (including
oneself) engaged in the "process of figuring out what to do... and the meaning of their
struggles" (Bochner and Ellis 111). Autoethnography is a means of “mak[ing] the
researcher's own experience a topic of investigation in its own right” (Bochner and
Ellis 733). Bochner and Ellis' description of autoethnography directly reflects my
own attempts to ascribe meaning to the struggles I faced before, during, and after I
assisted in the development of the documentation designed to gain FDA approval for
a new biotech product.
Autoethnography differs from ethnography in that ethnography—at least the
original, anthropology-based concept of ethnography—allows for a researcher
(anthropologist) to visit a community, observe the community’s activities and
practices as a detached and unaffiliated outsider, and record observations about the
community’s activities and practices. Traditional ethnographic accounts allow for a
sense of (or at least the illusion of) scientific detachment for the researcher.
Contrastingly, autoethnography is a much newer and slightly controversial
methodology that allows and encourages the observer to directly participate in a
group’s activities and practices. The acknowledgement of the observer’s role and
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unique perspective (and potential bias) is obviously a phenomenon closely tied to the
rise of postmodernist theory in academia.
Hybridized autoethnography as a methodology
In addition to autoethnography, it is also possible to claim my dissertation
contains elements of a case/workplace study. Sara Wall, in “An Autoethnograpy
about Autoethnograpy,” made the following observation about autoethnographic
methodologies:

[Methodologies] in autoethnography… var[y] widely, from the highly
introspective, through more familiar approaches connected to qualitative
research, to somewhat experimental literary methods... in terms of thinking of
writing as research.” (Wall 152)

The immense flexibility of an autoethnographic methodology easily allows for
the integration and assimilation of other methodologies. Some researchers even blur
the lines of distinction between autoethnographies and case studies, stating that
“autoethnographies are case studies [emphasis is my own] that follow the tradition of
ethnographic research” (Duncan 3), such as Malinowski's pivotal anthropological
research using participant-observation to study the Troibrand Islanders in the 1920s.
Robert Yin defines a case study as an investigation of a contemporary phenomenon,
within its real-life context, when the distinction between the event and the context are
not clearly evident, and in which multiple pieces of evidence can be used (23). Yin’s
definition of a case study certainly seems appropriate as a methodology for this
dissertation, particularly in terms of the event (RFD submission) and the context
(development of the RFD submission within a small and inexperienced biotech
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company employing a single technical communicator). Borrowing Yin’s definition of
a case study, this dissertation could therefore be viewed as an investigation of a
contemporary phenomenon (technical communication principles and practices) within
its real-life context (a small and inexperienced biotech submitting its first RFD to the
FDA) when the distinction between the event and the context are not clearly evident
(no existing technical communication research into RFD submissions).
Is this dissertation an autoethnography or a case study? Much as a
combination product is a hybridization of drugs, devices, and biologics; it is also
possible to view this dissertation as a hybridization of an autoethnography and a case
(or workplace) study. Use of hybrid qualitative methodologies is actually quite
common among technical communication dissertations. A survey of doctoral
dissertations (spanning from 1989 to 1998) relevant to technical, scientific, and
business communications found that 51.7% of these dissertations used ethnographies,
case studies, predictions/classifications, and surveys as their methodologies; and that
“many [of these] dissertations use methods that combine one or more methods”
(Rainey 506).
An autoethnographic methodology is the most pragmatic means of
communicating my perceptions of Madison’s historical background and corporate
culture. I use autoethnography in three chapters: 3, 5, and 6. Chapter 3 details my
perceptions of Madison’s background, corporate culture, and collaborative efforts at
assembling an RFD. Chapter 5 presents my perceptions of events at Madison postFDA approval. Chapter 6 shares my observations of ethical challenges within
industry and the FDA, as well as ethical issues I faced while developing
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documentation that supported Madison’s biotech product. In Chapter 4, I use a
hybridization of autoethnography and case study to examine the evolution of the RFD
submitted to the OCP. Chapter 7, the final chapter, contains my observations and
conclusions.
Data collection and analysis
Selection and application of a methodology is limited by the data available or
the data to be generated. In this dissertation, I use a mixture of retrospection and
textual artifacts as my data. MacNealy, in discussing case studies (and with advice
that can easily be expanded to include autoethnographies), recommends using “more
than one measure [to] converge on an issue” (202). As a means of grounding my
retrospection, I amassed the following materials:
•

Madison’s entire QuickHeal/Progenix binder (containing two 510(k)
submissions, an RFD submission, and back-and-forth communications
between Madison’s R&D group and the FDA).

•

Every revision made to the RFD, from initial draft to the final version
submitted to the FDA.

•

All in-house email communications regarding the RFD’s developments
and revisions.

•

The FDA’s RFD guidance documents.

•

Personal recollections and observations regarding Madison’s history,
corporate culture, meetings and discussions, and ethical quandaries.
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Methodology for Chapter 3
In “Conflict and Capitulation: A Bakhtinian Analysis of a Failed
Collaboration” and Collaboration and Conflict: a Contextual Exploration of Group
Writing and Positive Emphasis, Geoffrey Cross dedicates a substantial portion of text
to describing his case studies’ background information so readers can understand the
complex problems and corporate dynamics employees faced while working on
collaborative projects. For Madison, the QuickHeal/Progenix RFD submission was
the company’s first attempt at a cross-team collaborative writing project, and thus
there needs to be a description of the numerous forces that acted centripetally and
centrifugally upon the RFD’s development.
My intent in Chapter 3 is to help readers better understand how Madison
Pharmaceuticals’ historical and cultural factors influenced how the RFD submission
was written. Providing this background information is important not just to better
explain my choice of methodology, but also because “context plays an important role
in the production and comprehension of the discourse [being studied]” (Harrison 5).
To present readers with necessary background information, I use reflective
autoethnography to share my observations and interpretations of Madison’s history,
Madison’s corporate culture, and Madison’s (consensual and non-consensual)
collaborate environment during the RFD’s development. Reflective autoethnography
must also be used to present Madison’s history because Madison has no formally
documented history (and some events occurred prior to my arrival at Madison and I
learned of them second-hand through other employees). My autoethnographic
account in Chapter 3 (and also Chapter 5) is thus Madison’s only documented history.
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To acknowledge perspectives that do not mirror my own, I have attempted to
incorporate some oral histories, shared by other employees, which offer alternative
perspectives of Madison’s development as a company.
With no official corporate history written for Madison, it should also come as
no surprise that Madison’s corporate culture has also never been examined. I have
attempted to create a simplified overview of Madison’s corporate culture based upon
the four functional groups within the company: Executives (Madison’s executives),
Support (administrative assistants, bookkeepers, and receptionists), R&D (research
and development personnel including myself), and Europeans (a small group of
employees working at Madison’s European subsidiary). Rather than focus on the
actions of individuals, wherever possible, I try to speak in terms of group-based
actions. By focusing on group-based actions rather than individuals, I have
intentionally negated the roles of individuals (aside from myself)—thus preserving
the anonymity of all individuals.
Chapter 4: Developing the RFD submission
In chapter 4, I directly examine the RFD, its contents, and how its contents
were presented to the FDA. To accomplish this goal, I use a modified communication
triangle to analyze the discourse within each major section of the RFD (Fig. 2-1). The
data set for Chapter 4 is derived from the following sources of information:
•

OCP reviewer’s expectations (based upon the FDA’s RFD guidance
documents in Appendix A and Appendix B).

•

Madison’s final RFD submitted to the FDA (Appendix C).
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•

RFD textual artifacts (earlier versions of the RFD, emails discussing the
RFD’s development/revisions, safety/toxicology test results, and research
reports).

•

Personal retrospective reflection based upon my experiences with the
RFD’s development process.

There are a total of 15 sections within Madison’s RFD: 13 sections were
recommended by the OCP’s RFD guidance document (see Appendix A), and
Madison’s R&D group opted to add two additional sections. Examining the entire
RFD as a whole would be convoluted and difficult to follow because of the sheer bulk
of background information and background context. To facilitate comprehension, in
my examination of the RFD, I individually examine the 15 individual sections within
the RFD rather than the RFD in its entirety. These 15 sections of Madison’s RFD are
as follows:
•

Cover letter (added section not recommended by the OCP)

•

Contact Information

•

Product Name and Description

•

Prior Approvals and Agreements

•

Chemical, Physical, or Biological Composition

•

Developmental Work and Testing

•

Manufacturing Information

•

Proposed Use or Indications

•

Modes of Action
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•

Schedule and Duration of Use

•

Dose and Route of Administration for Drug or Biologic

•

Related Products

•

Other Relevant Information

•

Sponsor’s Recommendation

•

Appendix (added section the OCP considers to be optional)

I analyze each of these 15 sections within Madison’s RFD submission to show
the following:
•

The OCP reviewer’s (audience’s) expectations. (This information is
largely derived from FDA publications presented in Appendix A and B).

•

The information Madison had available and the choices Madison’s authors
made in responding to the OCP reviewer’s expectations. (This information
is derived largely from earlier revisions of the RFD and my own
retrospections).

•

The final version of each section of the RFD submitted to the OCP for
review. (This shows, on a section-by-section basis, how Madison’s authors
attempted to meet its audience’s expectations.)

After examining the rhetorical situation for a given section of Madison’s RFD
(based upon the OCP reviewer’s expectations, the information Madison had, and
Madison’s authors’ decisions as to how to present the information to the OCP
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reviewer), I present each finalized section of the RFD as it was submitted to the OCP
for review. (The compiled RFD, without commentary, is available in Appendix C.)

Information

Presentation
(RFD)
Authors

FDA
reviewer

Figure 2-1: Using a communication triangle as a tool for
analyzing Madison’s RFD

As I mentioned earlier, an excellent tool for examining the audience’s
expectations, the topics covered, and the authors’ rhetorical choices is a modified
communication triangle. Kinneavy uses the communication triangle as a tool for
investigating discourse, and he claims the “purpose in discourse is all important…
[and] the aim of a discourse determines everything else in the process of discourse”
(p. 48). Kinneavy cautions, “it would be dangerous to [use the communication
triangle as a tool to] adduce author intent as the main criterion of the aim of a
discourse” (p. 49); however, Gardner, in the context of using the communication
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triangle for literary analysis and as an aid for creative writers, counters Kinneavy's
warning. Gardner claims the danger (of assuming the author’s intent) is negated if the
author is the one (re)evaluating the intent of a discourse (55). As I was a content
contributor to, and the only editor for, Madison’s RFD, I obviously knew the
collaborative authors’ overall intent and purpose—though not my co-authors’
internalized thought processes.
Although I do have insight into the RFD’s authors’ intent, access to the raw
data available to the authors, and knowledge of the processes Madison employed in
developing the RFD submission; I do not have clear insight into the OCP reviewer’s
perception (and reception) of individual sections within Madison’s RFD submission.
Instead, I can only make estimates of how effective the reviewer found the document
based upon his or her response(s) to the RFD. (See Table 2-1).

Table 2-1: OCP reviewer’s possible responses and assumptions of RFD
effectiveness
OCP reviewer’s response
Desired jurisdiction granted with no
discussion.
Desired jurisdiction granted with
additional back-and-forth discussions.
Undesired jurisdiction granted with
additional back-and-forth discussions.
Undesired jurisdiction granted with no
discussion.

Assumption
RFD, as a whole, was effective and
persuasive.
RFD was effective, but it was deficient,
incomplete, and/or confusing in some areas.
RFD was ineffective and deficient in some
areas, which may have caused the undesired
jurisdiction.
RFD was very ineffective and not persuasive.

As the OCP reviewer would later award Madison with the jurisdiction
requested in the RFD, and as the OCP reviewer granted the desired jurisdiction with
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no addition questions asked, it is reasonable to assume Madison’s RFD submission
was ultimately a very effective document.
Chapter 5: Madison’s history after the RFD submission
Chapter 5, just like Chapter 3, uses autoethnography to record my experiences
and perceptions of events at Madison after the RFD’s development. Much like
Chapter 3 provides historical background context for the development of the RFD,
Chapter 5 details pivotal events that took place in Madison’s history after the
Progenix RFD was submitted. These events demonstrate the numerous challenges and
opportunities technical communicators may face in supporting an FDA-approved
product, provide a sense of closure with Madison’s success and subsequent
bankruptcy, and set the stage for a discussion of ethics in biotech companies for
Chapter 6.
Chapter 6: Ethics, the FDA and Industry, and Technical Communicators
In Chapter 6, I first examine how industry and the FDA development are
intertwined and how this close-knit relationship creates and resolves ethical problems.
I develop this background context by creating a brief historical overview of key
events that shaped the FDA and recent research into ethical behavior within both the
biotech industry and the FDA. In the second half of Chapter 6, I use autoethnography
to reflect upon the ethical challenges I faced in before, during, and after developing
Madison’s RFD submission.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and observations
In this final chapter, I share my observations and experiences as to how
technical communicators can be a valuable addition to a small biotech company
beyond developing the RFD: there are significant opportunities for technical
communicators in developing and supporting the documentation required to market
and manufacture FDA-approved medical products. I also share my thoughts on
pitfalls and problems other technical communicators may encounter while working to
develop materials for an FDA submission or in support of an FDA submission.

Methodology shortcomings
Every research methodology has its own strengths and weaknesses, making
some methodologies more appropriate than others. This dissertation relies heavily
upon autoethnography, but some researchers still view autoethnography as being a
subset of the case study research methodology. As such, I have created a table (see
Table 2-2) that lists common problems associated with autoethnographies (Chang 5255) and case studies (MacNealy 199-201). For each problem, I explain what actions I
took to minimize these inherent methodological shortcomings.
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Table 2-2: Methodology shortcomings and strategies to minimize them
Inherent methodology shortcomings
Exclusive reliance on personal memory
and recall as a data source.

Case study-based research is sometimes
only relevant to a very specific situation
and therefore does not always apply
well to other situations—even similar
ones.
Researchers (especially those outside of
the humanities) may regard case studies
and autoethnographies as being
unscientific because they lack
controlled, quantitative data sets.
Case studies and autoethnographies can
be prohibitively expensive to conduct.

Actions taken to minimize shortcomings
Where possible, when I use retrospection,
I base my reflections upon textual
artifacts that help to prevent “memory
drift.” Textual artifacts include the entire
FDA-binder for all QuickHeal/Progenix
submissions, 41 emails regarding the
Progenix RFD’s development, FDA
documents, and copies of each revision
made to the Progenix RFD.
Pairing my observations with technical
writing practices and theories makes my
observations more relevant to other
technical communication practitioners.
A controlled study would not be feasible
and the examination of a single document
does not lend itself to yielding useful
quantitative data.

The costs typically associated with case
studies and autoethnographies were offset
via my status as a participant-observer
(employee) while working at Madison.
Autoethnographies are prone to
I expressly state my potential bias (in this
researcher bias, yielding the results
chapter) and, when possible, attempt to
desired by the researcher.
provide contrasting viewpoints and
alternatives to my personal assumptions.
Excessive focus on self in isolation from Rather than focus on myself, I focus on
others.
groups and group motivations whenever
possible. Where my perspectives differ
from a group’s opinion, I contrast the two
positions.
Overemphasis on narration rather than
Whenever possible, I follow up my
analysis and cultural interpretation.
narrations with analysis and
interpretation.
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Table 2-2, cont.
Inherent methodology shortcomings
Negligence of ethical standards
regarding others in self-narratives.

Actions taken to minimize shortcomings
This document is being produced
retrospectively after the company’s
bankruptcy. I have used pseudonyms for
the companies and products, and I have
altered the chemical composition and
ratios of the product. The roles of
individuals have been negated by
focusing on groups’ actions instead of
individual’s actions (except for my own).

A note on protecting anonymity
Workplace studies pose difficulties for technical communicators and other
researchers for a number of reasons. For instance, job-related politics can inhibit or
prohibit the development and publication of certain workplace studies, and fear of
workplace repercussions for the investigator (and other employees) can stifle attempts
to conduct research (Kent 153-155). Also, companies are understandably protective
about sharing information that may be confidential or of value to competitors.
To address these issues, I have altered the names of companies and products
discussed in this dissertation. To protect company confidential materials, I have
altered not only Progenix’s name, but also the chemical compounds used to make it,
the formulation, and various aspects of the manufacturing process. No competitive
advantage may be gained by the RFD as I have presented it in this dissertation, other
than benefiting from seeing an example of a completed RFD.
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Additionally, Madison Pharmaceuticals went bankrupt and no longer exists.
The employees described in this dissertation no longer work at Madison. Rather than
discuss what individual employees did, I discuss actions in terms of work groups that
render individual contributions (other than my own) anonymous. When it is necessary
to discuss the actions of a single individual, I refer to the employee in question not by
name (even an anonymous name), but by a fictitious-yet-descriptive job title. (i.e.,
“CEO” might be presented as “President” or “Owner” and “Director of Product
Realization” might be presented as “Manufacturing Manager.”) All of these
obfuscations are designed to protect Madison’s former employees, the product, and
any trade secrets.
A note on minimizing retrospection
Retrospective studies can be a double-edged sword: they can provide greater
insight into an event, but the fine details can be overlooked and any generalization
made might not be applicable to similar situations elsewhere. In some instances, a
retrospective analysis can be heavily influenced by the person reconstructing the
event. Memories can grow hazy and become modified or even forgotten over time,
which further subjects ungrounded retrospective analysis (with no data or references)
to a high degree of insubstantiality in the eyes of many researchers. While this
dissertation is based largely upon retrospective descriptions of past events, these
retrospective descriptions are viewed through the focusing lens of an archive of
documents. For instance, in the chapter discussing the RFD’s development, I use the
final RFD, nine successive drafts, and 41 emails discussing the RFD’s development
to aid in keeping my retrospections as focused and as accurate as possible. These
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unchanging records help to reduce the “memory drift” that can come from
retrospection. There is always a human component involved in retrospection and
generalizations made from such retrospections; but retrospection can often provide
insight to events that, at the time they occurred, previously seemed trivial and
unworthy of documenting.
In Cross’ “Conflict and Capitulation: A Bakhtinian Analysis of a Failed
Collaboration,” Cross compiled data from participant observation field notes,
audiotapes of meetings, official and unofficial documents, as well as interviews (3-5).
However, it is entirely possible—if not probable—that numerous “unofficial” actions
and/or meetings transpired outside of Cross’ proximity and knowledge. These
unobserved and undocumented occurrences could have influenced the decisions and
actions taken in the evolution of the collaborative document without Cross having
been aware of their occurrence. At Madison, for instance, R&D employees often
discussed ongoing projects in an informal manner outside of the workplace—
typically during off-site lunches or person-to-person “I had an idea” phone calls well
after the official workday had concluded. As a small start-up company with few
employees, Madison operated with no rules or procedures governing how meetings
could be called or should be conducted, and there were no requirements to record or
communicate the minutes or decisions made at these meetings.
Retrospection is thus the only available means for me to capture the essence
of the informal and impromptu meetings and discussions that shaped Madison’s RFD
submission. However, by reviewing the emails and document revisions I collected
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during the RFD’s development with retrospection, it becomes easier to deduce the
authors’ intents between each revision without exclusive reliance upon retrospection.
A note on researcher bias
Researcher bias is not a unique problem encountered in just case studies and
autoethnographies. Bias can be present in all types of qualitative and quantitative
research methodologies. Lynn Nygaard’s book, Writing for Scholars: a Practical
Guide to Making Sense and Being Heard, provides some insight into the problem of
researcher bias in qualitative studies:

When data or observation is based upon something that is concrete and
measurable, it's much easier to see where observation stops and interpretation
starts.... But when what is being observed is somewhat abstract, difficult to
describe, and even more difficult to define, the line between observation and
interpretation becomes so fine as to be virtually invisible. (46)

With Nygaard’s comments in mind, the entire discipline of anthropology is
based upon qualitative observation and interpretation, because human interactions are
often complex—sometimes even apparently irrational—and difficult to describe.
When examining these complex human interactions, observation and interpretation
can still provide the most insight despite the potential for researcher bias. As a
participant-observer in my own research—and evaluating a document I helped to
create—it would be foolish for me to claim that my observations and conclusions are
completely without bias. I may be overestimating my own contributions to the FDA
approval process, I may be overestimating the R&D group’s effectiveness, and I may
be underestimating or failing to comprehend how much Madison’s executives
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contributed and the challenges they faced. “Approaching the question of researcher
bias in qualitative research firstly requires the acceptance that qualitative researchers
accept the fact that research is ideologically driven, and that there is no bias-free
research design” (Borzillo 96). Thus, the best I can do is to disclose my potential bias
(which is the primary purpose of this sub-section) and to present alternative and/or
contrasting perspectives to my own experiences and observations when I am aware of
them.

Conclusion
From a technical communications discipline-related perspective, there appears
to be “a call for more use of the case study [and other ethnographies]… and the
discipline is far from reaching a consensus on the primary methodologies to be used
by [surveyed business communication educator] researchers…” (Beard and Williams
292-293). Mary Sue MacNealy’s book, Strategies for Empirical Research in Writing,
includes case studies as a viable and valuable research methodology for research in
the field of writing, though she cautions extensively on the perils of ungrounded
retrospection. In discussing the merits of using retrospection (in clinical situations),
“we should be satisfied with nothing less than the best evidence that circumstances…
will allow" (Johnson 225). I believe that my experiences, observations, and the
documentation I collected during the RFD submission are the best evidence that
circumstances allowed within the context of examining technical communication and
the development of an RFD submission for the FDA, and that the best methodological
approach is qualitative and autoethnographic.
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The lack of prior research, the newness of the Office of Combination Products
and the Request For Designation document, and the numerous difficulties (if not
outright impossibilities) involved in artificially constructing controlled experiments
on this subject all but mandate the use of an autoethnographic methodology—despite
all the potential methodological shortcomings I outlined and addressed earlier in this
chapter. As this dissertation represents the first foray into technical communicationbased research and the development of RFDs, a macroscopic perspective is ideal for
presenting the “big picture” for future researchers to later build upon.
The next chapter delves into a history and background (rendered anonymous)
for Madison, helping to provide a rudimentary context for understanding the
strategies, processes, and choices made by the company and the RFD team in
preparing the FDA submission.
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Chapter 3: Corporate history, culture, and
collaboration

“Science advanced, knowledge grew, nature was mastered, but
Reason did not conquer and tribalism did not go away.”
— Harold Isaacs, “Idols of the Tribe”

“As a species, we're fundamentally insane. Put more than two of us in
a room, we pick sides and start dreaming up reasons to kill one another. Why
do you think we invented politics and religion?”
—Ollie Weeks, “The Mist”

Chapter overview
In this chapter, I use the focusing lens of autoethnography to retrospectively
examine several aspects of Madison Pharmaceuticals (which would later be renamed
to Madison Technologies) prior to the company submitting an RFD to the FDA. This
chapter is divided into three main sections: (1) Madison’s history, (2) Madison’s
corporate culture, and (3) Madison’s RFD collaboration.
The first section, describing the company’s history, provides the background
information necessary for understanding the variety of obstacles Madison’s
employees faced and why certain decisions were later made while developing the
RFD submission. The second section, describing Madison’s corporate culture,
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examines the social dynamics and power structures within the company, which also
helps to explain why certain actions were taken in orchestrating the development of
Madison’s first RFD submission. In the third section of this chapter, I examine how
Madison’s history and corporate culture influenced the company’s attempt at
collaboratively producing the RFD submission.
Due to the confidential nature of this research, I have used pseudonyms to
obfuscate the identity of Madison Pharmaceuticals, Madison’s business partners, and
Madison’s products. In presenting information about Progenix, I have also altered the
formulation and chemical composition. To address the potential for sanctions against
individual employees (Kent 153-157), I do not identify any individuals within the
company other than myself. To further protect individuals, I attribute actions to
Madison’s work groups (defined in this chapter) rather than to individuals (other than
myself).

History of a small biotech
In this chapter, I constructed a corporate history for Madison. The corporate
history I assembled has some obvious shortcomings. First, my personal observations
are not from an omnipotent or even a privileged (executive-level) perspective. My
observations on the company’s history are from the perspective of a “rank-and-file”
employee at Madison, and I was not privy to a great deal of executive-level, behindthe-scenes activities. Second, I was not present at Madison during its earliest years, so
I was not a participant-observer during this “prehistory” period of the company’s
existence. Rather than omit Madison’s formative years, I have attempted to

51

reconstruct the company’s history based upon oral histories (“office gossip”) shared
with me by employees who worked at Madison longer than I did. I also rely upon my
retrospective recollection of various textual artifacts I unearthed in old file boxes
while working to compile a comprehensive overview of Madison’s earliest
developmental research into patenting its formulation.
Why is a corporate history (and prehistory) relevant to this dissertation? One
problem that conflict management research suffers from is that the research fixates
predominantly on how to resolve the conflict between individuals and/or groups, but
this research often fails to adequately explore the social and business-related factors
that provide greater context for studying the origin and evolution of these conflicts
(Tjosvold 1203-1206). If a greater understanding of social and business-related
backgrounds can provide more insight into conflict management research, it is
reasonable to assume that a greater understanding of social and business-related
backgrounds can provide more insight into problems encountered in a corporate
collaborative writing.
The following account of Madison’s corporate history provides critical
background information crucial to contextualizing this workplace study—in
particular, the various factors that directly and indirectly influenced Madison’s sociopolitical dynamics and the later collaborative writing of the RFD submission. This
historical account is presented in chronological order from the pre-incorporation of
the company (~1995) to when the FDA determined an RFD needed to be submitted to
the Office of Combination Products (OCP) to determine which FDA center would
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have primary jurisdiction over Madison’s product (in 2004). To provide a brief
overview, a timeline of key events is listed in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: Madison’s historical events timeline
Year
Pre-1995
1995
1997
1998
1999

2000
2001
2002
2003

2004

Activity
o Origin of a biotech product.
o Research to develop a patent for a chemical compound.
o Patent for chemical compound acquired.
o Fund-raising activities begin.
o Madison Pharmaceuticals incorporates, acquires a US office.
o European office opened.
o European contract manufacturers work to develop prototypes
for use in research.
o Safety and animal testing begins in Europe.
o Technical communicator hired as a part-time consultant.
o European contract manufactures produce first production run.
o Madison moves to a larger office.
o European clinical (human) trials begin.
o Technical communicator hired full-time.
o Madison’s US branch expands to two physically separate
office suites.
o Madison’s European product, Epigenix (similar to
QuickHeal), approved as a device in Europe.
o Madison meets with the CDER to discuss QuickHeal as a drug
in the US.
o Madison submits QuickHeal as a device to CDRH.
o CDRH redirects QuickHeal to the OCP as a combination
product.
o European clinical trials end.

The origin of a biotech product
All histories must have a beginning, but the origin of Madison
Pharmaceutical’s first biotech product is rather apocryphal in nature and varies
widely depending upon who tells the tale. Because of Madison’s murky and largely
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undocumented early history, I cannot accurately describe the true origin of what
would eventually become Madison’s first FDA-cleared product; however, I can share
three “origin myths” told by various employees. I offer these orally communicated
accounts because, in addition to helping to establish historical context, they provide
insight into the culture within a small startup company. Also, just as origin myths in
early cultures were often used to describe how something came to be, origin myths
for corporate entities could be used to reinforce cultural status quos—establishing
why things are the way they are (Eliade 19-21). Madison’s origin stories will almost
certainly challenge preconceptions some people may possess regarding the very early,
exploratory phases of medical product development in small biotechs (which is often
focused on securing intellectual property rights and fundraising instead of FDA
approval), and case study (and autoethnographic) histories can be useful for
debunking commonly held assumptions (Flyvbjerg 223-229).
Madison’s origin story is directly tied to what would become its flagship
product in the US: QuickHeal. I heard the following stories as to how Madison came
into possession of QuickHeal’s formulation, which I’ve listed in order from most-toleast frequently communicated by company employees.
•

QuickHeal’s formulation was derived from a homeopathic remedy and
refined into a synthetic compound through research and animal
experimentation into a compound that could be patented.

•

QuickHeal’s formulation was a homeopathic remedy stolen from another
business and refined into a synthetic through research and animal
experimentation into a compound that could be patented.
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•

QuickHeal’s formulation was inspired by a divine vision from God and led
to the development of a synthetic compound, derived from a long-forgotten
homeopathic remedy, through research and animal experimentation into
something that could be patented.

The first origin myth was the “official party line” Madison gave to venture
capitalists and business partners, and this origin story is likely what most people
would expect. However, most “official” company histories are not their actual
histories. “Organizations are often reluctant to admit that a good deal of their activity
consists of reconstructing plausible histories after-the-fact to explain where they are
now, even though no such history got them to precisely this place” (Weick 5). (The
company history I am presenting here, for instance, could be viewed as my own
attempt at reconstructing a plausible corporate history written after-the-fact in an
attempt to make sense of what transpired at Madison.) Companies craft their own
origin myths and histories, and these histories are typically designed to perpetuate an
image of a rational-acting and stable company with a clear direction and purpose. If
we acknowledge the possibility that Madison’s self-promoted history may not be
entirely truthful or accurate, the other myths about Madison’s origins then merit
scrutiny as possible alternatives to the company’s proffered history.
When I joined Madison as a full-time employee, I learned the company was
quietly engaged in a long-term, patent-related lawsuit with a company claiming two
of Madison’s executives had stolen their product formulation while formerly working
at the plaintiff’s company. While the existence of this patent lawsuit with a former
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employer certainly lends credibility to the second origin myth, patent-based lawsuits
are not rare occurrences within the biotech industry. There were over 7.8 million
patents registered in the United States as of Sept 28, 2010 (“United States Patent and
Trademark Office”). Conflicts, oversights, differing interpretations, and overlaps are
inevitable with such a large number of patents, creating numerous opportunities for
patent lawsuits. In addition to legitimate patent lawsuits, patent pirates or patent trolls
(groups or individuals who instigate litigation in the hope of obtaining large cash
settlements) are a constant threat to companies that rely on patent protection and
exclusivity (Craig). Although I was not part of Madison’s legal team, I was asked to
use the Internet to observe the other company and report any news or changes to
Madison’s lawyers. I do not know if the patent lawsuit was frivolous or not, but after
several years Madison’s lawyers ceased work on the case and said I could stop
observing the other company’s actions. Madison’s executives never announced if
there was a legal victory or loss, but the gossip around the office was that Madison
had settled out-of-court by paying the plaintiff a large sum of money to drop the
lawsuit.
The third rumor, that the product was conceived as an inspiration from God,
was the least commonly circulated origin myth—and also the least plausible.
However, a number of factors do indicate the possibility that one or more of
Madison’s executives believed (or exploited) this origin myth. Madison’s executives
all had extensive religious upbringings and some were ministers. All were involved
with churches with large congregations (megachurches) across several US states,
several of which promoted a doctrine of how God wanted his followers to become
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wealthy (Chu and van Biema). Most of Madison’s initial stockholders and consultants
belonged to these churches. Official meetings within the company and at stockholder
events often began and ended with prayers for God to bless and guide the company
towards success and profit. Although these factors lend some credibility to the
“divine inspiration” origin myth, it may have been nothing more than a façade to
entice religious individuals into financing Madison’s operations.
Much like combination products can be a hybridization of device, drug, and
biologic; Madison’s history is likely a convoluted hybridization of these three
corporate origin myths. Although the inspiration that led to the development of
QuickHeal’s synthetic chemical compound varies in each of these three stories, it is
easy to detect the commonality linking all three product origin myths together:
research occurred after the moment of discovery/acquisition and additional
experimentation was conducted to obtain a patent.
Research to develop a patent
The first step in creating a new biotech product is typically exploratory
research followed by a patent application. A patent is critical to biotech companies
because without one, after going through the expense of FDA approval, any
competitor can make a generic version of the product and take quicker and less
expensive shortcuts in bringing their rival products to market. Obtaining a patent is
critical to long-term financial success, and obtaining a patent for a conceptual product
or application is substantially easier and cheaper to accomplish than acquiring FDA
approval.
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It is possible to file patents for machines that that have not been built, ideas
that have not been proven, and concepts that have not been researched. For example,
a “Motionless Electrical Generator” was patented in 2002 (U.S. Patent #6362718),
which is a perpetual motion machine. (Perpetual motion machines are fictitious
machines that operate without any additional energy input from outside the machine.
Perpetual motion is physically impossible to accomplish because of entropic forces
like friction, electrical resistance, etc.) The machine’s design was patented prior to the
machine being built or tested: if built, the machine will never work as described in the
patent. Patent #6362718’s filing references several similar perpetual motion machines
previously patented within the US (Patrick et al.). Just as perpetual motion machines
have been successfully patented without being built or proven to work, biotech
products may be patented without having been manufactured or proven to work.
Research performed to support a biotech patent filing is often done in a rapid
and haphazard manner as part of the preliminary exploratory process. Much of this
initial “quick and dirty” research used to back a patent would never be usable in a
later FDA submission. (All the work done by Madison to patent QuickHeal was
excluded from subsequent FDA submissions and, in fact, much of the earliest patent
work had been misplaced or lost by the time I was hired.) The FDA, unlike the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), demands that supporting research be
conducted in a rigorous, controlled manner. Typical of industry practices, Madison’s
earliest research to support its patent filing was lackadaisical and occurred prior to
Madison’s formal incorporation as a company. Madison’s office was nothing more
than an executive’s kitchen table. The only employees were work-at-your-
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convenience consultants, who were all friends, family, and church-goers with the
founding executives-to-be. Madison had not yet been incorporated, and the research
being conducted at the time mirrored the amorphous state of the company.
Eventually Madison’s early-stage research yielded enough material to support
a utility patent application. According to the USPTO, a utility patent claims that one
thing (such as a chemical compound) can be used to address another thing (such as a
disease state) (“Description of Patent Types”). Madison’s utility patent filing claimed
that three molecules (sodium citrate, lithium citrate, and zinc citrate), when present in
certain ratios, could be used in the treatment of wounds and a broad variety of other
ailments. Despite having almost no evidence to support the broad claims made in the
patent application, Madison’s patent was granted in early 1997.
After obtaining a patent (and the added legitimacy that comes with patenting
something), Madison’s founders realized they needed much more money to achieve
FDA approval. The founders decided to incorporate.
Madison Pharmaceuticals is formed
Madison Pharmaceuticals was incorporated in 1997. “Madison” was the name
of one of the founder’s children, but the “Pharmaceuticals” portion of the company’s
name was probably selected based on the belief the company was developing a drug.
A newly formed “pharmaceutical” company with a new patent can be a tempting
investment opportunity, and Madison Pharmaceuticals quickly shifted away from
doing exploratory research and focused on raising funds to do future research—and
providing employees with salaries. Family and friends who had invested earlier were
given shares in the company, and they in turn brought in more friends and family
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interested in an investment opportunity. Friends and associates who attended the same
large churches, where the founders and their families had considerable influence,
were the most common investors in the earliest stages of Madison’s growth.
When Madison incorporated (as a private company not on the stock market),
it did not yet have a prototype for QuickHeal. Madison’s founders, when talking to
shareholders and potential investors, positioned QuickHeal as being superior to
Johnson & Johnson’s highly profitable Regranex Gel (becaplermin), an ointment
classified as a pharmaceutical (Persson 39-40). Madison’s founders gave the
impression QuickHeal would be more effective and more profitable than Regranex
once approed by the FDA, and Madison would in turn reward its shareholders with
windfall profits. By comparing QuickHeal to an existing pharmaceutical on the
market and using the word “Pharmaceuticals” in the company’s name, Madison
Pharmaceuticals’ founders positioned the company as a lucrative opportunity for
investors.
As investors began purchasing more and more shares in Madison
Pharmaceuticals, the company used the revenue to rent a small suite on the second
floor of an office building (see Fig. 3-1). Obtaining a physical corporate office (in
comparison to a founder’s kitchen) gave Madison the appearance of legitimacy while
providing the additional space needed to accommodate the growing number of parttime consultants supporting the company.
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Figure 3-1: Office Layout (1997)

Madison opens a European office
In 1999, as investors’ money continued to flow into the company, Madison
opened a small, two-room suite in an overseas office complex. This newly opened
European office served as a base of operations for a few recently hired European
executives responsible for preparing the marketing and sales efforts in Europe while
coordinating contract research organizations and consultants engaged in preliminary
safety and animal testing.
Opening a small office in Europe made good business sense for Madison. The
biotech industry largely considers European countries to be easier, cheaper, and faster
to bring new biotech products to the market in comparison to the US market; and the
preliminary research requirements prior to engaging in human experimentation are
generally less stringent in Europe than in the US (Coley). Because it is often cheaper,
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easier, and faster to bring products to market in Europe, and manufacturing standards
(and regulatory inspection rigor) are far more casual in Europe than in the US
(Hawthorne 162), Madison’s US office intended to use the European office to
spearhead initial product development efforts.
The European staff was given five sequential objectives by the Madison’s US
office:
1. Establish a relationship with one or more contract manufacturers who
could make product for Madison.
2. Use the newly produced product to start European toxicology and animal
testing to be used to obtain permission to begin human trials.
3. Facilitate and support European clinical (human) trials with opinion leader
wound care physicians on a country-by-country basis.
4. Compile all of the collected data from the prior three tasks into a drug
submission to be reviewed by a European regulatory body (which is like a
“European FDA” but not as stringent).
5. Manufacture and market the approved product in Europe through various
distributors.

Madison’s European executives all came from sales and marketing
backgrounds, largely echoing the predominantly sales-based backgrounds of the US
executives, but the European employees had prior experience in pharmaceuticals and
medical device sales in Europe. Despite their experience with sales and marketing of
medical products, the Europeans had no experience with the technical aspects of
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manufacturing, research and development, or regulatory affairs. All of these scientific
and technical functions were outsourced to European consultants, contract
manufacturers, or contract research organizations (CROs)—with apparently almost
no oversight from Madison’s European or US executives.
Technical communicator hired part-time in the US
My introduction to Madison Pharmaceuticals occurred in 2000 via a friend,
George (an alias). George first learned about Madison at a get-together at his church.
One of Madison’s founder’s brothers went to the same church and told George about
how Madison would be going public soon and how George needed to buy shares
before they skyrocketed in value. George bought shares in Madison and occasionally
received newsletters that updated shareholders with information.
One day, while out flying raptors with George, I mentioned I was looking into
putting some surplus money into the stock market. George excitedly told me about
Madison, how he owned shares in the company, how the company was about to go
public soon, how he had an “inside connection” with an executive’s brother, and that
I should invest in Madison before it was too late. As we finished our hunting and
returned to our cars, George retrieved Madison’s most recent newsletter (written by
one of the executives) from his vehicle and excitedly showed it to me as evidence of
the company’s undertakings and potential for growth. After glancing at the
newsletter, I stunned George by criticizing Madison’s newsletter as being nothing but
a bulleted list full of grammatical errors instead of a professional-looking newsletter
like a legitimate business would provide to shareholders. I told George that
Madison’s newsletter was so unprofessional-looking it gave the appearance of being a
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fraudulent business, and that many of the things George said his friend with insider
knowledge had told him were not being put in writing in the company’s newsletters.
George listened, swore his friend and fellow church-goer was not making stuff up,
and asked what I could do to make Madison’s newsletter look professional.
Later that night I rewrote the original document, importing information
George had verbally shared with me earlier, and redesigned it into a newsletter
format. I then emailed my revision to George so he could see how Madison, with just
a couple hours of time invested in writing and designing its shareholder newsletter,
could have easily made itself look like a legitimate company. The next morning,
unbeknownst to me, George forwarded my revised newsletter to Madison’s executive
staff along with an account of how I had claimed the old newsletter undermined
Madison’s corporate image to the point where it had appeared fraudulent to a
potential investor. Hours later, Madison’s executives called me in for an interview
and offered me an “as-needed” consulting position doing technical communication
work for Madison.
“As needed” proved to be little more than interviewing executives on a
roughly bi-monthly schedule to gather sufficient information to create new
shareholder newsletters, which is all I did for Madison for approximately a year. The
newsletter had two primary purposes: (1) keep existing investors informed of
Madison’s various projects, and (2) entice potential investors (and current
shareholders interested in investing more money) into funding Madison’s operations.
Over time, as the company continued to grow, so would their documentation needs
and my role within the company.

64

US operation expands and moves to a larger office
Over the next few years, the momentum, excitement, and investor-fueled
funding grew. Several of Madison’s part-time consultants began to turn into full-time
employees, and the company could no longer house all the employees in such a small
office. Madison moved out of its four-room suite on the 2nd floor and into a larger,
12-room suite on the 3rd floor of the same office complex (Fig. 3-2). This 300%
increase in office space was rapidly filled with the company’s new employees and
consultants.

Figure 3-2: Office Layout (2001)

First production run in Europe
As the US settled into its new office space, the European contract
manufacturers made their first production run of Epigenix, Madison’s European
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version of QuickHeal. Over the years, the product concept had evolved away from
being an ointment in a tube like Regranex (possibly because Regranex lost its coveted
reimbursement status in the US, was no longer very profitable, did not perform well
in clinical studies or in the marketplace, and had fallen out of favor in the medical
industry). QuickHeal was now going to be an ointment coated onto single-use
dressings, because the dressings would help to deliver a consistent amount of
ointment per application. Also, single-use dressings could be sterilized whereas tubes
of ointment, once opened, are no longer sterile.
Like QuickHeal, Epigenix was a gauze dressing coated with an ointment
containing a nearly identical 1% concentration of Madison’s patented chemical
compound (sodium citrate, lithium citrate, and zinc citrate). Essentially, Epigenix was
the first generation of Madison’s product (and sold only in European countries) and
QuickHeal was the second generation of Madison’s product (and sold only in the
US).
Because Epigenix had not yet been approved for sale by a European
regulatory body, the first manufacturing run of Epigenix was very small: a few
thousand units. This production run was made to evaluate the contract manufacturer’s
capabilities, to generate finished samples of what the mass-produced product would
look like (for selling more shares to investors and showing ongoing progress to
current shareholders), and to use in subsequent animal and human studies. Madison
found the contract manufacturer’s work to be satisfactory and distributed Epigenix
samples to contract research organizations for use in safety and animal testing
designed to satisfy European regulatory requirements. Shortly after the initial test
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results came in, demonstrating Epigenix’s safety in animal models, the Madison’s
European office sought approval to initiate clinical trials to demonstrate Epigenix’s
safety and efficacy in humans.
Clinical trials begin in Europe
In comparison to the FDA, European regulatory bodies generally have a more
relaxed and less rigorous approach towards approving medical products, which
translates into lower costs and faster times for approving new products for use on the
market (“European approval of new biotech drugs outpaces US approval”). To exploit
these advantages, Madison’s European executives sought key opinion leader
physicians within smaller European countries and coaxed (and paid) a few prominent
researchers into performing human studies as soon as it became legal to do so.
Individually, these human studies had approximately 10-30 patients. Collectively,
approximately 80 patients underwent exploratory treatment with Epigenix.
Typical of many European small-scale medical studies, there was a definite air
of casualness with the researchers conducting the human trials (Hawthorne 162-163).
Epigenix’s study protocols were established by each European researcher with no
oversight by Madison, so there was no collaboration between these various opinion
leader researchers or between the researchers and Madison’s European office: the
study designs were independent of one another and done however the opinion leaders
wanted.
Later, when I was asked to begin compiling the European clinical research
into reports and PowerPoint presentations, the numerous flaws in the studies
immediately emerged.
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•

Even though the researchers established protocols for their own
studies, they frequently did not follow their own protocols.

•

Patients in the same study were typically treated inconsistently, often
by pairing Epigenix with a wide variety of other wound care products,
surgical procedures, and frequency of dressing changes (ranging from
every 24 hours to once or twice per week). It was impossible to tell if
Epigenix, by itself, contributed anything to the healing process.

•

Every study had missing data from patients. For instance, less than
half of the patients had both before-and-after wound photographs, and
more than half of the patients had missing information from one or
more data collection fields (i.e., age, sex, weight, medical history,
wound type, wound dimensions, etc.).

•

Although the studies were supposed to examine non-infected diabetic
and pressure ulcers only, physicians included patients with birth
defects, burn wounds, infected wounds, amputees, electrical burns,
mastectomies, and various other dermal injuries or conditions.

I made repeated requests for the missing clinical information, but my requests
were never fulfilled. The lax and uncontrolled nature of typical of European clinical
studies (Hunter 6-8, Hilts 227) would later allow the FDA to almost immediately
dismiss all related research findings connected with Madison’s Europe-based studies,
undermining what Madison’s executives hoped would later serve as evidence of
Epigenix/QuickHeal’s safety and efficacy.

68

Technical communicator hired full-time
During my first year as a consultant, I largely produced newsletters for
Madison’s growing body of shareholders. Eventually an executive asked if I could do
a business plan for Madison Pharmaceuticals. I did, Madison’s executives were
pleased with the final document, and the document was used to bring in more
investors. This success led to even more marketing and business-based writing
projects being given to me. By 2002, as the volume of writing increased along with
my consulting hours, I was offered a full-time position as Madison’s “Technical
Communications Manager” and given the responsibility of overseeing the
development of a wide range of business and scientific/technical documents. Over
time, I became more and more consumed by the scientific and technical
documentation, grant writing, and report writing. These writing projects were
affiliated with Madison’s emerging in-house research and development (R&D) group
in the US. As the overwhelming majority of my workload transitioned from business
writing for the executives into scientific and technical writing for the R&D group,
Madison once again outgrew its office space and I found myself a part of the
company’s R&D division.
Madison Pharmaceuticals expands to two office suites
Having outgrown the 12-room office suite on the 3rd floor, Madison
Pharmaceuticals’ executives opted to relocate the executive staff and the
administrative support staff to a substantially larger, just-refurbished 2nd floor office
suite that dominated the main floor of the building. Finances, fund-raising, and formal
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business interactions with potential investors and partners occurred on the 2nd floor.
The company’s R&D personnel (which now included myself) remained in the old 3rd
floor office space apart from the rest of Madison’s US employees. After the
executives and their support staff left, R&D employees migrated into the recently
vacated offices. Shortly thereafter, Madison’s executives pulled materials out of
rental storage facilities and the rooms unoccupied by R&D employees were rapidly
converted into storage areas for broken or obsolete computers, various unwanted
office furnishings and equipment, and numerous stacks of file boxes containing
various outdated legal, business, financial, and research documents. Of the 12 rooms
on the 3rd floor, seven were used as storage, one was left vacant for a future hire and
R&D consultant use, and each of the four members of R&D had their own private
office. No changes were made to the Europeans’ office layout: rather than hiring new
employees and expanding, the Europeans continued outsourcing all work that did not
involve sales and marketing.
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Figure 3-3: Office Layout (2003)
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Product obtains European market approval
Madison’s European executives had no experience in obtaining regulatory
approval for a biotech product, so they employed a consulting firm with European
regulatory experience to develop all the documentation required to approve Epigenix
for sale in Europe. There appeared to be minimal oversight of this consulting firm,
and the consulting firm wrote Epigenix’s regulatory submission as if it were a device
instead of a drug. After the US office learned that Epigenix had been recasting from
being a drug to a device, there was considerable concern that Epigenix (as a device)
would not be as profitable as a drug. These concerns were quelled after the consulting
firm demonstrated how they positioned Epigenix as having a high reimbursement rate
and how there was a “next step up” classification that would allow Madison to make
advanced (drug-like) wound healing claims at a later date—providing Madison could
support expanded claims. Additionally, by opting to submit Epigenix as a medical
device instead of a drug, no human trials would be required prior to product launch,
further shortening the approval time, reducing development costs, and accelerating
how quickly Madison could begin generating revenue from European markets.
The regulatory consulting group finished assembling the required
documentation, filed the submission with a European regulatory body, and eventually
succeeded in attaining regulatory approval prior to the completion of Madison’s
ongoing human trials originally intended to support Epigenix’s submission. The
European executives initiated rudimentary sales and marketing campaigns in Europe,
hoping they would be able to use the human trial results at a later date to leverage
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journal publications of the trial results and to make sweeping product claims in future
marketing materials. Keeping the European office small, no new employees were
hired to market Epigenix: instead, sales were supposed to be driven largely by wordof-mouth of the product’s efficacy—a cost-saving strategy Madison’s US office also
intended to use when QuickHeal was later approved in the US.
Madison Pharmaceuticals meets with the FDA
With Epigenix’s easier and faster approval process in Europe complete,
Madison Pharmaceuticals shifted its focus towards the more difficult and timeconsuming process of obtaining FDA clearance for QuickHeal in the US.
Unfortunately, Madison’s financial situation had become dire because of the
European product launch, clinical trials, outsourced manufacturing costs,
development work with pipeline products, and various other economic factors.
Instead of hiring an experienced but expensive ($400/hour) regulatory firm to take
QuickHeal through the FDA’s gauntlet, like Madison’s European office did earlier
with Epigenix, Madison’s US executives opted to conserve its money and have its
R&D group develop the FDA submission in-house. Meanwhile, Madison’s US
executives opted to arrange a face-to-face meeting with CDER to discuss QuickHeal
as a potential new drug. (Madison’s US executives believed a drug would be more
profitable in the US than a device.) Madison’s executives hoped the meeting with
CDER would convince the FDA that QuickHeal was not just a safe and effective
pharmaceutical, but also a drug that could reduce the government’s medical costs
associated with chronic wounds and amputations. Madison’s executives hoped their
arguments about safety and reduced costs to close wounds and prevent amputations
73

would be so favorably received by CDER, the FDA would place QuickHeal on a fasttrack approval process and provide additional considerations (such as subsidized
government funding and grant opportunities) allowing Madison to bypass the usual
FDA requirements for new drug approvals for a fraction of the cost.
Madison’s executives developed a PowerPoint presentation to present
carefully selected information from the still-ongoing human studies in Europe to the
FDA’s Pre-IND consortium. Using extrapolations derived from a small and
incomplete data set, paired with a handful of dramatic before and after pictures,
Madison’s executives hoped to convince the FDA of QuickHeal’s efficacy in wound
healing using the same presentation techniques that had worked well in the past for
drawing in new investors. Madison’s primary concern was that the FDA would deem
QuickHeal’s proprietary formulation components too simple to be a drug, so the
Executives used sweeping claims of efficacy—claims they also made to shareholders
and potential investors and on the company’s websites—despite the lack of scientific
rigor or experiments to substantiate these claims.
Everyone at Madison considered QuickHeal’s chemical compound to be
innocuous. The patented formulation was nothing but sodium citrate with trace
amounts of lithium citrate and zinc citrate. (These are not the actual chemicals in
QuickHeal, but they are relatively similar from a safety perspective.) Sodium citrate
is just ordinary table salt. The trace amounts of lithium citrate and zinc citrate in a
single QuickHeal dressing were lower than what could chemically be found in one
slice of cheese and a couple stalks of asparagus. To make the chemicals appear more
worthy of drug status, Madison’s executives theorized that these three molecules
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(sodium citrate, lithium citrate, and zinc citrate) synergistically interacted with one
another and a person’s body, enhancing and accelerating the healing process.
The FDA’s scientists were not impressed by Madison’s fiscal-based
arguments and unfounded speculations based upon poorly conducted research. The
FDA dismissed the before-and-after pictures of patients treated in Europe as
anecdotal. The FDA also dismissed the still-underway European clinical studies as
being uncontrolled and lacking statistical backing and scientific rigor. Contrary to
Madison’s biggest fear that the FDA would dismiss QuickHeal’s chemical compound
as not being worthy of drug status, the FDA instead viewed the multiple claims
Madison made for each of the citrate molecules—separately and in combination with
each other—as being unique, stand-alone drug claims. However, the FDA considers a
single molecule to be a single drug (“Investigational New Drug (IND) Application”).
At the conclusion of the meeting, the CDER employees explained that the numerous
mode of action claims Madison’s executives made to the FDA indicated that
QuickHeal was not one drug, but three drugs (sodium citrate, lithium citrate, and zinc
citrate) being used in concert with one another. If all three drugs in QuickHeal
interacted with one another, as Madison’s executives claimed they did in the meeting
and presentation (without evidence to prove this claim), the FDA required that all six
(3!=6) possible drug permutations be tested for safety and efficacy. Complying with
these testing requirements would likely cost well over a billion dollars (see Table 11). For a cash-strapped small company that had raised only $30 million in funding
over six years and was struggling to survive and raise funding, this was devastating
news.
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Fortunately, the FDA did offer Madison some hope. The FDA suggested to
Madison’s executives that if they dropped QuickHeal’s numerous unsupported drug
claims of speed, efficacy, and molecular interactions in the wound bed, it might be
possible to submit QuickHeal as a medical device instead of a very complex drug
compound. Madison’s executives abandoned their original plan to pursue a drug
submission for QuickHeal and shifted the company’s focus towards compiling a
medical device submission. However, there were serious communication problems
about to occur at Madison.
Pre-IND aftermath
As children, many of us played a game called “telephone.” Telephone
involves one person whispering a message to another, with the whispered message
being passed from person to person until it circles back to the original speaker. The
final message is often dissimilar to the original message. In “Conflict and
Collaboration,” Cross observed how problems arose when an executive officer gave a
writing task to a mid-level manager who in turn delegated the job to a subordinate
employee who had not been in the meeting between the manager and the executive.
The manager failed to fully communicate what the executive wanted and the
subordinate employee, making assumptions as to what was desired, produced a
document the executive was not satisfied with (6-7). A similar situation happened at
Madison after the Pre-IND meeting. When the FDA told Madison’s executives what
they wanted, and then Madison’s executives told Madison’s R&D group what they
believed the FDA told the executives, critical information was not communicated to
the R&D group. By excluding members of R&D from the Pre-IND meeting and
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failing to communicate vital information, Madison’s executives inadvertently
initiated a corporate version of the telephone game.
Madison’s executives informed the R&D department that the FDA told them
to submit QuickHeal as a device and not a drug. Possibly because of how poorly the
meeting went or because they failed to recognize important advice, Madison’s
executives failed to disclose to R&D employees the full details of the meeting’s
events and the critical nature of eliminating language that might indicate the presence
of a drug in the product. These omissions and/or miscommunications would later
have costly consequences and jeopardize Madison’s FDA approval process.
Madison submits QuickHeal to the FDA as a medical device
After the meeting with the FDA, Madison’s executives tasked R&D with
developing QuickHeal’s medical device submission and conducting any testing
required to support it as a medical device. Madison’s R&D group had no experience
(collectively or individually) submitting FDA applications, but had started gathering
materials believed to be needed for a drug submission. To save money, instead of
hiring a regulatory consulting firm in the US (which cost $400/hour), Madison’s
executives requested that its European office send a copy of Epigenix’s successful
medical device submission to the US so R&D could use it as an example for what to
submit to the FDA (despite European and US regulatory agencies’ processes and
expectations being very different).
Rather than rely solely on the European regulatory process and Epigenix’s
regulatory document, I took the initiative to make three Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests to the FDA for redacted 510(k) submissions for previously approved
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medical devices that appeared to be similar to QuickHeal. My hope was that these
previously successful 510(k) medical device submissions’ documentation would be
useful in crafting Madison’s own medical device filing. Unfortunately, it takes about
6-12 months to receive materials requested through the FOIA: none of the documents
I requested would arrive in time to be useful in developing the 510(k) for QuickHeal.
After quickly reviewing Epigenix’s European device filing and skimming a
few FDA guidance documents for medical devices, Madison’s R&D department
opted to define the QuickHeal product (for the US) as being substantially equivalent
to two similar medical devices already approved by the FDA. By claiming and
demonstrating substantial equivalence to just one medical device previously approved
by the FDA, QuickHeal could be submitted as a 510(k) medical device instead of a
PMA medical device: a 510(k) submission allows for the lowest costs, least
paperwork, least research, and fastest approval times (see Table 1-1). R&D also
believed, incorrectly, that the FDA was primarily interested in seeing how QuickHeal,
in the 510(k) submission, was similar to similar devices the FDA had already
approved. Normally, this would be a correct assumption as the purpose of a 510(k)
submission is to demonstrate the similarities between a new product and an existing
medical device; however, the FDA had already seen QuickHeal presented as a
pharmaceutical with numerous pharmaceutical claims. Because Madison’s executives
did not share the FDA’s discussions about drug claims with the R&D group, the R&D
group wrote the QuickHeal 510(k) device submission loaded with all the language
(and unsubstantiated drug claims) used in the marketing claims on the company’s
website and investor relations materials.
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Other than mostly superficial changes made to adopt the FDA’s recommended
510(k) format and making cross-comparisons of QuickHeal to two other 510(k)s
previously approved by the FDA, the resulting QuickHeal 510(k) submission was
largely similar to what R&D was assembling for Madison’s drug submission—and
was loaded with drug claims. The QuickHeal 510(k) was produced as rapidly and
inexpensively as possible. As a result, safety testing was largely borrowed from
earlier European studies. Rather than do all the tests the FDA requested, justifications
were produced for why studies done previously in Europe for Epigenix could
substitute for research the FDA required for QuickHeal in the US. These studies were
backed by claims that described how there were no observed adverse events with
Epigenix in the clinical trials or complaints reported from Epigenix customers in
Europe (where the product was being sold to the public). The hastily assembled
document was sent to Madison’s executives for review, approved by them, and then
submitted to the FDA. (I suspect the QuickHeal 510(k) may not have been read or
reviewed by the executives, as no one commented on all the drug claims and
language still present in the final document being sent to the FDA.)
Becoming a combination product
Approximately three months after submitting the QuickHeal 510(k) to CDRH
for review, the inevitable happened. The CDRH reviewer responded to Madison
Pharmaceuticals’ 510(k) submission by stating he believed QuickHeal appeared to
contain one or more drug components and that Madison appeared to be making
several drug-related claims in the 510(k) submission (i.e., accelerated healing,
chemical interactions with the human body’s normal cellular function, etc.);
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therefore, QuickHeal appeared to be a combination product (containing a device with
one or more drugs) and not strictly a medical device. The CDRH reviewer
recommended that Madison submit an RFD to the OCP in order to determine which
FDA center—CDRH or CDER—would have primary jurisdiction. The reviewer’s
recommendation prompted an emergency meeting where Madison’s executives and
R&D personnel evaluated the situation and initiated, among other things, an attempt
at a collaborative development process for the company’s next attempt at an FDA
submission: an RFD.

Madison Technologies’ corporate culture
I selected one of the quotes used at the beginning of this chapter—"Science
advanced, knowledge grew, nature was mastered, but Reason did not conquer and
tribalism did not go away" (Isaacs 25)—as a metaphor for Madison’s corporate
culture and the divisions between the workgroups within the company. When
Madison was founded, it was essentially a “tribe” of friends and family members. As
Madison expanded and began hiring specialists and researchers with technical and
scientific skills not available within their immediate circle of friends and family, the
company sought the power that scientific knowledge can bring. However, Madison’s
founding tribal members failed to adopt the scientific ideals that immigrated to the
company with incoming employees. Conflicting ideologies, backgrounds, and
dynamics caused cultural divisions among Madison’s work groups. Unaddressed,
these schisms grew until Madison’s internal communication network became
dysfunctional and groups ceased to try and cooperate on a consensual level. What
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started off as a company with a high-context culture evolved into one with a lowcontext culture. Communication style was not altered as the company evolved from
friends-and-family only (and about 6 people) into a blend of friends-and-family
combined with outsiders and foreigners (and 30-40 people).
Even though all of Madison’s employees shared the common goals of
bringing new biotech products to market, helping customers resolve their wound care
needs, and generating profits for the company and the shareholders; physical
segregation, cultural/educational/gender differences, and a highly compartmentalized
style of management appears to have hindered intra-company communications and
jeopardized Madison’s efforts to obtain FDA approval.
Madison’s cliques: Executives, R&D, Support, and Europeans
In sociology, a “clique” is an exclusive subset of a larger group. Cliques are a
small collection of individuals bound together by shared interests, beliefs, behaviors,
purposes, experiences, ethnicity, and/or education. Cliques tend to form within the
boundaries of a larger group—such as a classroom, volunteer organization, or
workplace—when there are more opportunities for smaller subsets of individuals to
interact on a frequent basis (Hallinan and Smith, 898-919). At Madison, employees
were separated both by physical segregation and by tasks, both of which facilitated
the emergence of cliques within the company and later hindered communications
among these various cliques. It is easy to identify the four major social cliques within
Madison, which I refer to as Executives, Support, R&D, and Europeans. A brief
summary of these four cliques is provided in Table 3-2.
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Table 3-2: Overview of Madison’s Four Cliques
Clique

Location Education

Sex

Ethnicity

Religion

Political
views
Strongly
conservative

Executives

2nd floor

100%
male

100%
Caucasian

100%
Christian

Support

2nd floor

Varied
(High school
diplomas
through law
degrees, but
no MBAs or
scientists)
High school
diplomas to
some college

100%
female

100%
Christian

Mixed

R&D

3rd floor

100%
male

Widely
varied
(Atheist
through
Christian)

Mixed

Europeans

Europe

Advanced
degrees
(MBAs,
Graduate and
doctoral
degrees)
Undergrad
degrees

90%
Caucasian
, 10%
AfricanAmerican
100%
Caucasian

75%
male

100%
Caucasian

Unknown

Unknown
(antiAmerican)

The Executives were composed largely of the company’s founders and longtime friends of these founders. Collectively, they were responsible for the typical
executive functions of leading a small company: establishing goals, raising and
controlling finances, managing employees, and developing the business. The
Executives predominantly had prior experience in sales (especially multi-level
marketing with vitamins and nutritional/herbal supplements, not with pharmaceuticals
or medical devices) with a little expertise in finances, and legal/patent issues;
however, none of Madison’s executives had a scientific background, manufacturing
background, or an MBA—and a few had no college education at all. There were only
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two Executives when Madison incorporated, but this number later peaked at eight
shortly after the FDA granted approval for Progenix.
The Executives shared their 2nd floor office with Support, whose primary
function was to aid the Executives in running the business. The Support clique
included receptionists, personal assistants, and bookkeepers. Support initially
consisted exclusively of people who were related to or long-term friends of the
Executives. Although nepotistic in nature, hiring initial employees based on
friendships and family relations is the norm for approximately 90% of new small
businesses (Potts, Hulme, Loeb, and Schoen 102-115). However, over time and as the
company grew, nearly all of the original friends-and-family Support employees left
the company for college, other jobs, or marriage. By the time Madison was
submitting documentation to the FDA in the hopes of obtaining FDA clearance (some
six years after Madison incorporated), there had been a 100% turnover among the
Support staff, completely severing the friends-and-family-only connection Support
previously had with the Executives. When Madison incorporated, there were only
three members of Support, and the Support group peaked at about 15-20 employees
shortly after the company’s FDA submission.
Because Support worked directly with the Executives, and because the
Executives often failed to provide adequate direction or prioritize tasks for employees
outside of the 2nd floor office, Support staff became an vital source of information for
what was going on within the company’s US office—especially after the US
company divided itself onto two separate floors. In the absence of effective direction
and communication from management, “grapevine” communication became a semi-
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functional substitute. Research indicates that grapevine communication in the
workplace actually helps to foster teamwork, a sense of community, and corporate
identity—and approximately 80% of grapevine gossip in the workplace is true or
contains a kernel of truth within a rumor (Davis; Sutton and Porter; Arnold).
Unfortunately, financial information the Executives didn’t want known (a potentially
illegal financial management blunder that resulted in employees having to survive on
half their normal pay for three months before being paid in full for withheld wages)
was communicated through the office grapevine, reached R&D, and caused
considerable morale problems and loss of faith in the Executives’ collective ability to
adequately manage the company. Madison’s Executives reacted by chastising Support
for “gossiping and spreading rumors” with the R&D employees (even though the
rumors were true) and threatened to punish or discharge employees caught spreading
rumors in the future. These actions largely severed the vital information link between
the Executives and Support on the 2nd floor and R&D on the 3rd floor, while
simultaneously enlarging the rift growing between the Executives and the company’s
R&D division.
When Madison was founded, there were no R&D employees—only a chemist
(from a church the Executives attended) sporadically called upon for consulting work.
R&D’s clique peaked at just five employees shortly after Progenix’s FDA approval,
meaning there were always more Executives than R&D employees. (A common
saying in the R&D clique was “we have too many chiefs and not enough Indians.”)
The R&D clique, isolated on the 3rd floor of the company, was composed entirely of
“new” employees (not related to or long-time friends with the Executives) who had
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either graduate or doctoral degrees in scientific or technical fields. Two members of
R&D had Master of Business Administration (MBA) degrees, and may have been
seen as a threat by the Executives—none of which had an MBA. (Despite R&D
having the only MBAs in the company, R&D employees were excluded from
meetings where Executives discussed future business tactics, affairs, and finances.)
R&D employees were responsible for conducting all US-based research, writing
research grants and reports, developing manufacturing capabilities in the US, creating
a quality system (standards, procedures, and associated record-keeping) for the US,
and producing FDA submissions. However, R&D had no authority or control over
any manufacturing, research, or similarly overlapping activities taking place overseas,
where the European branch of the company operated nearly independent of the US
office.
The Europeans initially consisted of three employees, but peaked at five
employees shortly after Epigenix received approval to be marketed in European
countries. Had these European employees been located in the US, I would likely have
placed them in with the Executive and Support groups because of their work
functions. However, the physical separation, lack of control the US office had over
the European branch, time zone differences, infrequent communications between the
US and European offices, cultural differences essentially created a unique clique in
Europe that was almost wholly independent of the main corporate office in the US.
Political differences may have also had an effect on Madison’s relations with their
European office. During the Iraq War, the US suffered a rapid decline in international
public opinion polls—73% disapproval by early 2007 (“World View of US Role
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Goes from Bad to Worse”), and the Europeans often used negative military terms to
describe requests from Madison’s US office. If an Executive was flying overseas to
meet with the Europeans, they referred to the upcoming trip as “the US is coming to
invade us.” When suggestions were made on how to handle something overseas, the
Europeans would intervene and claim that they would handle it because they claimed
Americans were too pushy, rude, and combative to handle delicate business
negotiations in Europe. The European staff all had undergraduate college degrees
(including the administrative assistants) and experience in sales, marketing, and
bookkeeping; but none of the Europeans had advanced or scientific/technical degrees.
This background made the European staff ideally suited for the sales and marketing
of Madison’s European products (as well as the day-to-day operation of the
Europeans’ office); and the Europeans (unlike the US office) outsourced all
European-based research, manufacturing, and regulatory documentation to European
contractors.
Given the physical separation and disunity among the cliques working at
Madison, communicating effectively would be a challenge for a technical
communicator. As the only technical communicator within the company, it would
have been nearly impossible for me to bridge the communication gaps. First, I was
never given the authority to do so: the Executives were the only employees with the
authority to make company-wide announcements. Second, as a rank-and-file
employee within the R&D clique, I would be viewed as an outside by all the other
cliques and had no power to coax cooperation from any other employee within the
company if they chose to ignore me. (As is, shortly after I joined the company and
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began requesting information on the European clinical study documents I needed to
do my job, it often took half a dozen or more emails and calls before I could get a
response from anyone in the overseas office.) Finally, there was not enough corporate
communication occurring to merit putting just one employee in charge of
orchestrating communications within Madison. The only way a technical
communicator would have been effective at Madison is if the employee was an
Executive or was an Executive’s assistant and able to call upon the Executive’s clout
to force communications if necessary.
Gender, ethnicity, politics, and religion within Madison’s cliques
One of the main advantages to having a diversified workforce is the
development of management skills that allow for the consideration of different
perspectives and values (Cunningham and Green 52). Madison’s workforce was lessthan-diverse, and this lack of diversity may have been a contributing factor to the
development of cliques within the company and the breakdown of communication
between these cliques.
Despite the complete lack of females in the Executives and the R&D cliques,
all of the Support staff were female. Of the Europeans, mirroring what was seen in
the US, all of the European executives were male and their support staff was
exclusively female. With the exception of one (Support) employee in the US, the
entire company was Caucasian.
In theory, “because of anti-discriminatory laws in the United States, more
companies can be assured a likely pool of heterogeneous employees” (Cunningham
and Green 51). While Madison did have a relatively heterogeneous makeup of male
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and female employees, female employees were exclusively isolated to one group
(Support) within the company—a subordinate group with no leadership roles that
supported the all-male Executives.
The lack of ethnic diversity in the European office (100% Caucasian) is easily
explained: the European office was located in a country that had very little ethnic
diversity and, with only five employees at its peak, it would have been statistically
unlikely for a non-Caucasian to have been employed at Madison’s European office.
However, the US office was located in a very diversified city, and that ethnic
diversity was not reflected within Madison’s US office. Because of Madison’s small
number of employees (about 30 in the US at its peak), it is possible—though
statistically unlikely—this lack of ethnic diversity in Madison’s US office was
attributable to chance.
Politically, Madison’s Support and R&D groups had a mixture of conservative
and liberal inclinations. Support was much more centrist/moderate, whereas R&D
tended to range to the far left or far right with very little middle ground. Likely due to
the polar extremes of R&D employees’ stances in politics, political debates were
frequent within the R&D group and became a common and occasionally heated (yet
civilly conducted) diversion. The European’s political views are large unknown to
me, although they occasionally verbally expressed disapproval of George W. Bush’s
2000-2008 administration and America’s involvement in the Middle East. The
Executives were all staunch conservatives, particularly with respect to businessrelated politics. One Executive was even related to a local conservative politician: as
a result of having a family-based political insider, the Executives established business
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and personal ties with additional politicians and sometimes held fundraisers for or
made donations to these politicians. Later, a former staff member for an ousted
federal-level politician was hired to act as Madison’s government liaison, creating
and maintaining the company’s political ties.
As discussed earlier in the company’s history, religion may have had an
unusually strong influence on Madison’s operations, and this religious influence
extended into affecting group dynamics among employees. Madison’s US executives
all had strong religious upbringings and beliefs. Some Executives acted as ministers
within churches with large (1,000+ people) congregations. Verbally, the Executives
promoted a “Christian business” theme to the employees and shareholders—even
though they knew some of their employees and shareholders did not share the same
faith. Madison’s executives were very open about their religious connections, often
opening official corporate functions—internal meetings, conference calls, and
shareholder meetings—with prayers and invoking God’s blessings.
Contrasting against the Executives’ frank openness with religion, Support was
largely silent about their religious affiliations, even though many within the Support
staff shared nearly identical religious beliefs with the Executives. Support may have
been less open about their religion because they lacked the institutional power the
Executives wielded. Also, there may have been less need or desire for Support staff to
call upon religion to establish familiarity or trust with the potential shareholders or
consultants frequently drawn from the Executives’ congregations.
Like Support, R&D was also not publicly open about their religious
affiliations; however, within the R&D clique, would frequently engage in religious
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discussions and debate—generally in areas where science and/or politics intersected
with religion (i.e., evolution, carbon dating, fossil records, etc.). Although R&D’s
frequent political and religious debates would likely horrify a human resources
manager from a large corporation, these internal debates about religion, science, and
politics may have inadvertently acted as a team-building exercise. Arguing with one
another over topics that were not related to work may have helped the R&D clique
hone their work-related communication, negotiation, and critical thinking skills;
which in turn may have facilitated subsequent collaborative projects within the R&D
group—including developing FDA submissions.
The Europeans’ religious beliefs, if any, are unknown to me. There were few
opportunities for me to communicate with the Europeans in a business capacity, and
fewer opportunities for informal oral communications. As a result, I am unaware of
any of the Europeans’ religious beliefs; however, the Europeans were clearly not as
open about their religious beliefs as the Executives were in the US office.
Over-reliance upon oral communication
Geoffrey Cross, in Forming the Collective Mind, claims corporate overreliance on oral communication is a common problem that often promotes
dysfunction and miscommunication in the collaborative writing process (62-63).
Madison had always used oral communication as the primary means (and nighexclusive means prior to the installation of a LAN (local area network) and
implementation of employee email accounts in 2003) of knowledge transfer among
employees, which set the stage for several problems encountered while attempting to
collaboratively develop documentation destined for review by the FDA.
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Prior to Madison’s incorporation, when various consultants and part-time
employees met in a founding Executive’s kitchen, oral communication was the
overwhelmingly dominant means of disseminating information. By 1998, when
Madison incorporated and moved to a small office, oral communication was still an
efficient and effective means of intra-company communication because Madison was
still a nearly 100% family business, had a limited number of computers, and had no
Internet access. Because most of the employees were relatives or close friends, one
can assume work-related topics were often discussed after regular work hours, thus
keeping everyone in the company informed of current events and long-term goals. By
2001—as Madison brought in more employees, expanded its office space, opened a
European office, and lost many of the earlier friends and family members who had
been previously working for the company—oral communication began to be much
less effective as a means of internal communication at Madison, although it was still
used almost exclusively.
When Madison’s US office was located on the same floor, company meetings
were a rarity and usually occurred only once or twice a year—despite having a large
conference room available. When the US office split onto two floors, the companywide meetings continued to be extremely infrequent, but the oral communication
network that had existed before (as people passed one another in the hall or walked
by other employee’s offices) rapidly broke down. The R&D group—finding itself
isolated from the Executives, Support, and the Europeans—implemented regular
weekly R&D meetings to discuss projects and distribute workloads. No such changes
occurred on the floor occupied by the Executives and Support. However, even though
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Support employees never had formal weekly meetings like R&D implemented,
Support employees often went to lunch together or mingled for smoke breaks behind
the office complex. R&D, realizing the valuable information the Support group could
share, began making a habit of taking smoke breaks with the Support employee—
even though no member of R&D smoked. The Support group would often verbally
complain about how the Executives frequently failed to coordinate amongst
themselves and how several different Executives would often independently give the
same tasks to several Support employees on the same day. To avoid doing redundant
work, the Support employees began informally coordinating with one another so they
would not have multiple people working independently on the same project.
Correspondingly, R&D would communicate with Support about projects they
believed would fail once the Executives realized a given project was not feasible, thus
helping Support to prioritize their projects. (For instance, one Executive, excited
about another company’s product that could kill germs on contact, tasked his Support
assistant to research the company. She talked with an R&D scientist, who examined
the company’s website and product, and informed her that the company’s new
product was nothing more than bleach water and not marketable. Support did not take
the information to her supervisor because it would make him look silly and inform
him that she had been “gossiping” with R&D employees. The project was given a low
priority by the Support employee and it was eventually abandoned or forgotten by the
Executive.)
Further adding to the poor intra-company communication problems, to keep
company overhead down, making overseas calls was vigorously discouraged and, if
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unavoidable, had to be approved by management and be as brief as possible. This
edict impeded overseas collaboration by nearly halting oral communications between
the US and European offices by anyone except the Executives.
By 2003, when Madison’s US office split onto two floors, reliance upon oral
communication persisted despite the company’s acquisition of a LAN, server, and
computers for all employees. Although oral communication was still the most
common means of communication, sending emails quickly became more
commonplace. Although the Executives invested in computer equipment and Internet
capabilities for the US office, the European office had only one email account and
one computer shared by (at its peak occupancy) five employees. Emails sent to the
European office often went unanswered, which frustrated employees in the US office
and gave the impression the European office was ignoring the US office. (For
example, when I was attempting to obtain copies of a clinical trial’s raw data, I
emailed the European office once per week for nearly a month before getting a
response that they were looking into it getting the information. Two months—and 4
more “reminder” emails later—I received a 4-page spreadsheet with obvious missing
information.) The Europeans’ reluctant/slow communication created the impression
in the US office (at least within the R&D clique) that the European office was
ignoring them or didn’t think emailed requests were important. This perception led to
US office employees using harsher and more demanding tones when communicating
with the Europeans by email, which likely emphasized cultural and rhetorical
differences and furthered communication problems—until R&D essentially gave up
attempting to communicate with the European division. One of the reasons R&D
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opted to dismiss much of the research that occurred in Europe was because it was so
difficult and time-consuming to get the Europeans to respond to requests for
information.
Research has shown that cultural differences can be particularly disruptive
when using email communication (St. Amant 196-197), and that may have been the
case with Madison’s difficulties in communicating with its overseas branch.
However, part of the difficulties in communicating with the European office could
have been due to multiple employees sharing the same computer and email account.
(I do not know who checked emails or how emails to individuals were redirected to
the intended recipient if the intended recipient was not the person who initially
opened and read email.) Additionally, Madison did not invest in spam filters. With
the company’s US and European email addresses on the company’s websites, the
Europeans could have been overwhelmed with spam email and accidentally missed
communications from the US office. (In the US office, I initially had all the US
website emails sent to my computer, and I routinely dealt with 200 or more spam
emails per day until the task was delegated to Support and, eventually, Madison
invested in a spam filter.)
In addition to cultural differences, shared computers and email addresses, and
spam emails; none of the European employees were native English speakers, and
none of the US employees could speak, read, or write Norwegian or Dutch (the
Europeans’ native languages). Because of the European employees’ shared language
and similarities in cultural upbringing (they were all originally from the same
country), the Europeans had a high-context culture in comparison to the American
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employees, who had a comparatively low-context culture. This disparity between
high- and low-context cultures makes communication between groups difficult
(Thrush 34-38), and may have exacerbated Madison’s attempts at productive
international communication. Worsening the situation, communication between the
offices tended to be very lopsided. The European employees almost never asked the
US employees for assistance or information, preferring to use European consultants
for all their research, documentation, and manufacturing needs. In contrast, the US
employees’ communications (when they contacted the Europeans) were often asking
that information be sent. US employees often simply gave up trying to communicate
with the Europeans if the information was not critical or immediately needed, which
in turn likely perpetuated the Europeans’ belief that Madison’s US employees were
rude and demanding—because almost every request coming from the US was critical
and needed to be accomplished immediately. Contrastingly, the European’s emails
often began with one or more comments unrelated to the business being discussed
(i.e., “The weather here is cold and we have almost 50 cm of snow. How is the
weather over there?”). Although commenting on weather or family in business emails
may be a common practice in Europe, it may have caused some US employees to feel
as if the Europeans were not focused on complying with requests coming from the US
office. Madison’s failure to establish better cross-cultural communications likely
caused employees in Europe and the US to “communicate inappropriate sentiments
when they draft[ed] their messages, and, as readers, they may [have] misinterpret[ed]
messages… receive[d] from other cultures” (Boiarsky 248, 251).
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Despite the numerous problems with using email (static communication with
delays in receiving feedback) for international intra-company communications, it was
more convenient than oral communication via telephone (dynamic communication
with instant feedback). In addition to the office policy requiring employees to justify
why they were calling the European office and to obtain clearance before doing so,
the time zone difference between the US and European offices meant the European
employees were leaving the office (or had already vacated the office) as the
Americans were just arriving at the office. Likewise, the Americans were typically at
home and asleep while the European employees were working. Because the
Europeans also kept irregular and flexible office hours (opening sometime between
8am and 10am and closing sometime between 3pm and 5pm in their time zone) and
were often on the road and unreachable, coordinating phone calls typically involved a
series of emails prior to a phone call.
Common practice, eventually established by the (US) Executives, was to call
the Europeans on their home phones after they had quit working for the day or to
demand that the Europeans stay at the office after hours—an act that re-emphasized
how the US office saw itself as being more important and powerful than the European
office, and which no doubt irritated the European employees with this intrusive
business practice that interrupted their family life and sleep schedules. Later on, I
began waking up at 3am when I needed to talk to a European employee at their office
(where they had access to paperwork I occasionally needed). The first time I did this,
the European employee expressed surprise that I had called during their normal
business hours, remarked at how early I was up, and thanked me for not calling her
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when she was having dinner with her husband or putting her infant to bed. I made a
practice of accommodating the Europeans’ schedules with phone calls and found
them to be more receptive, possibly because I was obviously inconveniencing myself
instead of them.
Physical separation communicates status but inhibits communication
The physical location of team members in an office can create significant
obstacles for effective collaborative writing projects, and the physical location of
offices can also be used to denote status within an organization. Cross described this
type of situation in “Conflict and Capitulation,” where the executives isolated
themselves in the building’s top (33rd) floor, separating themselves from the rest of
the company’s subordinate employees on the 1st through 10th floors, and
communications supposed to trickle down from executives to middle management to
subordinates became muddled and misinterpreted along the way (17). Similarly,
Madison Pharmaceuticals was housed in an office complex with three floors. The 2nd
floor was the “main” floor and most desirable because it was the best maintained and
had been completely renovated just prior to Madison’s Executive and Support staff
moving into it. The 3rd floor where R&D remained was not as desirable. The 3rd floor
had not been renovated in a long time, it had a leaky roof, and the climate control was
erratic; but the 3rd floor was more desirable than the 1st floor. The 1st floor was the
building’s “low rent district”—a bleak, windowless partial basement plagued by
mold, flooding, and faulty plumbing. (I do not know what status Madison’s European
office location held within its respective building, as I never visited Madison’s
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overseas office; although the European office was a small, two-room office in a larger
office building, so Madison’s European office was probably not very prestigious.)
Just as a business’s location in a building can be used to signify status and
power, the location of an individual employee’s office in relation to adjacent offices
can also indicate the status and power an employee possesses within an organization
(Becker 99-100). In Forming the Collective Mind, Cross observed how certain office
locations (“the city”) were reserved for upper management and other areas (“the
country”) for lower-status employees (25). Madison’s Executives similarly
communicated their status on the 2nd floor by claiming all the larger offices with
windows and doors. Support employees on the 2nd floor were given smaller,
windowless interior offices, sometimes without doors, and sometimes shared by two
or three Support employees and/or consultants. On the 3rd floor, right after the
Executives and Support staff moved one floor down, all the R&D employees claimed
the recently vacated large window offices formerly occupied by Executives.
However, if Becker’s observations about status being tied to adjacent office spaces is
true, the Executives may have signified their disdain for Madison’s R&D employees
when the Executives emptied out rented storage units and packing the vacant 3rd floor
offices adjacent to the R&D employees with corporate detritus (file boxes with
obsolete/old documents, damaged/mismatched office furniture, broken computers and
accessories, etc.). (See Fig. 3-2 and Fig. 3-3 to compare office locations before and
after Madison’s US office divided onto two floors of the same building.)
Madison’s company-wide communication breakdown was indicative of things
to come as it began interacting with the FDA. Physical distance and differences
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among Madison’s cliques were not the sole cause of the divisions adversely affecting
corporate communications: Madison’s management style, especially its aversion to
addressing conflicts within the company, also contributed to the centrifugal forces
building within the corporate culture.
“Hands off” management style fostered poor communication
Management style is one of the most important factors in achieving high
performance and productivity from employees, and finding the correct management
style for a group of employees can be a difficult task for some business leaders
(Dean). Traditional management styles can be reduced into three basic types:
authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire (Miner 39-44). The following table
condenses Miner’s discussion of these management styles:

Table 3-3: Comparison of basic management styles
Executive
leadership

Executive’s
required
knowledge of
subordinates’ job
functions

Executive
oversight of
subordinates

Authoritarian
Executives dictate
what employees
will do.

Democratic
Executives give
tentative plans
subject to change
depending upon
subordinates’ input.
Executives must
have a basic,
working grasp of
subordinates’ job
functions.

Executive must be
intimately familiar
with subordinates’
job functions.
Executives may
have formerly
performed the same
job the
subordinates do.
High level of
Moderate level of
executive
executive
oversight.
oversight.
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Laissez-faire
Executives are
largely “hands off”
with managing
subordinates.
Executives do not
necessarily need to
understand
subordinates’ job
functions.

Minimal level of
executive
oversight.

At Madison, the Executives (all males) used an authoritative management
style with Support (all females), who worked directly under the Executives and
performed tasks the Executives were familiar with and could have performed
themselves. In stark contrast to the authoritative management style used with Support,
the Executives employed a laissez-faire management style with R&D (all males) and
the Europeans (predominantly males), largely allowing these two groups to selfmanage. By allowing R&D and the Europeans to self-manage, the Executives did not
need to expend energy leading and monitoring these subordinate groups and could
focus on other critical tasks: acquiring finances, developing partnerships, and
establishing and pursuing new corporate goals. One drawback to self-management as
a corporate management style is that it can create new communication problems and
worsen existing communication problems, especially if management’s
communications with subordinate employees are often perceived as being
noncommittal and superficial (Nowicki and Summers).
Biotech research and development is difficult to manage because of its
multidisciplinary aspects and innovative nature, and a case study evaluating
management techniques at Upjohn (a large pharmaceutical company) found that
managing via a goal-oriented approach better accommodates the dynamic nature of
research and development work (Stucki 97-99). Corporate goals changed very rapidly
at Madison, and often because of failed partnership attempts by the Executives.
Rapidly shifting goals, combined with poor intra-office communication and a laissezfaire management style, created a situation where there was a disconnect between
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what the Executives wanted to be a priority and what Madison’s subordinate
employees interpreted company priorities to be in the absence of effective
communication from Executives. The end result was that the R&D clique (and
occasionally the Europeans and Support as well) often found themselves working
diligently on projects the Executives failed to communicate had been relegated to a
lower priority or even abandoned. For example, the Executives attempted to develop
a number of partnerships with a companies that made various types (foams, gels,
hydrogels, collagen, etc.) of wound dressings. By adding Madison’s proprietary
chemical compound to one of these existing products, it would be easy to create a
“new and improved” version of an existing product. Theoretically, both Madison and
its partner would benefit from this new revenue stream; however, most of these
potential partnerships never materialized. Executives rarely communicated bad news
to employees, so employees working on projects that had been abandoned or
relegated to a lower status were frequently unaware of the changes until after they had
wasted days or weeks of time on dead or on-hold projects.
I first noticed the Executives’ aversion to delivering bad news while I was
developing newsletters for Madison as a consultant. After writing about an exciting
new prospect for the company (i.e., “Madison developing a new hydrogel dressing”)
in one issue of the company newsletter, subsequent newsletters would ignore followup entries about how a project died—or that it simply was no longer a priority.
Instead of maintaining continuity and showing progress towards long-term goals,
Executives preferred the newsletters contain only snippets about possible new
projects and the potential for future profits. The Executives did not want to share bad
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news about failed opportunities with investors, only the promise of more profits to
come; and as Madison was a private company, it was not required to disclose as much
information to shareholders as a publicly traded company. (See Chapter 6 for a details
and a discussion of ethics, forward-looking corporate documents, and writing
newsletters.)
Just as the Executives appeared reluctant to share bad news with shareholders,
the Executives also appeared reluctant to share bad news with the rest of the
company’s employees. I can only speculate as to why the Executives were reluctant
to communicate bad news (such as the disastrous Pre-IND meeting with the FDA) to
employees within the company, but I suspect there were four probable reasons:
•

The Executives may have viewed Madison’s employees as potentially irate
shareholders (who might talk to other shareholders), because all
employees’ compensation packages contained options and most employees
had taken shares in lieu of being laid off during the sporadic lean times at
Madison.

•

The Executives may not have known how to deliver bad news or assumed
someone else within their clique (or perhaps Support through the company
grapevine) would spread the bad news for them.

•

The Executives may have felt the bad news was not that bad or failed to
comprehend the magnitude and importance of the information they
withheld from subordinate employees.

•

The MBA-holding employees in R&D, who were excluded from
Madison’s business decisions, may have made the Executives (who had no
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MBAs among them and some had no college degrees) feel insecure or
threatened.

Whatever the cause, the poor intra-company communication, ineffectual
management styles, and conflict resolution avoidance by Madison’s Executives led to
very frustrated and demoralized employees. (At one point R&D drafted a letter to the
Executives describing how “morale is no longer in the toilet: someone flushed and
jiggled the handle.” The letter was never sent because, even though R&D had a
proposed solution to the problem, R&D believed the Executives would not address
the conflict and might punish R&D for claiming a problem existed.) All of these
factors, resonating together, compounded the difficulties Madison would experience
when an Executive proposed undertaking a cross-clique collaborative project as a
means of developing Madison’s QuickHeal/Progenix RFD.

Collaboration and Madison’s RFD
Conflict between different groups within a business is commonplace and
frequently lampooned in popular culture. The television show, The Office, parodies
the conflicts between inept management and rank-and-file employees. Scott Adam’s
popular Dilbert comic strips make fun of stereotyped personas of dysfunctional
management, obsessive engineers, overzealous marketers, and frustrated technical
communicators. Unfortunately, workplace farces like Dilbert and The Office are
exaggerated instances of what can—and occasionally does—happen in some
workplaces (Joyce), and poor management practices often result in dissatisfied and
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unmotivated employees (Petroni 15-17). When it comes to creating collaborations
among different work groups in a company, “cross-pollination is great, but putting
sales and marketing and R&D and manufacturing [and executives] on the same team
can be tantamount to inviting the Hatfields and McCoys to a garden party”
(Guttman). These are obviously not ideal conditions for forming collaborate groups.
However, over 70% of professionals must write collaboratively on the job (Faigley
and Miller 561). An exploratory inquiry into 20 collaborative writers’ experiences
found that 100% of them had experienced group conflict (Allen et al. 354, 358).
Collaboration and conflict are likely inseparable: effective conflict management is
therefore crucial to achieving collaboration.
In “Conflict and Capitulation,” Cross states that Bahktin’s centrifugal forces
are “inherent in the language and in the process of its articulation…” and these
centrifugal forces are “socially rooted” (3). The numerous socially rooted centripetal
forces I described earlier in this chapter would clearly influence any cross-clique
collaborative writing project undertaken at Madison. In this final section of this
chapter, I examine how the constructive act of Madison assembling an RFD via an
imposed collaboration between the R&D clique and a member of the Executive clique
set the stage for conflict. Examining how Madison coped—and failed to cope—with
these internal stresses provides observations on a few interesting aspects of the
overall collaborative process in Madison’s RFD submission’s evolution.
A catalyst for collaboration and conflict
Earlier in this chapter, I ended the company’s history with the CDRH
reviewer rejecting the QuickHeal 510(k) submission and recommending that Madison
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submit an RFD to the OCP for assessment and to determine primary jurisdiction. The
CRDH reviewer’s response prompted the Executives and R&D staff to meet and
discuss the situation—the first formal meeting between these two groups in over a
year despite the small size of the company and the close physical proximity. During
the meeting, R&D was initially lambasted for QuickHeal’s failure to obtain CDRH
approval, quickly establishing an adversarial tone for the rest of the meeting.
As the groups reviewed and discussed the letter from the reviewer, R&D
noted the CDRH reviewer examined not just the QuickHeal 510(k) submission, but
also online websites and marketing materials: all of which made sweeping and
unsubstantiated drug claims developed by the Executives in charge of marketing—
and R&D intentionally mirrored this language in developing the QuickHeal 510(k)
submission. (The reviewer looking outside of the FDA submission was a surprise to
me and likely everyone else at Madison, but clearly a very good practice for the FDA
to be following.) The FDA considers advertisements to be labeling, and so the
materials displayed on a company’s website for marketing purposes can bear the
same weight as claims made in an FDA submission, on a product’s instruction for
use, or on its packaging (“Device Advice”).
As the two cliques discussed the reviewer’s observations about drug claims on
Madison’s web site, the Executives revealed the events that transpired in the prior
Pre-IND meeting (which no member of R&D had attended). It quickly became
obvious the Executives failed to share critical feedback from the Pre-IND meeting
with R&D: as a result, R&D wrote the QuickHeal 510(k) unaware of how important
it was that no drug claims be made in that document. Instead, R&D had written the
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document intentionally mimicking the claims and language found in the company’s
marketing and advertisement (developed by the Executives)—all of which was still
on the company’s website and in shareholder newsletters, business presentations, and
other marketing materials. Even if R&D had initially produced the 510(k) submission
without drug claims, the 510(k) would have been rejected because the claims in the
510(k) would not mirror the marketing claims the Executives neglected to change on
the company’s website.
Due to communication breakdown between both R&D and the Executives,
Madison’s attempt at obtaining FDA approval for QuickHeal’s 510(k) failed.
Frustrated with one another, the two cliques proposed two diametrically opposed
solutions to address CDRH’s rejection: (1) pursue an RFD as recommended by the
CDRH reviewer, or (2) challenge the CDRH reviewer’s decision using Madison’s
political connections to influence or overrule the CDRH reviewer’s decision.
R&D’s recommendation was to follow the CDRH reviewer’s advice: write an
RFD demonstrating QuickHeal’s primary mode of action (claiming it was a device
containing a subordinated drug component) and submit the document to the OCP for
review. R&D felt confident they could recast QuickHeal’s primary mode of action as
a device, because there was no research data to support marketing claims Madison
was making about the drug effects. (Insufficient data and poorly conducted/controlled
research trials had been a subject of contention and debate between R&D and the
Executives before I joined R&D—and I may have been placed with R&D after I
began questioning authenticity and precision of the claims the Executives wanted in
shareholder newsletters. A common saying in R&D was that the Executives preferred
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“very little research and a whole lot of speculation” in their marketing claims and
shareholder materials.)
A device-based primary mode of action would mean CDRH (not CDER)
would be given primary jurisdiction, which would allow Madison to revise and
resubmit the 510(k) to CDRH—effectively gaining a second chance at obtaining FDA
clearance as a medical device. R&D estimated this approach would require 1-2
months to develop and submit the RFD to the OCP, another 2 months for the OCP to
review the document (assuming the 60-day maximum review time claimed in the
OCP’s guidance document was accurate), and perhaps another month of back-andforth discussions to answer any questions from the reviewer. Developing, reviewing,
and defending the RFD would therefore likely take 3-5 months. After the OCP had
finished with the RFD, and assuming CDRH was given primary jurisdiction, the
510(k) would need to be rewritten and resubmitted. Revising the old 510(k), having it
reviewed by CDRH, and then addressing any concerns from the submission, would
probably take an additional 4-6 months. And, naturally, all of Madison’s marketing
materials would need to be rewritten to purge the numerous unsubstantiated drug
claims. R&D’s proposed course of action would take 7-11 months to accomplish.
Madison required roughly half a million dollars per month to operate, so R&D’s plan
would cost the company approximately $3.5-5.5 million—excluding any profits that
might be realized by an earlier approval and the resulting sale of product.
The Executives wanted a faster and cheaper option that would allow for the
product to enter the marketplace quicker than what R&D was proposing. Rather than
follow the CDRH reviewer’s recommendation, the Executives proposed a far more
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aggressive approach. First, the Executives proposed appealing to the CDRH
reviewer’s supervisor to give QuickHeal a new, expedited review from a different
CDRH reviewer, possibly with a revised 510(k) submission. Second, the Executives
considered using some of their political connections with senators and representatives
to pressure someone in the upper tiers of the FDA to persuade the FDA employees
under them (i.e., the CDRH reviewer and his supervisor) into approving QuickHeal’s
510(k). Using this strategy of applying political pressure, the Executives estimated
they could achieve FDA clearance for QuickHeal within 1-2 months at a cost of $1.01.5 million (for the cost of operating the company 1-2 months and any additional
expenses that might be required for lobbyists and/or campaign contributions).
Although using political pressure to force an FDA reviewer’s hand in a review
process might seem ludicrous, it is not an uncommon occurrence. In Chapter 6, I
delve further into the FDA, politics, and ethical considerations.
Biotech companies prefer to blame the FDA for unfavorable decisions rather
than claim a product was actually ineffectual/harmful and/or suffered from a poorly
written FDA submission that failed to address a reviewer’s needs and concerns. For
example, GTx, a small pharmaceutical company (with about 200 employees),
received word from the FDA on Nov 2, 2009 that CDER was not going to approve
their drug and requested that GTx conduct a additional clinical trials—which would
take over three years to write and execute. GTx’s CEO immediately “blasted the Food
and Drug Administration on a [shareholder] conference call” (Feuerstein). GTx
appealed the CDER reviewer’s ruling, but GTX’s appeal failed and there were no
options but to either follow the FDA’s recommendation (with a huge drop in stock
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price and deep layoffs and cutbacks throughout the company) or drop the product
(likely resulting in GTx going out of business). GTx followed the FDA’s
recommendation and the company’s stock price plummeted to one-third its former
value. Madison, in 2004, was effectively in the same situation GTx would find itself
in half a decade later—except Madison was a private company that could obfuscate
(at least temporarily) a negative FDA decision from its shareholders.
While the Executives at Madison proposed an aggressive response to the
CDRH reviewer’s decision, Madison’s R&D group strenuously objected to this
course of action. R&D argued Madison was too small a company (about 25
employees at the time) with too little experience with the FDA to take such a
confrontational approach and emerge successful. R&D also doubted the FDA would
be swayed by a few politicians, even though the FDA, as a government agency, is not
fully insulated against political machinations (Hawthorn 209-232). R&D also stressed
to the Executives that if the Executives’ gamble failed, Madison would likely create a
hostile relationship between Madison and the FDA. R&D argued that, for a company
basing its future prosperity upon additional FDA submissions (and later FDA
inspections), directly challenging an FDA reviewer—or the FDA itself—seemed
unwise and dangerous to Madison’s long-term viability.
The Executives listened to R&D’s objections and instructed the R&D group to
begin work on preparing the RFD while the Executives investigated the potential for
using political influence to pressure the FDA. During the meeting, the Executives
favored their cheaper, faster, and more aggressive plan; but they never clarified which
of the two proposed courses of action was the primary option, which was the backup
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option, or if both had equal weight. As the meeting concluded, one of the Executives
(with a high school education, no scientific/technical background, and a relative who
was a local politician) stated he would directly oversee the development of the RFD
with the R&D group and informed R&D that he was to be sent copies of the
document as it was being developed for his review and input. Considering Madison’s
long-standing practice of using a laissez-faire, hands-off management style with R&D
staff and projects, this new management approach was a highly unusual request. The
R&D clique universally viewed the executive’s order as being intrusive, counterproductive, and insulting—but R&D was powerless to object to their newly selfappointed manager.
The meeting ended on a strong note of division between both groups, and this
division was mirrored by a similar lack of focus and direction for the company. This
one meeting would be the only face-to-face meeting between the Executives and
R&D during the entire RFD development cycle, which would take just over two
months.
Preparing for collaboration: the rough draft
I was responsible for developing the initial draft of the RFD. Having never
written or seen an RFD before, and as industry had been writing RFDs for barely a
year, I sought assistance and directional cues on the FDA’s website. The FDA’s
website has a reputation for being vast: it often has exactly what you are looking for,
but it can take a considerable amount of searching and sifting to locate a singular,
critical piece of information (Harnack 6-7).
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Fortunately, I located two useful documents: a 15-page set of instructions for
writing an RFD (“Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for
Designation (RFD)”) labeled as being a draft document (see Appendix A); and 15
pages buried in the Federal Registry (Vol 70, No 164, pages 49848-49862)
elaborating upon the definition of a “primary mode of action” (see Appendix B).
After studying these two documents, I condensed the portions relevant to
QuickHeal’s submission into a three-page summary explaining the purpose of an
RFD submission, how the FDA determines primary mode of action, and the critical
organizational factors for the RFD (page length, required sections, etc.). The purpose
of this summary was to help focus Madison’s collaborators on the RFD, underscore
key requirements and concepts specific to the QuickHeal product’s RFD, and to stave
off any unsubstantiated, marketing-centric divergences the one collaborating
Executive might attempt to impose (as all the members of R&D were suspicious
would happen) upon the RFD.
Using the FDA’s draft guide for writing an RFD, I also created an incomplete,
10-page rough draft for QuickHeal’s RFD submission. Instead of being a polished
document, the draft was intentionally developed as a skeletal outline. I highlighted
section that required additional input from the SMEs within R&D. (There were no
sections where I asked the managing Executive to contribute information.) Some
sections where I did not need information from SMEs—such as Contact
Information—were nearly complete in the initial draft (except for formatting and
changes we later made in the review process). Other sections had chunks of
information I pulled from various other document resources (mostly rewritten from
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the QuickHeal 510(k) submission) coupled with in-text, highlighted commentaries
asking collaborators for their thoughts on how to present certain information in given
sections, offering multiple approaches that might work, and referencing the guidance
documents and the three-page summary document I had compiled. These partially
completed sections would serve as later talking points to shape collaborative
discussions about content and phrasing.
I emailed all of these documents (the 10-page draft RFD, two FDA source
documents, and the 3-page RFD submission summary document) to the R&D group
and the Executive overseer along with a request for input and feedback on the RFD. I
intended the documents in the email to serve as the foundation for opening dialog and
negotiation among the RFD’s contributors, not as a nearly finished product. By
providing guidance documents, generating a rough draft outlining the final
document’s structure and core content, and highlighting critical areas for debate and
discussion, I openly invited collaborators in R&D to participate in the act of crafting
the skeletal document—thus encouraging the SMEs to become invested in not only
the RFD’s content, but also its style, wording, and organization. The technique I used
was highly similar to a practice of using “seed documents” to focus collaborative
knowledge management in pharmaceutical development teams (Bernhardt and
McCully 22-34), but adapted towards Madison’s unique situation.
The Executive may have felt left out of the discussion. Even though he was
included on the email distributing the documents and asking for input from the team,
none of the sections I highlighted in the draft RFD specifically requested input from
him. All the questions and comments I embedded in the draft called upon the SMEs
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within R&D, who possessed the specific scientific and technical knowledge needed
for a given section.
Collaboration within R&D
The R&D group typically worked well with one another and had ample
experience collaborating on various earlier and ongoing projects. There was a definite
level of comfort and familiarity within the R&D clique, which created a highly
functional (and informal) work relationship. Establishing a functional relationship
facilitates getting responses to draft documents in need of input and revision (Olson
22). Contrary to a commonly complaint that SMEs are often unavailable,
uncooperative, or unenthused by being disturbed from their work by technical
communicators seeking information (Hart 291-298); I experienced no such
difficulties within Madison’s R&D group. I strongly suspect my ease of access to the
company’s SMEs was attributable in part to my being perceived as a fellow problemsolving SME by Madison’s R&D group. “Technical writers are [SMEs], just like
scientists or engineers. Our tools are different, but we all create needed solutions”
(Patrick 44). I previously assisted R&D’s SMEs in various other projects (largely
compiling reports, editing/proofreading critical documents, managing outsourced
research projects, and writing research grants), typically on a one-on-one basis, and
had formed personal and professional relationships with the R&D SMEs—all of
which was made substantially easier due to R&D’s small size, isolation, and cliquish
nature. Developing relationships with SMEs, becoming active and valuable
participants in SMEs’ various projects, and establishing oneself as a resource (instead
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of an imposition required by supervisors) are all effective means of enhancing
interpersonal relations and collaborations with SMEs (Hart 291-298, Duffy 18-20).
The proximity of employees’ offices and break areas directly facilitates
collaborative efforts (Solomon 123-124), and Madison’s R&D employees’ offices
were located very close to one another. R&D’s collaboration began almost
immediately after I emailed the draft RFD. After sending the email, I physically
visited each R&D employee’s office to personally let them know the RFD draft was
done and let them know which sections needed their input, what additional
documents were attached, why the other documents were attached, and that I was
available to discuss any concerns, writing, or phrasing. The techniques I used—
highlighting questions, submitting appropriate amounts of materials, one-on-one
discussions, and accommodating reviewers’ needs—are all helpful strategies for
encouraging reviewer participation (“Inspiring Reviewers to Review Your
Documents”), and may be equally effective for fostering collaborative participation.
The next day, the R&D group went off-site for an extended lunch to discuss the
document, contents, organization, strategy, and what everyone needed to do next.
Upon returning to the office, the R&D employees split up and individually
began making revisions and additions to the draft RFD. The following workday, I
began receiving multiple revised versions of the same document. Some were sent
directly to me and no one else while others went to everyone on the original
distribution list. Collaboration existed within R&D, but version control clearly needed
to be implemented.
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Revision control problems and a collaboration-enhancing solution
If version control problems are not properly addressed, they will inevitably
occur again (Angier and Foy). To prevent version control problems within Madison’s
R&D division, I initially recommended that everyone use MS Word’s track changes
function so group members could see what the original text was and what the
collaborator had changed in the original text. None of the R&D employees were
familiar with MS Word’s track changes function (and the Executive overseeing the
project never responded to my emailed recommendation). After I demonstrated the
feature to the other members of R&D, they still did not want to use it. They claimed
MS Word’s track changes feature made the document difficult to read and hard to add
to, and they also disliked how track changes disrupted the document’s formatting and
cluttered the document up with colors, underlining, and strikethrough text. Cross
observed a similar situation at Monsanto involving group collaboration using Lotus
Notes, where unfamiliarity with the software being used hindered the collaborative
process and threatened group cohesion (63).
Rather than pressure R&D employees to use MS Word’s track changes
feature, something Madison’s R&D employees clearly did not want to use, I offered
an alternative means of collaborating and version control that worked well with the
R&D group’s office environment and culture. I suggested that everyone in R&D meet
in my office to collectively review, discuss, modify, and incorporate any changes to
be made to the RFD. This real-time communal writing, editing, and negotiating of the
textual content took advantage of the opportunity to work face-to-face with the other
R&D team members by “paying attention to human factors and not just technology”
115

(Drakos and Knox). Once R&D finished a collaborative revision session, I would
save the master document and email copies to all of the collaborators—including the
Executive—so they could read the revisions at their leisure.
In addition to enhancing collaboration by allowing immediate verbal and tacit
feedback from group members, sharing a single computer for collaborative work
meant I was the only employee with access to and control over the only current
version of the RFD. At the time, Madison had no established process for managing
and controlling versions of documents (such as ISO 9000 or a similar quality system).
The informal process I implemented for collaboratively writing the RFD quickly was
so well-received that it became the traditional means of producing all collaborative
documents within R&D afterwards. The system I implemented was crude, but it
worked well in a small collaborative and there were no future version control issues
with the RFD.
Informal environment, dynamic collaboration
Madison’s laissez-faire management style meant that oversight of R&D was
almost non-existent: so long as critical tasks were accomplished, R&D largely
operated independently of the rest of Madison (aside from needing approval for
resource expenditures). This freedom allowed the R&D group to determine its own
internal organization and hierarchies, which in turn influenced the collaborative
writing process. “Organizing [a collaborative writing group]… to allow for flexibility
provides an environment for success by granting [participants] important control and
responsibilities about forming groups, working together, and evaluating assignments”
(Baker 283). R&D’s informal work environment fostered a collaborative writing
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group that embraced creative, non-judgmental exploration, and shared writing
sessions; and this collaborative workplace environment might not have been possible
in a more rigidly controlled, micromanaged, or formal business setting. In a way, the
writing environment at Madison emulated the freewriting style advocated by Peter
Elbow for English composition classes. Indeed, Peter Elbow might claim this largely
unrestrictive work environment was ideal for a corporate-based variant of
collaborative freewriting; except instead of writing without teachers (authority
figures), Madison’s R&D clique generally wrote without any palpable managerial
oversight or involvement.
Elbow states, “a person's best writing is often all mixed up together with his
worst” (69). If Elbow’s assumption is correct, creating a workplace environment that
enables employees to take risks in offering partially formed ideas and written
materials instead of polished documents could improve the quality of collaborative
projects. Contrastingly, writers in a more formal business environment might not feel
secure sending out a draft document for review, invest more time in the document’s
development, and become more invested and defensive about the text once it is
shared with a group. A formal business environment may hinder the collaborative
writing process by making it more difficult for individuals to share half-finished
thoughts and drafts that might provoke group discussions, debates, and innovations.
Discussions and debates were common during Madison’s collaborative RFD
writing sessions. R&D employees—working simultaneously on the same project, in
the same room, and on the same computer—all had a voice and the opportunity to
provide and receive immediate feedback on every change to the RFD. As people
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verbally proposed changes to be typed into the computer, others would interject if
they didn’t agree or if they felt the sentence could be better stated. As text was being
entered into the computer and read on the monitor, additional verbal suggestions for
optimizing the text might still be made. Normally I controlled the keyboard, but
sometimes the keyboard was passed around when SMEs had difficulty vocalizing
their thoughts. This dynamic, instant-feedback approach towards collaborative
writing worked exceptionally well for such a small and close-knit group, and it
seemed to encourage radical substantive changes as opposed to surface edits
(affecting only grammar and spelling but neglecting content and content
presentation); however, some problem areas of the RFD proved to be more difficult to
achieve consensus on than others.
When the group encountered problem areas (such as not having enough
information about a topic or because of disagreements over how to organize and
present certain information) while writing the RFD in a face-to-face session, rather
than linger upon it, the group would agree to move on to another section. After the
session ended, employees could individually dwell on problem areas outside of the
group. If an employee had an idea for resolving a problem, these ideas would then be
communicated by email or by simply visiting other R&D employees’ offices. If the
bantered-about idea appeared to be a potentially viable solution, the R&D group
would re-convene in my office, gather around my computer, enter the information,
debate the merits of the new approach, and offer alternatives or suggestions for
further refining the improvement.
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Also contributing to the RFD’s development was R&D’s internal means of
management. Internally, R&D used a democratic management style (as opposed to
laissez-faire or authoritarian management style). R&D’s leader had a PhD in
chemistry, an MBA, and had previously owned his own business. He was well
respected within the R&D group and wielded the final word on any matters of
contention among the R&D group, yet he never resorted to using his authority to end
a debate unless the debate could not otherwise be resolved. (The usual points of
contention were when an SME wanted to do research that was not immediately
practical or beneficial to the business, and R&D’s leader emphasized how all research
needed to be driven by business-related logistics and pragmatism.) R&D’s group
dynamics were thus well-sorted prior to the RFD collaboration project’s start. During
the RFD’s development, there were no major points of contention that could not be
resolved internally within the R&D group, so there was no need for R&D’s leader to
step in to arbitrate or otherwise exert his authority. Sharing of power and
responsibility, as well as acceptance of decisions by the group, is critical to creating a
consensual collaboration (Weiner 55). Whereas R&D did have a microcosm
conducive to collaborative writing, the addition of an Executive completely altered
these otherwise stable dynamics and power hierarchies, creating a nonconsensual
collaborative environment.
A successful collaborative writing project often hinges upon an interactive,
participatory environment with reviews by key employees and someone with the
authority to arbitrate points of conflict and to finalize changes within a document
(Pardis, Dobrin, and Miller 293-295). While R&D’s clique had all of these key
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elements on its own, introducing an Executive into the group created a dysfunctional
collaborative environment with numerous centrifugal forces stemming from
Madison’s corporate history and culture.
Conflict between R&D and the Executive
The commonality of conflict in multifunctional teams, especially between
technical groups and management, has already been established (Busby and Payne;
Inkpen and Choudhury; Manders; Pelled and Adler). At Madison, the R&D clique
was wary of having an Executive involved in developing the QuickHeal RFD because
of the potential for conflict, and this trepidation was largely due to three factors:
•

The Executives (including the one who insisted on overseeing the RFD’s
development) had previously advocated using political influence rather
than developing an RFD, indicating a lack of commitment to the project.

•

The Executive who insisted on overseeing the RFD’s development had no
scientific or technical background, only multi-level marketing experience
with nutritional, dietary, and herbal supplements.

•

Despite having the least to contribute to the RFD and being the least
committed to the project, the intervening Executive wielded the most
power within the collaborative group.

Having an Executive overseeing an R&D project was a situation none of the
existing R&D employees had encountered before at Madison: this was a radically
new practice. “If management institutes a new strategy or practice... that runs counter
to the organization’s prevailing culture, negative attitudes and resistance are sure to
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follow.... Thus, workers may view cultural change as personally threatening and resist
such change” (Alder 327-328). R&D viewed this abrupt change in management style
as threatening and discussed various means of resisting it. Furthermore, having an
Executive directly involved with R&D meant greater surveillance of R&D
employees—all during a time when there were rumors about potential company
downsizing. A departure from the typical management practices used for monitoring
employees will likely “dampen employee enthusiasm and motivation… and
encourage employees to subvert and create ways around the [new management]
system” (Keyton 113).
From the outset of the collaborative project, the R&D clique verbally
communicated their collectively held belief the Executive over the project would be
ineffectual as a contributor and a project leader. R&D feared the Executive would
either sabotage the RFD project so the political option could be pursued exclusively,
or he would attempt to turn a fact-based technical document into a marketing-centric
document that would be as ineffectual as the Pre-IND submission and the subsequent
510(k) submission.
R&D was unable to resolve their concerns: Madison lacked a human resource
department to act as an intermediary between R&D and the Executives. Any of
Madison’s employees who had irresolvable conflicts with other employees and took
the issue to the Executives, who used conflict avoidance/withdrawal resolution
techniques (ignore it and it will go away), were always told to “work it out with each
other.” Physically separating employees who are in conflict is also indicative of
trying to resolve conflict through avoidance/withdrawal techniques rather than take
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action to address the root causes of these internal conflicts (Bercovitch 114).
Madison’s executives, recognizing the conflict that had persisted for years between
the Executives and R&D, may have attempted to alleviate the friction by physically
isolating the R&D group on the 3rd floor—which inadvertently worsened both the
conflict and communications.
The Executives were not the only group guilty of using ineffectual means of
conflict resolution. R&D, in verbally discussing the situation, believed any attempt to
discuss their problems with the Executives would be fruitless. Rather than seek
resolution from a position of disadvantage in a company whose management was
renowned for not addressing even severe internal conflicts among employees, R&D
also resorted to the use of avoidance/withdrawal techniques for coping with the
situation.
Despite the antagonistic relationship between R&D and the Executives, R&D
was enthusiastic about creating the RFD submission. A successful RFD submission
would demonstrate to the Executives that the R&D group’s recommendation had
been correct. Verbally, R&D members also discussed how the RFD’s success might
be dependent upon keeping one or more of the Executives from becoming involved in
the development process, where they could dictate how the RFD was to be written—
or not written at all.
Subverting Madison’s Executive-in-charge
Madison’s R&D group had ample motivation to exclude the Executive who
placed himself in charge of the RFD project. Although the R&D clique did verbally
discuss various means of subversion, they were never actively acted upon. However,
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in retrospect, I committed two potentially subversive acts during the collaborative
process: (1) exclusion of the Executive from face-to-face collaborative meetings, and
(2) obfuscation of changes between revisions.
After creating the initial draft of the RFD, I emailed copies to all of the
employees involved in the revision process: the R&D group and the Executive
overseeing the RFD’s development. However, after sending this email, I went from
office to office to discuss what I had just sent them and what steps everyone needed
to take next. The Executive, outside of R&D and the 3rd floor, had no specific
contributions to include in the revisions, so I never visited his office on the 2nd floor
to talk in person and discuss the RFD with him. (This could be another facet of the
withdrawal/avoidance conflict management strategy that R&D and the Executives
used.) Not including the Executive in the face-to-face discussions established a
pattern for not contacting him in the future when R&D meet to collaborate face-toface in negotiating content one or more of R&D’s SMEs were developing. Although
the Executive received emailed copies or each revision resulting from these
collaborative sessions, he was never invited to participate in them. As the meetings
were often spur-of-the-moment or verbally communicated, no e-mails were sent out
alerting the Executive of R&D’s often spontaneous plans.
I may also have inadvertently made it difficult for the Executive to provide
feedback to the R&D group by not explaining or identifying changes from revision to
revision. Even though the Executive received copies of each revision as soon as R&D
concluded a collaborative editing session, R&D had opted to not use MS Word’s
“track changes” feature before the second version of the document was produced and,
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instead, R&D opted to use collaborative over-the-shoulder editing to coordinate
revisions and establish a means of version control. To find changes made between
revisions, the Executive would have had to use MS Word’s “compare documents”
feature (which I am relatively certain the Executive did not know how to use) or
manually compare the old and new documents to spot differences (which is time
consuming and the Executive probably never did).
It is possible that, just as members of R&D had additional projects other than
the RFD to work on, the Executive may have also been too preoccupied with other
tasks to bother looking at the various RFD revisions—intending only to look at a
near-final or final copy and not realizing how many revisions and modifications the
document would undergo prior to completion. It is also possible the Executive did
read each RFD revision and remained almost completely silent about them. The
Executive eventually did send a single email responding to the RFD document’s
development, and I discuss this event in the next section.
Non-consensual collaboration becomes consensual collaboration
In Forming the Collective Mind, Cross extensively recounts how an attempt at
creating a non-consensual collaborative team resulted in apathy, cacophony, and anticonsensual revolt (31-84); and how the large-scale writing project was salvaged
through restructuring tasks to reduce confusion and create an environment where
consensual collaboration could emerge (85-127). At Madison, the reverse occurred.
R&D had previously established consensual collaboration within its clique, but when
an Executive imposed his presence into the existing R&D dynamics, he created a
non-consensual collaborative environment. R&D’s anti-consensual revolt consisted of
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passively excluding the Executive from the active collaborative process in an attempt
to re-establish the consensual collaborative group.
Several weeks after the first draft of the RFD had been emailed to everyone
involved in the project (R&D and the overseeing Executive), and after numerous
other versions had been written, the Executive did email the R&D group back with
feedback. Unfortunately, he made changes to the original draft instead of the current,
working copy—ignoring all the revisions R&D had made since then. As the R&D
group had anticipated, the Executive wanted to insert all of the European human
testing trials as evidence of QuickHeal’s safety and efficacy—something R&D had
debated early on and had chosen to exclude from the RFD because the European
studies were anecdotal (at best); protocols had not been followed (even by the
physicians who wrote them); patient data was missing (sometimes suspiciously so),
incomplete, and inconsistently collected; study sizes were too small to be of any
statistical significance to the FDA; and the product being tested in Europe was
technically not the same product being made for the US market (because of a minor
reformulation involving inert ingredients in the ointment). Also, clinical trials are not
specifically required in an RFD submission. R&D felt that, despite the poor quality of
the European trials, they contained no evidence of positive or negative data: there
were no adverse events, no side effects, and no indications the product would be
harmful when used—all things the FDA would want to be made aware of and which
Madison would need to disclose. Also, there was no evidence to support that
Epigenix or QuickHeal did anything to heal wounds better than a generic, salinesoaked gauze bandage. R&D felt the European clinical trials served no function
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within the context of the RFD, might confuse or distract the OCP reviewer from the
task of classification of the product (which is the purpose of submitting an RFD), and
could easily undermine Madison’s credibility with the OCP if the reviewer requested
to see the piecemeal raw study data and protocols.
When R&D received the Executive’s email suggesting the inclusion of the
European clinical trials, R&D immediately gathered together to discuss the situation.
R&D then collectively wrote a response to the Executive illustrating the numerous
scientific problems with the European clinical trials, explained how the shoddy and
piecemeal research was inconclusive, and how trying to pass off these massively
flawed studies would likely damage the company’s credibility with the OCP
reviewer. The Executive never responded to R&D’s email, and he never sent R&D
any more emails regarding the RFD project.
Re-establishing collaboration with the Executives: renaming a company and a
product
The R&D group later discovered there was a need for the Executive’s
involvement, albeit indirectly, in the RFD submission’s development. During one of
the many revision session, with an eye towards minimizing phrases that emphasized
drugs or drug-like claims, I noticed the product’s name—QuickHeal—could be seen
as an efficacy/drug claim for faster wound healing. Madison had no clinical studies
that statistically supported claims of faster healing—just anecdotal evidence. In
addition to the need to rename QuickHeal, I also noticed the company’s name—
Madison Pharmaceuticals—implied Madison made only pharmaceutical products,
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thus undermining claims we made in the RFD that the product described within was a
device and not a drug.
Changing QuickHeal’s name (and all the accompanying marketing materials)
and Madison Pharmaceutical’s name was clearly beyond R&D’s authority and power.
After R&D discussed the situation and decided the name changes were absolutely
needed, R&D emailed all of Madison’s Executives (not just the one Executive who
wanted to be in charge of the RFD), explained how these names would likely
adversely influence the OCP reviewer’s decision, and recommended the Executives
consider renaming both the product and company to eliminate drug claims and
references.
The Executives agreed and began evaluating various replacement names that
did not imply the existence of drugs or efficacy claims. QuickHeal was eventually
renamed to Progenix, which did not imply any claims of efficacy or drug-like effects.
Madison Pharmaceuticals was renamed to Madison Technologies, which effectively
disassociated the company’s name from drugs, devices, and biological products while
largely retaining Madison’s corporate identity.
Once the new names had been determined, a company-wide email was sent
out to announce these major changes. While it was a simple matter for R&D to amend
the RFD with these name changes, it took considerably more time and money to alter
the company’s letterhead, business cards, marketing materials, shareholder
documents, product packaging, instructions for use, websites, building signs, etc. By
focusing the Executives on marketing and rebranding (their area of expertise), R&D
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was able to complete the RFD without any additional interference. The Executives
did not even comment on the final draft prior to its submission to the FDA.

Chapter conclusion
Madison’s inexperience with the FDA critically hindered the company.
According to David Rosen (of Foley and Lardner, an FDA consulting firm), there are
five critical mistakes a biotech company can make in dealing with the FDA—each
potentially resulting in severe setbacks or even the rejection of a product’s FDA
submission (5-7). Madison managed to make all five mistakes (see Table 3-4).
Although Madison initially struggled to meet the FDA’s expectations, over the next
four years, the company improved and matured as its employees gained more
experience, learned what the FDA’s expectations were, and implemented procedures
to ensure the FDA’s expectations were met.
Paired with Madison’s inexperience dealing with the FDA and meeting the
FDA’s expectations, Madison suffered from internal conflicts—especially between
the Executives and R&D. The Executives represented the old ways Madison
conducted business: marketing hype without substance and using personal
connections and influence to advance the business (by selling shares, bringing in new
employees, or consorting with politicians). Contrastingly, R&D represented the new
way Madison needed to operate to be successful with the FDA: doing research to
substantiate claims, advancing the business by complying with regulations and
industry practices, and following procedures to ensure quality control. The conflicts
that emerged as a result of developing Madison’s RFD were likely a part of the
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company’s painful transition from operating “the way it always had” to “the way it
needed to be.”

Table 3-4: Madison’s mistakes in dealing with the FDA
Rosen’s five critical
How Madison made these mistakes
mistakes a company can
make with the FDA
Failing to understand
Madison (both the Executives and R&D) initially did not
FDA expectations.
understand the FDA’s expectation and the substantial
differences that existed between drug and device claims.
Attempting to
After the CDRH reviewer directed Madison towards the
force/bully the FDA to
OCP, the Executives wanted to contest the ruling, go over
base an approval on
the reviewer’s head, and considered using political
questionable data.
connections to pressure the FDA into approving
Madison’s product. (I have no knowledge of there being
any follow-through with these plans.)
Failing to have the
Madison lacked the resources to follow through with
infrastructure necessary developing the drug product they initially brought to the
to comply with FDA
FDA in a Pre-IND meeting. Later, in Chapter 5, I discuss
requirements.
how Madison also initially lacked a stabile manufacturing
process and quality management system needed to make
product that met the FDA’s standards.
Failing to conduct
The Executives presented the FDA with piecemeal
clinical trials without
anecdotal studies from Europe and attempted to claim it
good clinical practices.
was a clinical trial during the Pre-IND meeting. Madison’s
European clinical studies were clearly conducted without
meeting the FDA’s standards for good clinical practice.
Failing to maintain
During the Pre-IND meeting, when the Executives gave a
credibility with FDA
presentation developed for business partners, investors,
staff.
and shareholders to the FDA scientists; Madison’s
credibility as a competent biotech company was almost
certainly undermined.

Conflict within a company can be healthy for an organization and could be
indicative that a business is changing, evolving, and improving itself (Lloyd 151152). But too much of a good thing can be bad, particularly with drastic changes and
the conflicts that come with them. The internal conflict resulting from Madison’s
129

poor communication with employees—particularly the Executives failing to
communicate critical information (eliminating drug claims) to R&D for the
QuickHeal 510(k) submission—impeded the company’s ability to operate effectively.
One means of reducing conflict within a company is to unify employees by focusing
on the company’s goals and how to achieve those goals (Rotemberg and Saloner 630633, 650). When R&D communicated to the Executives the problems the company’s
name and product name would probably cause in the RFD submission, these two
divisions were able to cease feuding and focus on Madison’s immediate and longterm goals: (1) getting the OCP to classify Progenix as having a device PMOA and
(2) obtaining FDA clearance to market Progenix.
Effective conflict management is necessary when running a business, just as
effective conflict management is necessary for collaborative writing. The very act of
collaborative writing—negotiating thoughts, content, and phrasing among
contributors—involves the conflict of ideas, positions, and goals (Calderonello 7-18).
Individuals within a collaborative group must occasionally submit to the will of the
group, repressing some ideas in favor of others. Productive conflict arising from
collaborative writing, much like productive conflict within a business, can enhance
the final product.
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Based upon my experiences at Madison, I believe the following are key
components in yielding productive corporate collaborative writing projects:
•

Assess and clearly define the purpose of the collaborative writing project.

•

Eliminate any superfluous personnel from the collaborative project so as to
reduce any unnecessary interference, power imbalances, and political
friction.

•

Empower those responsible for the project by giving them the time,
freedom, resources, and authority required to complete the project.

If a group leader fails to establish goals and empower the collaborative writing
group, then a technical communicator may prove to be an effective group coordinator
in the absence of managerial leadership, oversight, or involvement. A technical
communicator, acting as a knowledge manager and placed in a role of authority, may
be particularly effective in coordinating a collaborative documentation project (Wick
515-529). Madison, in contrast, imposed an ineffectual leader upon R&D’s already
highly functional collaborative group, resulting in a cacophony that was quelled only
by the imposed leader failing to participate in the collaborative writing process.
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Chapter 4: Developing the Request For
Designation (RFD) Submission
“Be careful about reading health books. You may die of a misprint.”
—Mark Twain

“The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has
taken place.”
—George Bernard Shaw

Chapter overview
In this chapter, I examine how Madison’s R&D clique developed the Request
for Designation (RFD) submission for Progenix wound dressings. To accomplish this
task, I dissect Madison’s Progenix RFD into its individual sections, which are
individually mirrored as sections in this chapter and placed in the order they appeared
within the Progenix RFD:
•

Cover letter

•

Contact Information

•

Product Name and Description

•

Prior Approvals and Agreements

•

Chemical, Physical, or Biological Composition

•

Developmental Work and Testing

•

Manufacturing Information
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•

Proposed Use or Indications

•

Modes of Action

•

Schedule and Duration of Use

•

Dose and Route of Administration for Drug or Biologic

•

Related Products

•

Other Relevant Information

•

Sponsor’s Recommendation

•

Appendix

I further divide each of these 15 sections of the Progenix RFD into three
subsections:
•

Audience needs (for the given section)

•

Development of materials (for the given section)

•

Submitted materials (for the given section)

In the audience needs section, I examine the Office of Combination Products’
(OCP) expectations, which can be derived primarily from the two FDA guidance
documents R&D used to write the Progenix RFD. The first guidance document,
“Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for Designation
(RFD),” is attached as Appendix A; and the second guidance document, “Definition
of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product” (found in the May 7, 2004
edition of the Federal Register (Vol 69, No 89, pages 25,527-25,533)), is attached as
Appendix B.
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In the RFD development section, I use retrospection guided by a series of
earlier RFD revisions to explain what information Madison had available, what the
draft RFD I initially wrote on my own contained, and how the draft document
evolved during the collaborative process and as strategies changed and new
information became available.
After discussing the audience’s needs and the development of each section, I
present the individual sections of Progenix’s RFD as they were submitted to the OCP.
This final presentation allows the reader to see how Madison chose to present the
information needed by the OCP reviewer. A complete copy of the Progenix RFD is
supplied in Appendix C.
The information provided within this chapter offers technical communicators
a unique glimpse at the development processes and presentation of information
designed for review by the FDA. The following development process and techniques
may be applicable to the development of other RFDs to the OCP—and potentially
other FDA submissions to the Center for Biologicals Evaluation and Research
(CBER), the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), and the Center for
Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH).
RFDs differ in some significant ways from typical drug, biologic, and device
submissions. Of particular note is the length of an RFD, which is limited to just 15
pages—including any attachments or appendices—according to the “Guidance for
Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for Designation (RFD).” There is no
page limit to device, drug, and biologic submissions; however, as can be gathered
from CDRH reviewers’ quotes from the first chapter of this dissertation, submissions
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that are too lengthy take longer to review and might be rejected if the length makes it
too difficult or impossible to locate critical information. RFDs are the shortest kind of
FDA submission because the reviewer is not specifically evaluating the product
described in an RFD for safety and efficacy (as would be done for devices, drugs, or
biologics submissions). Instead, the OCP reviewer is focused almost solely on
determining and assessing a product’s modes of actions (MOA)—how a product
achieves its intended therapeutic effect.
Combination products have more than one MOA, and the OCP reviewer’s
duty is to determine which of these multiple modes of action is the primary mode of
action (PMOA)—the MOA that contributes the most to the product’s intended
purpose. (See Appendix B for a detailed explanation if MOAs and PMOAs.) A
product’s PMOA determines which of the FDA’s centers—CBER, CDER, or
CDRH—will have primary jurisdiction for approving the product. When the OCP
assigns a combination product to CBER, CDER, or CDRH as having primary
jurisdiction, this assignment also determines the approximate amount of time, testing,
and expense needed to gain FDA approval. (See Table 1-1.) Obtaining a favorable
outcome with an RFD submission is thus critical to most companies, as unfavorable
outcomes can make it fiscally impossible for a company to pursue FDA approval for
a product. Notably, obtaining a device-based PMOA with CDRH jurisdiction is the
fastest and cheapest route to FDA approval for a product, and a drug- or biologicalbased PMOA are both substantially longer, more involved, and cost hundreds of
millions to pursue. Madison, with its Progenix RFD submission, sought to obtain a
device-based PMOA decision from the OCP.
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Cover letter
Audience needs for the cover letter section
The FDA’s “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request
for Designation (RFD)” (see Appendix A) makes no mention of attaching a cover
letter to the RFD. The OCP does not require—and does not request—an introductory
cover letter. Thus, adding a cover letter section is probably atypical of most RFD
submissions—and Progenix’s RFD may have been unique because of this addition.
Developing the cover letter section
When I wrote the initial draft for the Progenix RFD, I did not include any
information prior to the “Contact Information” section—the first section listed as
being required by the OCP guidance document (see Appendix A). My primary focus
in producing the initial draft of the RFD (prior to involving the other members of the
R&D department) was to create an outline based upon the RFD guidance document’s
recommended format and to fill in these blank sections with all the relevant
information I had readily available. I highlighted and left comments in areas within
the draft document, clearly indicating where individual members of Madison's RFD
group would need to contribute specialized knowledge I did not possess. I hoped this
technique would foster participation in the collaborative writing process by directly
engaging the individual subject matter experts (SMEs) within R&D.
My tactic of requesting specific input for specific sections from specific SMEs
worked. Once R&D began collaborating, revising, and adding to the document, it
seemed strange to me that there was no summary at the beginning of the document.
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The RFD guidance document had a section for a recommendation (or summary a
recommendation) at the end of the RFD; however, American rhetorical style—which
is prevalent throughout grade school, college, academia, and business writing—
revolves around the concept of having an introduction, body, and a conclusion to a
document. (We’ve all probably heard the adage of “tell them what you’re going to tell
them, tell them, and then tell them what you told them” used to describe this trope.)
Thus, it seemed peculiar to me that the FDA’s recommended outline for an RFD
provided no introduction or summary at the beginning. It also seemed to be affecting
the other members of the R&D group as we struggled to organize the timing of our
main arguments, avoid repeating arguments made in prior sections, and coordinate
the introduction of new materials and concepts within the RFD. The collaborators
were concerned that the reviewer might begin to form undesired opinions about
Progenix’s MOAs, which might lead the reviewer away from making the devicebased PMOA decision Madison desired.
When I vocalized my concern about the RFD’s summary/recommendation
being located only at the end of the document and how unusual it was to not have an
introduction/summary at the beginning of a document, the rest of R&D agreed they
also found the organization a little peculiar. They belatedly recognized how it had
been adversely impacting our attempts to write a coherent, persuasive, non-redundant
RFD. In an attempt to strictly adhere to the OCP’s guidance document’s outline for
writing an RFD (see Appendix A), R&D had been producing redundant arguments
throughout the various sections. Recognizing the need for an introduction to the RFD
that clearly stated the device-based PMOA Madison desired, R&D collectively began
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working on a introduction and summary, which we planned to add as a cover letter.
The cover letter would then be attached to the front of the RFD, much like a cover
letter, introduction, or an executive summary is commonly found at the beginning of
most technical documents. Initially, R&D collectively wrote this cover letter as a
stand-alone document using a separate MS Word document, and this later prompted
me to question whether or not we wanted the cover letter to be a separate document—
one that could be easily separated from the RFD. Two questions arose: (1) would the
cover letter count against the RFD’s 15-page limit and (2) would someone at the
FDA’s mailroom remove the cover letter and give only the RFD (without the cover
letter and introductory material) to the reviewer?
Omitting a summary/introduction from the RFD violates American rhetorical
trends, but omitting a summary/introduction does help reduce an RFD’s overall
length—which may explain why the FDA proposed the unusual format suggested in
the RFD guidance document. However, even if the OCP chose to exclude an
introductory section, I was concerned the OCP reviewer may begin reading
Progenix’s RFD (without a summary/introduction) and form preconceptions about
Progenix based upon the sequence of sections outlined in the FDA’s guidance
documents. I feared the RFD’s guideline-proposed information architecture may
inadvertently and irrevocably influence the OCP reviewer’s perception of Progenix’s
classification. Specifically, after the first two sections (discussing contact information
and the product’s name and description), the next three sections discuss prior
approvals and agreements (which may bias a reviewer to favor prior FDA
approvals/agreements and subjugate any newly added component that caused the
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product to be classified as a combination product); chemical, physical, or biological
composition (which can bias a reviewer towards a drug designation because many
chemical components could be inactive/preservative components) and developmental
work and testing (where a company’s earlier research—such as clinical trials in other
countries—might not be indicative of the jurisdiction being sought in the US). For
example, Madison’s Progenix product had no prior approvals/agreements with the
FDA, but Progenix used a wide range of mostly inactive/preservative/buffering
chemical components to make the ointment coated onto the dressing—and the FDA
believed at least two of those chemicals might be drug components. Also, Madison’s
European testing from Europe with Epigenix (which was very similar to Progenix)
included some wound bed studies looking for drug-like effects before and after
wound treatments. (However, the research from this study was so poorly documented
that no statistical conclusions could be drawn from the data, rendering the study
useless to the FDA but hinting towards Madison acting like the product might have a
drug PMOA.) These two factors—the number of chemicals and a poorly conducted
drug-like study—if presented early in the Progenix RFD, might quickly bias the OCP
reviewer into classifying Progenix as having a drug PMOA. Additionally, Madison’s
executives had mistakenly sought out a pre-Investigational New Drug (IND) meeting
with the FDA earlier, and that earlier incident might have predisposed the OCP
reviewer towards a drug PMOA already—further underscoring the need for an
introduction in the Progenix RFD.
In addition to using the cover letter to state that Madison was arguing for a
device-based PMOA, R&D also wanted to alert the OCP reviewer of two major
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changes that occurred between the RFD submissions and the earlier 510(k)
submission. Specifically, Madison Pharmaceuticals had changed its name to Madison
Technologies and the product's name had changed from QuickHeal to Progenix. To
avoid confusion, we wanted to front-load the RFD with this critical information.
To accomplish these two goals—telling the OCP reviewer that Madison
sought a device-based PMOA and that both the company and the product had
undergone name changes—R&D’s first thought was to write a cover letter attached to
the RFD, as most people would traditionally do to preface a research or technical
report being sent to a reader located outside of a company. However, we were
uncertain if the OCP would count the cover letter as being one of the 15 pages
allowed in an RFD submission—representing a waste of 6.7% (1 of 15 pages) for the
RFD's allotted 15-page limit. Also, we were unsure how the FDA processed incoming
physical mail and incoming email and feared the cover letter might be separated from
the RFD.
We ultimately decided to make the cover letter as short as possible by
trimming out our argument for why Madison believed Progenix should be classified
as having a device PMOA. Instead, we simply stated that Madison was requesting a
device PMOA and that both the company and product name had been changed since
the earlier QuickHeal 510(k). We then physically integrated the entire cover letter
into the first page of the RFD along with the first required section (contact
information), which inseparably joined the introduction to the RFD submission—
unless someone at the FDA took extraordinary means of tampering with an RFD
(censoring the hardcopy or deleting a portion of a PDF file). Although we lost about
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3/4ths of a page because of the letter (5% of the 15-page limit for an RFD), I knew
there were numerous formatting and typographical options I could employ
(condensing information into tables, font/size alterations, subtle
kerning/leading/margin manipulations, etc.) to condense the text and make up for this
lost 5% without overly compromising readability. The first opportunity to condense
text in the RFD was in the contact information
Submitted cover letter section

Figure 4-1: Progenix’s cover letter section
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Contact Information
Audience needs for the contact information section
The FDA’s “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request
for Designation (RFD)” (see Appendix A) requests that an RFD submission contain
contact information so the OCP can readily identify the sponsoring company and a
person designated as the OCP’s point of contact within the sponsoring company for
any issues regarding the RFD submission. The following list contains all the contact
information mentioned within the RFD guidance documentation:
•

Company name

•

Company address

•

Company establishment registration (if available)

•

Contact name

•

Contact alternate’s name

•

Phone number

•

Fax number

•

Email address

Developing the contact information section
The contact information section initially seems fairly straightforward.
However, there are still things that can be done to enhance this section of the RFD,
particularly in regards to reducing potential miscommunication between the FDA and
the sponsor. The most important information is identifying the sponsoring company,
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designating one (or two) employees as the point of contact within the company, and
including a mailing address. Not all of the information mentioned in the guidance
document is required: the phone number, fax number, email address, and alternate
contact name (and the alternate contact’s phone number, fax number, and e-mail
address) are optional additions.
When I wrote the initial draft of the Progenix RFD, I included the company’s
name, address, front desk phone number, and fax number. I flagged this section with
a comment stating we needed to designate someone to be the lead point of contact for
the OCP for all communications regarding the RFD. (I expected the lead point of
contact would be the R&D Manager, but was unsure if the Executive overseeing the
RFD’s development would want to be included as the lead contact, an alternate, or
omitted completely.) Madison had no company establishment registration at the time,
so I left this field blank and flagged it as something we needed to initiate prior to
submitting the RFD.
During later collaboration, we submitted an application to obtain a company
establishment registration number for Madison. The R&D group (without input from
Madison’s executives) appointed the R&D Manager to be the only contact within
Madison for the FDA. R&D made this appointment without any input from the
participating Executive (or other Executives). The Executive in charge of the RFD
was given notice of the need for a decision when he received the initial draft with my
embedded comments, but he never commented on these comments and never
objected to later revisions he received which listed the R&D Manager as the sole
point of contact.
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R&D opted to have only one person (instead of two) acting as Madison’s
point of contact with the OCP for the Progenix RFD for three reasons:
•

Having one point of contact ensured that all communication would go
through a single person, reducing the chance for miscommunications
between the FDA and Madison—and within Madison, which had a history
of internal communication problems.

•

The R&D collaborative group universally wanted the R&D Manager (who
had a PhD in Chemistry and an MBA) to be the sole point of contact with
the FDA and exclude the Executive who wanted to be part of the RFD’s
development (with a high school education and a multi-level marketing
background in homeopathic nutrition supplements) as being an alternate
point of contact for the FDA. This would ensure that all communications
with the FDA’s scientists would occur exclusively with one of Madison’s
best scientists—not an Executive with a history of exaggerating the
company’s research findings and no formal scientific education.

•

Listing only one point of contact (with only phone number and email
address) conserved space in the RFD and allowed the contact information
table to fit completely onto the first page of the RFD.

After R&D established the R&D Manager as the sole employee
communicating with the FDA, I recompiled the information into a table that
efficiently presented as much information as needed in as small an area as possible. I
redesigned the table so the first row was designated for “company information,”
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which combined the company’s name and physical address. The second row named
the R&D Manager as the point of contact for the FDA, and it also included his email
address, phone numbers (office and cell), and fax number. The third and final row of
the table was reserved for the company’s registration establishment number with the
FDA, which we stated had been applied for but not yet received. (R&D felt it prudent
to state that Madison had applied for a registration number so we could show the
FDA that Madison was working towards complying with the requirements for an
FDA-registered establishment.)
Submitted contact information section

Figure 4-2: Progenix’s contact information section

Product Name
Audience needs for the product name section
Despite the heading of “product name,” this section of the RFD calls for much
more than just the name of the product. The FDA’s “Guidance for Industry and FDA
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Staff: How to Write a Request for Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A)
requests that the sponsor submit the following information in this section:
•

Classification

•

Common, generic and/or usual names of the product and of all components

•

Proprietary product name

The guidance document further explains that if the product described in the
RFD is a combination of two or more previously FDA-approved products, then the
classification, common/generic/usual names, and proprietary names need to be
included for each FDA-approved product being used as a component in the
combination product.
Developing the product name section
For the draft of the Progenix RFD, I simply put “Progenix” as the trademarked
product name. I then flagged this section as being incomplete because I did not
understand what the “classification” and the “common, generic and/or usual names”
aspects were referring to, and the RFD guidance document did not explain what they
were or how they differed from one another. I hoped another member of the R&D
group would be able to explain the differences, and the Regulatory Affairs Manager
was fortunately able to explain the differences to the rest of the group.
During the initial collaboration process, this section of the RFD proved to be a
contentious topic. Initially (before we came up with the idea of using a integrated
cover letter), R&D wanted to explain to the OCP reviewer why Madison had changed
the product’s name (and the company’s name) and initiate an argument for why we
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believed the FDA should classify Progenix as a device. I suspect the desire to
construct an argument for changing the product’s name, changing the company’s
name, and making a device claim all in this section was because the group was
seeking to make this first section with full sentences into an introduction, even though
this section is clearly not intended to serve an introduction and the FDA’s proposed
structure for an RFD submission provides later sections allowing for these kinds of
discussions. The solution to resolving this disagreement was, as previously discussed,
was integrating a cover letter section at the very beginning of the Progenix RFD.
Putting the explanation regarding the product’s name change in the introduction to the
RFD allowed Madison’s collaborative group to considerably shorten the product
name section and focus on just the product’s name.
Progenix was manufactured by assembling a variety of raw materials, not by
adding materials to an existing product or combining two or more previously FDAapproved products as components. Because the FDA had previously approved none
of the components in Progenix, there was no classification to list for Progenix. The
FDA had previously identified Progenix’s lithium citrate and sodium citrate as being
potential drug components; however, Madison searched for all the drugs that listed
lithium citrate or sodium citrate (alone and in combination) as active ingredients
(drugs) and found that none of these products made wound healing claims. Progenix
used off-the-shelf chemical components, not a combination of pre-existing FDAapproved products. Because none of the potential drug components in Progenix came
from pre-existing FDA-approved products, rather than attempt to argue a
classification (and primary mode of action) in this section, R&D opted to write “none
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assigned” in response to the OCP’s request for Progenix’s classification. (Avoid using
“unclassified” as a classification because “unclassified” is actually a type of
classification the FDA can assign to products. In fact, Progenix was later given an
“unclassified” classification, and I suspect many combination products may be
classified as “unclassified.”)
FDA-regulated medical products can have more than one name: medical
products can have proprietary/trade names and common/generic/usual names.
According to Katrina Bramstedt, in an article discussing ethical issues in medical
device marketing, there are a number of considerations that must be taken into
account when naming a medical product being reviewed by the FDA (47-57). Even
though the FDA has no formalized product name review process, the FDA is aware
that words can trigger emotional responses when heard or read, and linguistic
manipulation can be used to create implied meanings or claims in a product’s name
(50-52). In discussing product names, Bramstedt covers three kinds of product names
that are relevant to an RFD submission and inadequately covered in the OCP’s guide
to submitting an RFD:
•

The FDA considers the proprietary name of the product to be marketing,
and any name that makes or implies a claim can result in the FDA
imposing additional research and review processes—or rejecting the
product submission completely based solely upon its name (47).

•

Generic names are assigned by the United States Adopted Names Council
and then further reviewed by the International Nonproprietary Name
Committee of the World Health Organization (WHO) (48).
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•

Trademarked/proprietary names must be approved by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to ensure there are no legal
conflicts with existing trade names, and the FDA reviews
trademarked/proprietary names to ensure that "near spellings" and "near
pronunciations" with other products do not occur—helping to prevent
physicians and pharmacists from accidentally prescribing and
administering unintended products (48).

Madison had trademarked Progenix as a name, but had no
common/generic/usual name previously approved and classified by the WHO
(Bramstedt 47). In compiling the information for this section, I chose to use a
compact table that presented Progenix as having no predicate FDA-approved products
used as components. Using “none assigned” repeatedly for both the product’s
classification and its common/generic/usual names emphasized the need for the OCP
reviewer to assess the product as something new, not a blend of FDA-approved
products being used as component in Progenix. R&D opted to emphasize the absence
of FDA-approved product components in Progenix—and hopefully start the review
process without a drug-based bias on the reviewer’s part—by stating below the table
that none of the components in Progenix were previously approved as products by the
FDA.
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Submitted product name section

Figure 4-3: Progenix product name section

Prior Approvals and Agreements
Audience needs for the prior approvals and agreements section
The “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for
Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A) states the following about this
section of the RFD:

This provision requires you to identify:

•

any component of the product that has received premarket approval, or

•

is marketed as not being subject to premarket approval (e.g., OTC
monograph, Section 361 human cellular/tissue product or 510(k)
exempt), or

•

has received an investigational exemption, and the identity of the
sponsors.
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You should also include the status of any discussions or agreements that you
have had regarding the use of the product as a component of a new
combination product.

Developing the prior approvals and agreements section
When I drafted this section of the RFD, it contained nothing but comments
and questions. I asked if the stand-alone gauze dressing (without ointment) was an
FDA-approved component. (It was not.) I commented how this might potentially be a
place to introduce CDRH-approved medical devices that were similar to Progenix,
like non-adhesive, saline dressings. (R&D opted to do this initially, but later decided
it was not the best place because we were making the same arguments repeatedly in
multiple sections.) I also suggested any arguments made in this section should avoid
discussing individual components because the next section of the RFD is designed
specifically for addressing individual components in a product.
During the collaborative phase, in discussing this section, the R&D group
came to the following decisions:
•

Progenix’s components had not received premarket approval.

•

Progenix’s components had not been marketed as not being subject to
premarket approval.

•

Progenix’s components had not received an investigational exemption.

•

There were no ongoing discussions with the FDA (other than CDRH’s
recommendation to submit the RFD, which we stated in the cover
letter).

151

Our strategy for this section was simply to recast the language used in the
RFD guidance document’s bulleted statements, thus making it easy for the OCP
reviewer to see that each aspect within the guidance document had been directly
addressed. Even though the net effect of this text could be summed up in a simple
“not applicable” comment, we felt it better to explicitly address each concern raised
in the guidance document in case the reviewer used some form of checklist in
processing the RFD.
Even though there were no prior approved components, the R&D group
debated whether or not we should disclose Madison’s prior attempt at obtaining
510(k) approval for the product in this section—and if being redirected to the OCP
qualified as a “prior agreement.” After some debate, we opted to stick with the literal
explanation provided in the “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a
Request for Designation (RFD)” document, which stated to include “any discussions
or agreements that you have had regarding the use of the product as a component of a
new combination product.” As the earlier QuickHeal 510(k) submission had been for
a complete product (not a component), and Progenix was a complete product (not a
component), and it was obvious that Madison had been redirected to the OCP from
CDRH (and we disclosed this in the first sentence of the RFD submission’s cover
letter), we came to the conclusion that repeating this information was redundant,
unwarranted, and wasted space.
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Submitted prior approvals and agreements section

Figure 4-4: Progenix’s prior approvals and agreements section

Chemical, Physical or Biological Composition
Audience needs for the chemical, physical or biological composition section
The “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for
Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A) states the purpose of this section of
the RFD is to fully describe the product’s chemical, physical, and biological
composition. The guidance document claims the OCP uses this information “to
determine regulatory identity or appropriate assignment” of the product described in
the RFD submission and that this section is a “fundamental part of your product’s
description.”
Developing the chemical, physical or biological composition section
The FDA clearly uses this section of the RFD to review the raw materials used
in manufacturing the combination product. By reviewing the raw materials, the OCP
reviewer can begin to characterize the product’s identity and begin assessing how the
product might be classified. In situations where there are no prior agreements with the
FDA, or components that have prior agreements/approvals from the FDA (which
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would be disclosed in the prior section of the RFD), this is the first section within the
RFD that presents evidence towards how a product should be classified—or should
not be classified. Like with a null hypothesis, the absence of certain materials can
immediately exclude certain jurisdictional decisions. For instance, by listing no
biological components in this section of Progenix’s RFD, the OCP reviewer can
rapidly eliminate a biologic MOA (and thus a CBER jurisdiction) from Progenix’s
classification and focus on whether or not the PMOA will be chemical or physical.
This section of the RFD was the first opportunity for Madison to provide
evidence that Progenix should be classified as having a device PMOA. Initially, I
drafted this section with a short, three-sentence paragraph describing Progenix as a
gauze wound dressing coated with an ointment base (signaling a device), which
included a saline mix including the sodium and lithium salt components the CDRH
reviewer had earlier identified as being a potential drug along with a zinc salt
component CDRH had been unconcerned about (sending an intentional “is it a drug
or a device?” mixed message to the reviewer), and how the dressing was sterilized
and applied topically to wounds (signaling a device delivery mechanism). Below this
draft paragraph, I compiled the following table (see Table 4-1) to detail the chemical
composition of the ointment coated onto Progenix dressings.
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Table 4-1: Draft table for chemical, physical, biological composition
section
Components
Ointment
Saline solution

Citric acid
Benzoic acid
TOTAL

Components for Progenix’s ointment
Percent
Subcomponents Subcomponents
(by weight)
(by weight)
77.9%
PEG 1000
77.9%
21.0%
Distilled water
20.0%
Sodium citrate
0.999%
Zinc citrate
0.000998%
Lithium citrate
0.000002%
1.0%
—
1.0%
.1%
—
0.1%
100.00%
—
100.00%

USP Grade?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
—

When I drafted this table, I had intentionally organized the ointment’s
components into groups. These groups were further organized by weight. This placed
the inactive polyethylene glycol (PEG) component at the top, making the device
component most prominent. Because the CDRH reviewer had singled out lithium
citrate and sodium citrate as potential drugs in the QuickHeal 510(k), I minimized
these two components by grouping them in with the water (instead of being mixed in
with the PEG ointment base) and listed all of the salts and the water as being a saline
solution. (The manufacturing process for Progenix called for making a saline
solution, then blending it with the PEG ointment, because the salts would not dissolve
in the PEG base). Saline solutions are often used to clean wounds (device MOA), are
commonly applied to gauze dressings to help moisturize wounds (device MOA), and
are innocuous enough that they can be purchased in most pharmacies’ over-thecounter wound care products’ sections. By grouping the sodium and lithium salts into
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a saline solution, I tried to position the collective group as being an innocuous device
component.
The remaining components in Progenix’s ointment—citric acid (a common
pH buffer) and benzoic acid (a common preservative)—were apparently innocuous to
the CDRH reviewer, who expressed no concerns about either. These most innocuous
components were listed last.
In collaboratively reviewing what I had drafted with the other members of the
R&D group, we felt the original table (see Table 4-1) focused all of the attention on
the ointment and the chemicals used to make the ointment—ignoring the rest of the
components in the device and inadvertently creating a drug connection. This table
went through numerous revisions as we struggled with different ways to present the
information in a way that explained Progenix’s components accurately (not just the
ointment on the dressing), yet minimized the potential drug (chemical) components
and maximized the potential device (physical) components. R&D accomplished this
by including all of the components of the finished, single-unit product as delivered to
the consumer—thus loading more information into the table than the initial draft
contained. Instead of presenting only the ointment in the table (as I had done in the
draft), R&D reorganized all of Progenix’s raw materials into the following groups:
foil packaging, gauze dressing, ointment, citrate salts, and sterilization.
These component groups were then classified into having a physical or
chemical composition, based upon physical or chemical contributions (or MOAs). I
redesigned the table to reiterate the numerous physical components in Progenix,
resulting in four physical components as opposed to just one chemical component. In
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the event the OCP reviewer was uncertain as to which MOA was the PMOA, we
wanted it to be obvious there were four times more physical components than
chemical components contributing to the overall product—hopefully biasing the
reviewer towards a physical MOA decision and the CDRH’s jurisdiction in the event
there was no single MOA determined to be the PMOA. I prefaced the resulting table
with an explanation of its organization/hierarchy and by noting there were no biologic
raw materials, thus immediately aiding the reviewer in eliminate a biological PMOA
and a CBER jurisdictional decision—allowing the reviewer to focus solely on
whether or not Progenix’s PMOA was physical or chemical.
R&D also took a gamble in making groups for this new table: we grouped
zinc citrate, which the CDRH reviewer had not identified earlier as being a potential
drug, together with the sodium citrate and lithium citrate, which the CDRH reviewer
had flagged as being potential drug components. We hoped that by creating a “citrate
salts” group—including the innocuous zinc citrate along with the lithium citrate and
sodium citrate the CDRH reviewer had been concerned about—the OCP reviewer
might be inclined to reconsider whether sodium citrate and lithium citrate should be
classified as drugs. (There was a risk the reviewer might then consider zinc citrate to
be a drug as well, but we felt it was an “all or nothing” gamble worth taking.) These
were the first steps we took in characterizing the ointment as a physical, moisturebearing component that was independent of the citrate salts, which was to become a
lynchpin in our later arguments for Progenix having a physical/device PMOA.
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Submitted chemical, physical or biological composition section

Figure 4-5: Progenix’s chemical, physical, or biological composition
section

Developmental Work and Testing
Audience needs for the developmental work and testing section
In this section, the “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a
Request for Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A) requests that the
sponsor present a brief summary of past and ongoing research, including animal and
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clinical testing, for the product undergoing review by the OCP. The OCP reviews this
information to help assess if the PMOA is chemical, physical, or biological.
The RFD guidance document does not mention that the OCP reviewer is also
examining this section of the RFD to assess safety factors that may influence how the
product may be classified due to safety concerns. However, the Federal Register (Vol.
70, No. 164, August 25, 2005) states the following regarding the OCP granting
jurisdiction to an agency based upon safety and efficacy concerns:

… if the agency cannot determine the most important therapeutic action of a
combination product, and there is no agency component that regulates
combination products that as a whole present similar safety and effectiveness
questions as the combination product at issue, the agency will assign the
product to the agency component with the most expertise related to the most
significant questions of safety and effectiveness of the product. In situations
where the new product is the first such combination product, or where another
combination product exists but the intended use, design, formulation, etc. for
this combination product raise different safety and effectiveness questions,
FDA will assign the product to the agency component with the most expertise
to evaluate the most significant safety and effectiveness issues raised by the
product. (49850)

Developing the developmental work and testing section
My goals for writing the first draft of this section were as follows:
•

Show how well Progenix and Epigenix performed in their safety and
animal tests. (It’s safe and innocuous.)

•

Omit the badly flawed Epigenix clinical trial data from Europe. (Recall
from the previous chapter how the Epigenix trials were irrelevant due to
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experiment protocols not being followed, a statistically insignificant study
size, and a substantial amount of lost/missing patient data.)
•

Describe the similarities between Progenix and Epigenix, demonstrating
Epigenix’s safety and medical device classification in Europe, and then
using this as an opportunity to recommend Progenix also receive a medical
device classification in the US. (Presenting evidence for a device
classification.)

When I drafted this section of the RFD, I started by compiling a table to
present all the safety testing and animal testing Madison had conducted with both
Epigenix and Progenix—excluding the European Epigenix clinical trials. After the
table was compiled, I wrote a discussion of how Progenix was almost identical to
Epigenix, how Epigenix was classified as a medical device in Europe, and how the
FDA should also classify Progenix as a medical device. My draft would later be
altered substantially during subsequent collaborations by the R&D department.
Perhaps because the collaborative group had scientific researchers who had a
part in the early development of Progenix/Epigenix, and perhaps because the RFD’s
heading included the wording “developmental work,” several members of R&D felt
compelled to describe Progenix’s earliest history—even though this was not required
or recommended in the OCP’s RFD guidance. The R&D collaborative group revised
the text for this section so it began with a narrative explaining how Progenix’s orgins
were rooted in a poultice folk remedy from the 19th century, how Madison revisited
this forgotten lore, and how Madison had turned this folklore poultice into a modern
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wound dressing. (This story largely mirrored the company’s “official story” given to
investors as to how Madison developed the product.) The scientists in the R&D group
believed the OCP reviewer would see how Madison had taken a biological-based
poultice and transformed it into a wound dressing that was manufactured using
synthetic (non-biological) components that would ensure greater safety and
consistency.
Following the discussion of how Madison came up with the concept for the
product, the R&D collaborators wrote an introduction about the product’s safety,
pointed out Madison was making no drug-like efficacy claims with the product, and
that there had “never been a human study with the synthetic formulation.” The quote
in the prior sentence was factual, even though there had been human studies
conducted in Europe with Epigenix, because Epigenix and Progenix had slightly
different formulations. Technically speaking, Progenix had never been tested in
human trials. (I discuss the ethics of excluding the Epigenix clinical trials in Chapter
6.) Prior to presenting the table containing safety and animal testing, we further
explained how Madison adhered to accepted laboratory practices in conducting
Progenix’s safety and animal testing.
Because the R&D group had ruled out using the Epigenix clinical trials
because there was a formulation difference between Epigenix and Progenix, the table
I initially drafted was substantially reduced in size as we removed all of Epigenix’s
safety and animal testing. In presenting the results of Progenix’s safety and animal
tests in the draft table, I used a ranking system, which I borrowed from the test
results, that graded safety with a number between 1 (negligible irritation/toxicity) and
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4 (severe irritation/toxicity). Progenix received a “1” for all but one of these safety
and animal tests, where Progenix received a “2” (mild irritation/toxicity but still safe).
The R&D group felt uncomfortable that all test results were not a “1.” Rather than list
all the specific test results, which drew attention to the one test that had a “2”result,
R&D opted to change the 1-4 ranking scale to a “Pass/Fail” classification (where
“Pass” was a 1-2 and a “Fail” was a 3-4). Doing so allowed Madison to put “Pass” on
all of the safety and animal testing results. Although using the Pass/Fail grade made
the test results look more uniform, it was definitely a gamble that might have
prompted the OCP reviewer to request more information.
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Submitted developmental work and testing section

Figure 4-6: Progenix’s developmental work and testing section
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Manufacturing Information
Audience needs for the manufacturing information section
The “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for
Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A) states the purpose of the
manufacturing information section is to “include a description of the processes that
will be used to manufacture your product, including the sources of all
components….” The guidance document claims the OCP is looking for two things in
this section of the RFD: (1) a general description of manufacturing processes, and (2)
a flowchart illustrating these processes.
Developing the manufacturing information section
Drafting the section for the manufacturing information was relatively easy,
but not without significant problems. Although the QuickHeal 510(k) submission I
had helped to develop earlier had a 3-page section that vaguely summarized how
Progenix would theoretically be manufactured, the actual processes and process
documentation had not yet been developed. In the draft, I compacted this vague
information from the earlier QuickHeal 510(k) submission into a smaller space,
making it even more vague in the process. First I made a table listing the raw
materials that would be used to make Progenix, including the various companies we
obtained the raw materials from. Next I summarized how the product would be
manufactured and tested according to the FDA’s requirements for medical devices,
showing the OCP reviewer that Madison already intended to manufacture Progenix as
if it were a medical device with CDRH jurisdiction. The 510(k) did not have a
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flowchart in it, and because the manufacturing processes described in the 510(k) were
so vague, I included a comment requesting that the Manufacturing Manager work
with me on developing a flowchart to describe the manufacturing process and any
updates to the manufacturing process that might have occurred since the QuickHeal
510(k) was submitted nearly half a year ago.
In revising this section with both the Manufacturing Manager and the R&D
Manager, I learned the manufacturing process described in the QuickHeal 510(k) had
undergone—and was still undergoing—substantial changes as we learned more about
the FDA’s requirements for device manufacturers. Because the manufacturing
process was essentially still being developed and was not yet finalized, we opted to
shorten the manufacturing description even further so as to not reveal the gaps and
inadequately controlled aspects still being addressed. (None of these gaps were
critical in to the RFD review process, but they would become issues in a subsequent
CDRH review of a later 510(k) submission—and then plague the company with
quality control and consistency problems for nearly two additional years.) After we
compiled a rudimentary, updated summary of the manufacturing process, I compiled
a flowchart that vertically stacked the processes. The vertically stacked flowchart
consumed an entire page, so I later revised the manufacturing flowchart into a much
more compact left-to-right zig-zag pattern. Z-patterns are familiar to western readers
(Schriver 354), and I grouped processes by row: (1) ointment manufacturing, (2)
coating and packaging individual dressings, and (3) additional packaging,
sterilization, and warehousing.
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Submitted manufacturing information section

Figure 4-7: Progenix’s manufacturing information section
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Proposed Use or Indications
Audience needs for the proposed use or indications section
The “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for
Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A) states this section is critical to the
RFD submission and offers the following advice:

You should state concisely and clearly the intended use and indications for use
of your product. OCP considers both the intended use and indications for use
of your product when making an assignment to an agency Center for
premarket review and regulation.

Developing the proposed use or indications section
When creating the RFD’s initial draft, the first thing I did was seek out the
FDA’s definitions for “Indications for use” and “Intended use.” The FDA’s guidance
document failed to adequately define either term. The following table (Table 4-2)
provides the definitions for these terms and a “plain English” translation of the
definitions.
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Table 4-2: Indications for use versus intended use
Phrase

Definition

Indications
for use

“… a general description of the disease or
condition the [product] will diagnose, treat,
prevent, cure, or mitigate, including a
description of the patient population for which
the [product] is intended” (“Deciding When to
Submit a 510(k) for a Change to an Existing
Device”).
“… objective intent of the persons legally
responsible for the labeling of the device. The
intent is determined by their expressions or
may be shown by the circumstances
surrounding the distribution of the device. This
objective intent may, for example, be shown
by the offering or the using of the device, with
the knowledge of such persons or their
representatives, for a purpose for which it is
neither labeled no advertised” (“CFR - Code of
Federal Regulations Title 21”).

Intended
use

“Plain English”
translation
What a company
claims in an FDA
submission and on its
packaging that a
product will be used
for.
What a company,
distributor, or the
public actually uses
the product for.

In the prior QuickHeal 510(k), Madison’s had proposed the following
indication for use: “QuickHeal is a single-use topical wound dressing intended to treat
diabetic neuropathic foot ulcers. Dressings should be changed once per day.” This
QuickHeal 510(k) indication for use was copied from Madison’s earlier, aborted
QuickHeal drug submission (which was never completed or submitted), which in turn
had essentially been copied from a competitor’s drug-classified wound care ointment.
As I compiled the initial draft of the RFD, I copied the QuickHeal indications
for use into the Progenix RFD. However, I left comments in the document suggesting
that the collaborative group revisit Progenix’s indications for use. (This request to
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revisit the product’s indications for use included the participating Executive member,
but he never acknowledge the email or participated in the subsequent collaboration
that took place within R&D for this section of the RFD.) I knew from word-of-mouth
gossip around the office and unofficial presentations the Executive gave to
shareholders (and I was a shareholder in attendance at several of these presentations)
that Madison was initially seeking a diabetic ulcer indication for use, but the
Executives hoped physicians would quickly start using QuickHeal off-label on more
than just diabetic ulcers—improving Madison’s sales and profits. These intended offlabel uses would thus qualify as being “intended uses.” Because 510(k) medical
devices are generic equivalents of pre-existing, FDA-approved products with low
safety risks, I suggested Madison should broaden its indications for use to include a
wider range of wounds—like many other 510(k) wound dressings were already
doing—so as to help eliminate off-label use of the product and to broaden what
marketing representatives and sales materials could claim.
Consequently, R&D revised Progenix’s indications for use so they were
broader and more in line with the claims typical of 510(k) medical devices—not
drugs. To accomplish this, we did the following:
1. Used the FDA’s 510(k) online database to identify physically similar
wound dressings previously approved by the FDA that might contain saltbased components (i.e., saline dressings or dressings with ointments R&D
suspected contained chloride- or citrate-based salts).
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2. Eliminated products R&D suspected did not contain one or more salt-based
ingredients by data-mining the products’ websites, marketing materials,
research publications, and FAQs.
3. Compiled a table listing these medical devices’ indications for use as stated
in the FDA’s 510(k) online database.
4. Cross-referenced the indications for use listed in the FDA’s database with
these products’ websites to verify the indications for use matched. (There
were no discrepancies, indicating the importance of being consistent with a
product’s indications for use.)
5. Checked the FDA’s databases to verify there were no outstanding
complaints, warnings, or recalls levied against the remaining salt-based
dressings.
6. Verified the products’ manufacturers had passed their last FDA inspections
and were thus likely seen by the FDA as being reputable and compliant
medical device manufacturers.
7. Purchased boxes of about half a dozen of the wound dressings that had
made it through this process and sent them out for chemical analysis along
with samples of Madison’s Progenix product. (How we used the results of
this chemical analysis is discussed in the “Related Products” section.)

With a list of indications for use obtained from very similar, FDA-approved
510(k) medical devices, we were able to craft Progenix’s indications for use with a
high probability of the FDA reviewer having no problems with its wording. In the
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RFD, we explained, quoting from prior 510(k) medical devices’ indications for use,
how we derived Progenix’s indications for use. Also, by citing the 510(k) medical
devices we derived Progenix’s indications for use from, we further solidified
Progenix’s connection with 510(k) medical devices while emphasizing the
appropriateness of a device PMOA and the CDRH primary jurisdiction we hoped to
obtain from the OCP.
Because none of the 510(k) products R&D linked to Progenix in the RFD had
an “intended use” listed, and because R&D (independent of any Executive oversight
or guidance) had expanded Progenix’s indications for use to include earlier intended
off-label uses, we chose to not include any intended uses for Progenix. The OCP
likely requests an intended use statement to help assess potential MOAs. (I discuss
intended use statements and MOAs in the following “Modes of Action” section.)
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Submitted proposed use or indications section

Figure 4-8: Progenix’s proposed use or indications section

Modes of action
Audience needs for mode of action section
In the “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for
Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A), the advice given for the mode of
action section is almost ten times longer than what is provided for every other section
of the RFD. The guidance document also specifically states, “this is the cornerstone
of the RFD submission.”
In this section of the RFD, the product’s sponsor is asked to state the
product’s various modes of actions (MOAs) and the identify the primary mode of
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action (PMOA). The PMOA is distinguishable from the MOAs in that the PMOA
contributes the most of all the MOAs to achieve the product’s therapeutic objective. If
the OCP reviewer is unable to ascertain which individual MOA contributes the most,
then the OCP reviewer uses an assignment algorithm to determine primary
jurisdiction. (A copy of the assignment algorithm is in Appendix C.)
In addition to the advice given in the RFD guidance document, the Federal
Register (Vol. 70, No. 164, Aug 25, 2005, pages 49848-49862) (see Appendix B)
contains both industry feedback regarding the initial 2002 regulations and
modifications/clarifications the FDA made to address industry’s feedback and
questions. Of particular note for this section of the RFD, the Federal Register details a
subtle yet significant change that was made to the FDA’s original definition of a
MOA, which in turn affected the FDA’s original definition of a PMOA. (See Table 43.)

Table 4-3: Change in the FDA’s MOA definition†
Original definition
Revised definition
3.2 (k) Mode of action is the means by
3.2 (k) Mode of action is the means by
which a product achieves a therapeutic
which a product achieves its intended
effect.
therapeutic effect or action.
†
Federal Register. Vol. 70, No. 164. August 25, 2005, page 49851.
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The change made to the MOA’s definition also affected the PMOA’s
definition. (See Table 4-4.)

Table 4-4: Change in the FDA’s PMOA definition†
Original definition
Revised definition
3.2(m) Primary mode of action is the
3.2 (m) Primary mode of action is the
single mode of action of a combination
single mode of action of a combination
product that provides the most important product that provides the most important
therapeutic action of the combination
therapeutic action of the combination
product. The most important therapeutic
product. The most important therapeutic
action is the mode of action expected to
action is the mode of action expected to
make the greatest contribution to the
make the greatest contribution to the
overall intended therapeutic effects of the
overall therapeutic effects of the
combination product.
combination product.
†
Federal Register. Vol. 70, No. 164. August 25, 2005, page 49851.

Developing the modes of action section
These changes to the FDA’s definitions of MOA and PMOA are noteworthy.
The prior definitions suggest the OCP was looking at nothing but evidence of
therapeutic effects when assessing MOAs (and the PMOA); however, the new
definitions suggest the OCP would consider MOAs the sponsor intended to have a
therapeutic, even if there was a lack of evidence to support the effectiveness of these
intended MOAs. This is an unusual position for the normally evidence-centric FDA.
The change allows sponsors to make what are essentially nearly unsubstantiated
claims about their products’ MOAs in an RFD, and the change also gives the OCP’s
reviewers the freedom to assign a PMOA based upon assumptions about each MOA’s
therapeutic contributions. These changes do make sense, though.
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When the FDA is reviewing a new drug, device, or biologic submission for
approval; the reviewers expect to see completed research studies that support safety
and efficacy claims. Contrastingly, RFD submissions do not need to have the same
level of supporting evidence because the product is not necessarily as well-developed
and will almost certainly lack research data for certain aspects of the combination
product. With Progenix, for example, Madison had ample research to support a
device filing with CDRH (and thus device MOAs), but Madison had no presentable,
rigorous research to support a CDER filing (and thus drug MOAs). Although from the
prior QuickHeal 510(k) submission, Progenix’s (and Epigenix’s) marketing materials,
and Madison’s poorly conducted European research; it was obvious Madison
certainly intended for the citrate salts to have a drug-like therapeutic effect—even if
there was no solid evidence to support this intention. (This re-emphasizes the
importance of ensuring a biotech’s marketing division does not make unsubstantiated
claims that may help sales but hurt or destroy a product’s chances of obtaining FDA
approval—a mistake Madison made in its earlier QuickHeal 510(k) submission.)
With the new definitions of MOAs and PMOAs in mind, when I produced the
initial draft for the RFD, I attempted to record every possible intended MOA I had
ever heard discussed—however casually—within Madison’s walls. I came up with 11
potential MOAs, and I created a table that listed and described every potential
Progenix MOA regardless of whether there was any research to back up these MOAs.
Adhering to the FDA’s revised definition of an MOA, Progenix’s 11 MOAs had
intended therapeutic effects that ranged from the patently obvious (“putting a dressing
over a wound helps to protect the wound from mechanical trauma” and “mesh gauze
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dressings allows for wound fluid drainage” and “the ointment contains 20% water and
thus helps moisturize the wound”) to wildly holistic, speculative, and unsubstantiated
theories (“lithium is a trace element that many people with chronic wounds lack in
their body because industrial farming techniques have depleted certain trace elements
in the earth’s soil” and “lithium may be working with zinc to supercharge growth
factors critical to wound healing”). I inserted comments within the table, suggesting
MOAs we might want to exclude and why, intending to provoke MOA-related
discussions within R&D to assess which of the MOAs seemed most supportable.
Finally, after the table with the 11 MOAs, I wrote two paragraphs arguing that
Progenix had numerous intended MOAs and that Madison was unable to pinpoint one
single MOA as being the PMOA; however, Progenix’s numerous similarities to FDAapproved 510(k) medical devices indicated the product was more akin to a medical
device than a drug and, as such, Progenix should be classified as having a device
PMOA with CDRH having primary jurisdiction.
My approach had the desired effect of promoting internal discussions of
Progenix’s various MOAs—particularly which MOAs should be eliminated and
which might be the PMOA. After much debate, the R&D group concluded that
Progenix had three MOAs: (1) physically protecting the wound bed, (2) physically
adding moisture to the wound site, and (3) unknown contributions by the citrate salts.
As we continued revising the RFD, I intentionally arranged these items into a
numbered list (as opposed to a bulleted list) to indicate the existence of a hierarchy
that placed the two device MOAs above the lone drug MOA. In the subsequent
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descriptions of each MOA, we again presented the MOAs in order of importance,
placing the two physical (device) MOAs above the one chemical (drug) MOA.
The first two MOAs were physical (device) and easily verified by observation
and common sense. Progenix wound dressings were coated gauze dressings that,
when placed over a wound, helped to physically cover and protect the wound site;
and 97.9% of Progenix’s ointment is a mix of polyethylene glycol and water, which
physically adds water to the wound site and aids in moisturizing and lubricating the
wound.
The last MOA was attributed to the citrate salts chemicals (drugs) in
Progenix’s ointment, but we made no claims as to how these drugs might work. (We
derived this “no claims” strategy from FDA reviewer comments we located in
Vitagel’s 510(k) submission documentation, which I had obtained through one of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests I made earlier for QuickHeal’s 510(k).
This discovery is discussed in the next paragraph.) Although Madison suspected the
salts contributed somehow to the wound healing process, we had no convincing
evidence that supported how or why the citrate salts might contribute to the wound
healing process—or proof that the citrate salts did anything at all. (The citrate salts
and story behind them might have very well been nothing but a marketing gimmick,
like how shampoos might add aloe or shea butter or coconut milk to the formula in
order to advertise a new ingredient.) By essentially saying “we don’t know what the
salts do, but we think they’re probably helpful, they’re clearly safe, and we are not
making any drug claims” to the OCP reviewer, we were taking yet another calculated
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risk. However, R&D clearly could not claim the citrate salts helped in the healing
process either, as we had no reliable evidence to support this claim.
Earlier, in one of the two 510(k) submissions I obtained via a FOIA request, I
discovered a handwritten exchange between two FDA reviewers debating whether or
not Vitagel—a product very similar to Progenix—was a drug and needed to be
reviewed by CDER instead of CDRH. This textual artifact gave a brief glimpse at
how the FDA handled combination products before the OCP existed. One of the
reviewers asked his supervisor for an opinion on whether the salts in Vitagel were
drugs requiring CDER input. The supervisor responded by stating that no drug claims
were being made by the manufacturer, so even if there were a potential drug in the
Vitagel wound dressing, Vitagel should not be reviewed by the FDA (or CDER) as
having a drug component.
Madison decided to capitalize on this prior FDA decision by making no drugbased claims as to the effectiveness of the citrate salts in Progenix. Later in the RFD,
we would present the FDA’s earlier Vitagel comments in an appendix and craft an
argument that the FDA could not classify Progenix as a drug because, like Vitagel,
Progenix also made no drug claims. We hoped our arguments plus this FDA
precedent with a similar product would merit a CDRH primary jurisdiction, and we
hoped the FDA still considered this precedent decision with Vitagel to be valid
despite regulatory changes that may have occurred over the decade that had passed
between Vitagel’s 510(k) approval and Madison’s Progenix RFD submission.
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Submitted modes of action section

Figure 4-9: Progenix’s modes of action section
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Schedule and Duration of Use
Audience needs for the schedule and duration of use section
The “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for
Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A) requires that the sponsor “explain
how often and for how long your product is intended to be used.” A specific example
for a drug-device combination wound dressing is provided in the guidance document,
where the sample dressing needs to be changed every four hours with no more than
six separate dressings to be applied within 24 hours. The guidance document also
mentions a “discontinue use after a certain number of days” statement for drugcontaining products, as well as surgically-implant-it-and-forget-it devices.
Developing the schedule and duration of use section
Madison intended for Progenix wound dressings to be changed once per day,
discontinued after 12 weeks of use, and disposed of after each use, which is fairly
standard for most generic ointment-coated wound dressings. (Our safety testing of the
product originally went to 12 weeks duration, but R&D liked my suggestion of
extending the test to 20 weeks so we went above and beyond the testing the FDA
wanted to see.) This 12-week statement was the same information contained in the
earlier QuickHeal 510(k), which I simply copied for the initial draft of the Progenix
RFD.
We largely mirrored the schedule, duration, and single-use claims made by
similar 510(k) medical devices; rendering Progenix virtually indistinguishable from
their schedule and duration of use. There was one major difference, though. Other
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wound dressings typically recommended that dressings be changed every 1-2 or 1-3
days, but Progenix was to be changed every day. We considered modifying
Progenix’s wound dressing change frequency to match these other wound dressings’
recommendations, but we felt that leaving a Progenix dressing on for 2-3 days might
allow for the growth of bacteria or allow wound tissue to grow into the gauze mesh.
(The latter situation might cause mechanical trauma, pain, and bleeding when the
dressing was removed.) Also, changing the Progenix dressing every 2-3 days instead
of daily would reduce profits by 50% or more. Although we were briefly tempted to
recommend changing Progenix twice per day (and doubling profits), R&D did not
believe most people would follow these twice-a-day instructions. Also,
recommending a twice-a-day dressing change might make Progenix unpopular—and
thus sell less—in hospitals and nursing homes because dressing changes require more
time and labor from staff. Additionally, the combination drug-device wound dressing
presented in the RFD guidance document, which was to be changed every 6 hours,
seemed to emphasize the benefits of a drug-component over the device component
(which seemed to be acting more like a delivery system)—and R&D did not want to
suggest to the FDA that it was more important to replenish the citrate salts (potential
drugs) in Progenix’s ointment more frequently than Progenix’s coated wound
dressings (devices).
Finally, we explicitly stated that Progenix was a single-use disposable wound
dressing that was not designed to be reused. Although we did look for reusable
wound dressings (out of curiosity), we did not locate any examples—probably
because the inexpensive nature of device-based wound dressings makes it far more
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cost-effective to use disposable dressings than to recondition and ensure the safety
and efficacy (and sterility!) of reusable dressings.
Submitted schedule and duration of use section

Figure 4-10: Progenix’s schedule and duration of use section

Dose and Route of Administration
Audience needs for the dose and route of administration section
In the “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for
Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A), the OCP requires that the sponsor
state the dose (amount) of a drug or biologic product being delivered, as well as the
means of delivery, and how it will be used in or on the body. An example is provided
using a combination drug-device wound dressing, where a wound dressing is applied
topically to deliver a certain amount of drug to the body.
Developing the dose and route of administration section
For this section, in the initial draft of the RFD, I wrote that Progenix had no
applicable dosage and that the wound dressing was topically applied. Although
Progenix’s topical route of administration was obvious, I knew my initial claim of
there being no dosage was risky and easily debated—particularly since the CDRH
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reviewer had expressed concerns about the two citrate salts—and made a note to that
effect for the other members of R&D to see when they reviewed the RFD’s draft.
However, if the RFD claimed there was any dose at all in Progenix, we were
essentially admitting that Progenix did have a drug component—something everyone
at Madison wanted to avoid. Unsurprisingly, my initial draft would be substantially
modified during the collaborative process as we worked to find a way to state the unit
dosage found in a Progenix dressing without overtly claiming there was a drug
component.
R&D debated whether or not to include a dose for Progenix, fearing that
declaring that Progenix had any dosage at all might result in a drug classification and
a CDER jurisdiction. Simultaneously, R&D also felt that the CDRH reviewer had
already flagged lithium citrate and sodium citrate as being drugs, so Madison could
not just ignore the reviewer’s concerns—even if Madison disagreed with them.
Rather than take a stance that Progenix contained no recognized drug
components, the collaborative group opted be ambiguous as to whether or not
Progenix contained a dose/drug. We wrote how a CDRH reviewer (not Madison) was
concerned about the lithium citrate and sodium citrate in Progenix, then commented
to the effect that if the OCP believed these two compounds were drugs, then the dose
for each of these two compounds would be 19.98mg of sodium citrate and 0.00004mg
of lithium citrate per 4” x 4” dressing. We then followed up by stating there were
other wound dressings with higher levels of both chemicals already approved by
CDRH and referenced the “Related Products” section of the RFD as having
supporting information. We suspected the lithium component would be of greater
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concern than the sodium, so we also argued the trace amount of lithium present in
Progenix was so small it was innocuous and should not be considered as a drug
component. We referenced the “Other Relevant Information” section of the RFD as
having supporting information for this argument.
Finally, we included a table that demonstrated how we assessed the weight of
individual chemical components in the Progenix dressing. We hoped the table would
illustrate the trace quantities of lithium citrate and zinc citrate present in a single unit
dose dressing of Progenix and encourage the FDA reviewer to drop at least the
lithium citrate drug component. Additionally, we hoped that contrasting the citrate
salt weights against the PEG, water, preservative (benzoic acid), and pH buffer (citric
acid) would further de-emphasize the contributions of the citrate salts in the
ointment’s overall composition. We again referenced the “Other Relevant
Information” section after the table, hoping to encourage the reviewer to focus on
additional supporting arguments we made there.
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Submitted dose and route of administration section

Figure 4-11: Progenix’s dose and route of administration section
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Related Products
Audience needs for the related products section
For this portion of the RFD, the “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How
to Write a Request for Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A) requests the
sponsor identify any related products similar to either the entire device or components
of the product. If there are no related products, the sponsor is asked to state there are
no related products. If there are related products, the sponsor is asked to explain what
these products are, how they are regulated, and their regulatory status (approved,
investigational, under review, etc.).
Developing the related products section
Madison’s R&D collaborative group believed the OCP reviewer would be
highly inclined to classify a combination product like any virtually identical products
previously approved by the FDA. Thus, R&D assumed if we could demonstrate how
Progenix was similar to one or more 510(k) medical devices previously approved by
CDRH, we were confident Progenix would be classified in a similar manner.
However, R&D also realized the FDA’s decision process changed over time as the
agency and the products it regulated evolved, so what might have been classified as a
device three, five, or ten years earlier might now, due to changing regulations, be
classified as a drug-device combination product. Still, Madison’s R&D group hoped
that creating a strong link between Progenix and one or more related products the
FDA had previously approved as 510(k) medical devices would result in the OCP
granting a CDRH primary jurisdiction for Progenix.
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In the earlier “Proposed use or indications” section, I explained how R&D
looked at a collection of 510(k) products that were similar to Progenix to ensure that
Progenix’s indications for use were nearly identical to these medical devices. The last
step in establishing Progenix’s indications for use involved purchasing boxes of half a
dozen of these related 510(k) devices to send out for chemical analysis at a contract
laboratory. It took nearly a month for the results of this testing to become available,
but it also provided some of the best evidence for why Progenix should be given
primary jurisdiction under CDRH. Because of the delay in getting this critical
information, and because much of the RFD had already been written by the time the
results came in, the chemical analysis data caused widespread changes to occur
throughout the RFD in the late stages of its revision process.
In the initial draft for this section of the Progenix RFD, I listed nearly half a
dozen related wound dressings in a table that presented the products’ names,
manufacturers, 510(k) numbers, indications for use, and physical descriptions of the
products. This draft table emphasized the similarities between Progenix and these
FDA-approved 510(k) medical devices. Later, when the chemical testing results came
in, this entire section was rewritten from scratch so we could do a direct chemical
comparison of just two of these 510(k) dressings. We created two tables to crosscompare these related products to Progenix.
The first table was similar to the one I had initially drafted—comparing the
product’s names, 510(k) numbers, and indications for use—but the revision also
included raw material sources (synthetic and/or biological) and which agency had
jurisdiction. The purpose of the first table was to illustrate all the similarities between
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Progenix and the two related products, to highlight how the FDA had classified both
predicate products under CDRH, and how Progenix was awaiting jurisdictional
assignment from the FDA. The obvious implication is that the OCP needed to classify
Progenix as a device, just like the two related products described in the table.
The second table contrasted the levels of sodium citrate, zinc citrate, and
lithium citrate in Progenix with two related wound dressings: Satusalt and Vitagel.
Both related wound dressings were previously approved as 510(k) devices by CDRH.
Although Satusalt dressings had 48 times more sodium citrate than Progenix and
Vitagel nearly 350 times more zinc citrate than Progenix, the contract laboratory
could not detect trace quantities (>5mg) of lithium citrate. Whereas Vitagel and
Satusalt both had <5mg of lithium citrate, we knew from its formulation that
Progenix would theoretically have 0.00004mg of lithium citrate per dressing “dose.”
While Madison’s collaborative group could have submitted Progenix samples for
testing along with Vitagel and Satusalt, we opted to instead present Progenix’s
calculated chemical concentration in the table instead. (This decision and a few other
considerations for the second table are discussed in more detail in the ethics chapter
of this dissertation.)
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Submitted related products section

Figure 4-12: Progenix’s related products section
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Other Relevant Information
Audience needs for the other relevant information section
In the “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request for
Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A), the FDA encourages the sponsor to
include any additional information relevant to the product’s submission in this
section.
Developing the other relevant information section
This section of the RFD is clearly meant to be used as a “catch all” section
that allows sponsors to present additional information relevant to their RFD
submissions, but which does not necessarily fit within the organizational framework
provided by the OCP in its guidance document. In the initial draft of the RFD, I left
this section blank. I realized this section would be where we would make a number of
arguments that stemmed from the questions and comments I had seeded throughout
the draft document. Indeed, the collaborative group did use this section to make two
arguments:
•

Progenix’s chemicals were safe and innocuous (and therefore should
not be considered drugs)

•

There were similar 510(k) medical devices previously approved by the
FDA under CDRH’s jurisdiction and that Progenix made no drug
claims (and therefore CDER should not be given jurisdiction for
Progenix’s approval process).
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The first argument R&D developed was centered on the citrate salts found in
Progenix and how safe and common they were. We referenced FDA-established
dietary intakes for sodium, zinc, and lithium and showed how a single Progenix
dressing contained hundreds of times less of these elements. (I also located some
USDA-established dietary intake levels, but we opted to focus solely on the FDA’s
findings and not the FDA’s former parent agency.) We also contrasted the amount of
lithium in Progenix (0.0004mg) with the minimum known FDA-approved therapeutic
dose of lithium (50mg) used as a drug to demonstrate the massive difference—1.25
million times—between these two values. We hoped these arguments would
eliminate the possibility of the OCP reviewer pushing Progenix towards a drug
classification based solely upon safety concerns.
Our second argument was crafted to elaborate upon the previous “Related
Products” section and to showcase evidence I found in Vitagel’s 510(k), which I had
obtained earlier through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Specifically,
we wanted to highlight how Vitagel, which had chemical components similar to
Progenix, had already been informally evaluated by CDRH as a potential drugbearing combination product prior to the existence of the OCP. We emphasized how
this evaluation had been initiated by the Chief of the Plastics and Reconstructive
Surgical Devices Branch (the branch of CDRH that reviews wound dressings), not by
a rank-and-file CDRH reviewer, because we hoped the names and higher rank of
these FDA officials involved in Vitagel’s earlier and successful 510(k) approval
process might further prompt the OCP reviewer to classify Progenix as a device and
prevent CDER from obtaining primary jurisdiction.

191

Submitted other related information section

Figure 4-13: Progenix’s other related information section

192

Sponsor’s Recommendation
Audience expectations for the sponsor’s recommendation section
According to the “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a
Request for Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A), this section of the RFD
is where the sponsor recommends whether CBER, CDER, or CDRH should have
primary jurisdiction. This recommendation should be supported by claims about the
product’s “composition, intended use, modes of action, and the single mode of action
that provides the most important therapeutic action.” The guidance document also
recommends using the PMOA assignment algorithm in the PMOA Final Rule (21
CFR 3.4(b)). (A sample algorithm is included in Fig. 4-14.)
Developing the sponsor’s recommendation section
In the initial RFD draft’s mode of this section, I wrote that Progenix had 11
potential MOAs, reflecting what I wrote in the initial draft version of the mode of
action section. I claimed that because of the numerous potential MOAs, Madison
could not determine with absolute certainty which of these 11 MOAs contributed the
most to the dressing’s indications for use. Therefore, Progenix had no clearly
identifiable MOA. However, I argued that because 8 of the 11 MOAs were physical
and because Progenix bore so many similarities to existing wound dressings
(classified as 510(k) medical devices), Madison recommended that primary
jurisdiction be given to CDRH.
During the collaborative process, each time we revised the Modes of Action
section of the RFD, we also had to revise the Sponsor’s Recommendation section to
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reflect the new modes of actions and the arguments supporting which MOA was the
PMOA. As the RFD evolved and we gathered more evidence and developed new
arguments for the OCP reviewer to give CDRH primary jurisdiction, this section
continued to grow in size until it was several pages long. To reduce the volume of
text and to better emphasize critical information in this concluding section, we
eventually shifted away from detailing each point in a small paragraph to using a
bulleted list that rapidly summarized the discussions we held in prior sections of the
RFD. (Bulleted lists are better at emphasizing key points than short paragraphs that
lacked transitions between them, the latter of which seemed disjointed and visually
crowded the page.)
Concluding the section, we inserted a scanned copy of the OCP’s PMOA
Decision Chart with a hand-drawn line illustrating the decision path Madison
believed was supported by the arguments and evidence presented in the Progenix
RFD. We knew from a copy of the Vitagel 510(k), where the FDA reviewer’s
decision was documented, that a CDRH reviewer had hand-drawn a decision path for
the Vitagel product’s submission, and that that Vitagel algorithm document had been
important enough to be included with the other FDA correspondences attached to the
Vitagel 510(k) archival data. We assumed the OCP reviewer would complete a
similar algorithm for the Progenix RFD submission, and when we discovered the
PMOA Assignment Algorithm attached to an entry in the Federal Register (Vol 69,
No 89, May 7 2004, page 25533), we decided to include a completed version that
illustrated how Madison felt the OCP reviewer should complete that form. We also
assumed that seeing the PMOA Decision Chart with a handwritten path already
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completed might signal to the OCP reviewer that Madison was familiar with the RFD
process, and this might make the reviewer feel more comfortable in mimicking a
device path he or she had already seen provided within the RFD and advocated by
Madison throughout the RFD.
Submitted sponsor’s recommendation section

Figure 4-14: Progenix’s sponsor’s recommendation section
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Figure 4-14: Progenix’s sponsor’s recommendation section (continued)

RFD’s Appendix
Audience expectations for the appendix section
Like the cover letter section Madison added to the beginning of its Progenix
RFD submission, the “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: How to Write a Request
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for Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A) does not mention including an
appendix section as a part of the RFD submission.
Developing the appendix section
Although the guidance document does not specifically mention the possibility
of including an appendix in an RFD submission, appendices are so commonplace that
(unlike with the cover letter section) Madison’s R&D collaborative group had no
reservations about including an appendix in the Progenix RFD submission.
Appendices are commonplace in technical documents and thus are probably not
uncommon in RFD submissions. However, in the draft version of the Progenix RFD,
I did not include an appendix: many of the arguments and data we included in the
final submission were unavailable during the initial draft, so an appendix wasn’t
initially needed or useful.
As R&D implemented and then revised the appendix during collaboration and
as our argument began to shift towards the analytical chemistry results comparing
Progenix to Vitagel (and Satusalt), the Freedom of Information Act request I had
previously made for Vitagel’s 510(k) documentation became more relevant to the
Progenix RFD. Three pages in the Vitagel 510(k) document were important enough
that R&D believed they needed to be included as evidence in the RFD’s appendix.
The first page included from Vitagel’s 510(k) was an inter-office memo from
a CDRH branch chief asking for an opinion on whether the chemicals added to
Vitagel constituted a drug and, if so, if CDRH needed to consult CDER for a drug
review of the product. The second page was less formal—just a handwritten letter in
response to the memo—declaring that Vitagel did not make any drug claims and thus
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should not be reviewed by CDER as if it contained a drug. The implication is that if
Vitagel had made drug-based claims in its 510(k) submission—perhaps through
declaring drug-based modes of action in the accompanying 510(k), product
packaging, instructions for use, or marketing materials—then CDRH could attempt to
continue the approval process with a joint CDRH-CDER review process (with no
clear primary jurisdiction because the OCP had not yet been created) or reject the
Vitagel 510(k) by claiming it was a drug that needed to be submitted to CDER. The
third and final page was a decision-making flowchart, completed by a CDRH
reviewer, showing the rationale the FDA previously used to classify and approve
Vitagel as a 510(k) medical device despite earlier concerns about Vitagel having a
chemical component that was similar to Progenix.
Madison’s R&D collaborative group initially considered pulling quotes from
the memo and letter in Vitagel’s 510(k) documentation, attributing the quotes to the
authors (officials within CDRH at the time), citing the source of the quotes, but
excluding the source documentation from Progenix’s RFD to save space. However,
we suspected that quoting information (that took us nearly half a year to retrieve from
an FDA archival file and which the reviewer might not bother to track down) would
be less powerful, persuasive, and immediate than presenting digital scans of the actual
archived documents. Vitagel had been approved nearly 10 years prior to Madison’s
preparation of its Progenix RFD, and when the Vitagel 510(k) FOIA request I
submitted finally arrived, it was delivered in an envelope that contained microfiche
negatives—a common means of archiving documents prior to PDFs and digital
scanners—and a compact disc that contained what were obviously digital images
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made from the microfiche negatives. (By looking at the digital scan’s file properties,
and specifically at the files’ created date, it appeared Madison was the first to make a
FOIA request for this information. Thus, it may be difficult for FDA reviewers to
access these older files archived prior to digital archiving technologies like Portable
Document Format (PDFs).)
I suspected, if the OCP reviewer had to physically hunt through an FDA
archive to locate microfiche negatives (possibly in a different location and possibly
involving making external requests for the information to be found), it might easily
result in several weeks of delay. Worse still, the reviewer might ignore the quoted
materials or the archival status might indicate to the reviewer that the Vitagel
documents cited in Progenix’ RFD were from a product approved nearly 10 years old.
There had been substantial changes in the medical device approval process since
Vitagel was first approved, such as the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (“Medical
Device Provisions of FDA Modernization Act”) and the Medical Device User Fee
and Modernization Act of 2002 (“Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of
2002”). What might have been perfectly acceptable when Vitagel was originally
approved might have become an unacceptable practice to the FDA over that period of
time and with multiple changes in regulatory requirements.
Rather than taking a gamble on referencing Vitalgel’s archived 510(k) ad
alerting the reviewer of the document’s age, or hoping that the OCP reviewer would
spend the time tracking down archived source materials that Madison already had in
its possession, we opted to include digital scans of the memo and response letter in an
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appendix to the Progenix RFD. Doing so would accommodate the reviewer’s needs
and expedite the review process, saving Madison time and money.
Initially, R&D simply included the three pages from Vitagel’s submission (the
memo, the letter, and the CDRH’s 510(k) “Substantial Equivalence” DecisionMaking Process) into Progenix’s RFD’s appendix section. As revisions went by, we
eventually wrote brief introductory notes to explain what each scanned document in
the appendix was and how it was important to the Progenix filing. We did this so we
could remind the reviewer of the importance of the information in the appendix,
enabling the reader to scan the documents for the evidence rather than mandating a
close reading to make connections between the documents in the appendix and the
text in the body of Progenix’s RFD.
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Submitted appendix section

Figure 4-15: Progenix’s appendix
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Figure 4-15b: Progenix’s appendix (response letter to Vitagel query)
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Figure 4-15c: Progenix’s appendix (Vitagel’s 510(k) Decision-Making
Process)

Conclusion
Industry insiders claim the FDA frequently fails to adequately explain
everything they want from the biotech industry during the submission and approval
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process for new biotech products, and thus a common perception in industry is that
the FDA’s guidance (and the FDA’s guidance documents) is insufficient for
industry’s needs (Hawthorne 127-128). In speaking of FDA regulations for medical
devices, Harnack, author of Mastering and Managing the FDA Maze, writes that “one
quickly learns that there is a lot of ‘stuff’ whenever you deal with the FDA.
Understanding this is the first part of dealing with the FDA’s information maze” (xi).
Harnack further claims there is a veritable mountain of information provided by the
FDA, it can be difficult to sift through this information because the content is very
dull and tedious, and it can be difficult to know what information is critical in a sea of
non-critical and unrelated information (xi-xii). In short, there is definitely a reason
Gordon Harnack’s book is titled Mastering and Managing the FDA Maze.
The underlying problem might not be that the FDA provides insufficient
guidance (and regulations) for the biotech industry: it could be that there is too much
information, making it too difficult for biotech companies to locate the information
they need buried in all the information they don’t need and too time-consuming for
the FDA to direct industry to the neededresources. For instance, the FDA’s “How to
Write a Request For Designation (RFD)” document (see Appendix A) includes only
hypertext links that return the reader to the previous page, start an email to the OCP,
or skip to sections within the same document. The numerous references made to the
Code of Federal Regulations are all unlinked. (Keep in mind that each year’s Federal
Register frequently exceeds 50,000 pages, creating needle-in-a-haystack situations for
people seeking information in them.) Definitions for FDA-specific terms (such as
what distinguishes “trademarked name,” “common name,” “generic name,” and
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“usual name” from one another) are missing from the RFD’s guidance document, but
could easily be linked to source materials to assist readers—provided the FDA has the
time and resources to do so.
Even though the FDA’s website was redesigned in late 2010 (“FDA Guidance
Documents: General and Cross-Cutting Topics”), these usability problems—
stemming from what appears to be poor information architecture and the sheer
volume of information—still persist. Unfortunately, reorganizing such a monumental
amount of highly specialized information would be a time-consuming effort for an
organization that is already resource-challenged. Situations such as these are fertile
breeding grounds for regulatory affairs consultants, whose invaluable ability to guide
biotech companies through the maze of FDA resources may make all the difference in
the regulatory approval process. (A usability study of the FDA’s website might also
be an interesting future research project and valuable to academics, the FDA, and
industry.)
Looking back on the overall development process for the Progenix RFD, the
single greatest thing Madison could have done to improve the quality of its FDA
submission would have been to hire a former FDA insider to act as a consultant and
work with the R&D group in developing Madison’s FDA submissions. Although
R&D was able to assemble an RFD for Progenix, and although we were ultimately
successful in attaining the device PMOA and CDRH jurisdiction we sought, our
collective inexperience resulted in a lot of confusion and delays due to the steep
learning curve involved with learning how to work with the FDA. Earlier, in better
financial times, Madison’s European office had hired a regulatory affairs consulting
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group to assemble Epigenix’s submission. Had Madison’s Executives done the same
thing in the US for Progenix, it may have saved the company from its botched
QuickHeal Pre-IND meeting, its bungled QuickHeal 510(k) submission, and its
potentially unnecessary Progenix RFD submission. What took Madison roughly two
years to accomplish might have been accomplished in 9-12 months.
Hindsight
Retrospectively examining the Progenix RFD, I can see definite room for
improvement. In the following subsections, I share my thoughts on how Madison
might have been able to improve upon the final, submitted Progenix RFD. In
particular, I feel there was room for improvement in the cover letter, development
work and testing section, manufacturing information section, and the RFD as a whole.
In addition to these potential improvements to the RFD, I also briefly discuss the
ramifications of how the Progenix RFD reshaped Madison’s marketing claims and
strategies, and how the RFD’s success in attaining primary jurisdiction under CDRH
led to new technical communication projects required to support a newly FDAapproved medical device.
Cover letter
Even though the OCP guidance document does not mention including a cover
letter/introduction in the RFD outline, I believe it was an excellent addition for the
Progenix RFD—and would go so far as to recommend that other companies who
submit RFDs use this tactic in their submissions. According to Marlana Coe, author
of Human Factors for Technical Communicators, people generally read documents in
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one of two ways: sequential (beginning to end) or random (jumping into and about in
a document) (138-140). For a short, technical document being vigorously reviewed
by an employee of the FDA, it seems logical the document would be read
sequentially (front to back) instead of randomly skipping about. By putting Madison’s
jurisdictional recommendation at the beginning of the document, reader expectations
are established on the first page instead of the Sponsor’s Recommendation section
near the very end of the document—when the reviewer has probably already formed
his or her own opinion as to how the product should be classified and the Sponsor’s
Recommendation might be dismissed.
In the Progenix RFD’s cover letter, Madison explained more than just what
jurisdiction it wanted: Madison also explained that the company’s name and the
product’s name had changed since the earlier QuickHeal 510(k) submission that
prompted the CDRH reviewer to redirect Madison to the OCP for a combination
product jurisdictional decision. Although I never heard, saw, or read anything that
suggested that Progenix’s RFD reviewer would be given a copy of the QuickHeal
510(k) submission (or CDRH reviewer’s comments and decision) that triggered the
OCP review for Progenix, I also cannot dismiss the possibility that the OCP reviewer
had a copy of the earlier QuickHeal 510(k) submission and the CDRH reviewer’s
comments. At the very least, it seems logical that an OCP reviewer would receive a
memo or some notes from the CBER/CDER/CDRH reviewer who previously flagged
a product as being a potential combination product in need of review by the OCP. If,
while reviewing the Progenix RFD, the OCP reviewer also had access to the
QuickHeal 510(k) submission and/or the CDRH reviewer’s comments, the OCP
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reviewer would almost certainly notice other major changes Madison made between
two submissions. These additional changes were not addressed in the Progenix RFD’s
cover letter.
For instance, R&D altered the Progenix’s Indications For Use (IFU),
modifying the IFU so it was derived from previously approved 510(k) wound
dressings regulated by CDRH instead of from a previously approved drug-based
ointment regulated by CDER. In chapter one, I quoted a CDRH reviewer as having
stated the following: “However you phrase your indications for use, make sure it is
exactly the same throughout the document. Every word. Every period. Every comma.
Because the reviewer will notice.” If an FDA reviewer will notice a change in how
the IFU is stated within the same document, they would probably notice a change if
they are comparing two documents from the same company for the same product.
In addition to the change we made to Progenix’s IFU, we also altered the
Related Products section. In the earlier QuickHeal 510(k), we based our related
products upon physical manufacturing properties: we claimed to be equivalent to
510(k) medical devices previously made on the contract manufacturer’s coating and
packaging machines being repurposed to manufacture Progenix. In the Progenix
RFD, we used chemical composition analysis to show similarity to other 510(k)
medical devices’ chemical compositions, and none of these products were
manufactured at the contract manufacturer Madison would use to produce Progenix.
This shift was necessary to demonstrate that CDRH was already overseeing 510(k)
medical devices with similar chemical composition to what Progenix contained
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instead of demonstrating similarities in Progenix’s manufacturing processes to prior
510(k) medical devices.
If I had the opportunity to do the cover letter over again, I would have
expanded it to consume about two pages of the RFD, detail all of the changes
Madison made between the earlier QuickHeal 510(k) and the submitted Progenix
RFD. (By reducing the 12-point body text in the RFD to 11- or 10-point, the RFD
would still fall within the 15-page limit.) Additionally, I would have explained that
QuickHeal had been Madison’s first FDA submission and, due to inexperience,
Madison had inadvertently made neophyte mistakes in the QuickHeal 510(k)
submission that were being corrected in the Progenix RFD and mirrored in a followup revised 510(k) submission. Additionally, I would have hired an FDA regulatory
consultant experienced with 510(k) submissions and alerted the FDA that Madison
had hired a consultant and Madison’s staff was undergoing training for how to
properly pursue and maintain FDA compliance with medical devices.
By explaining how Madison was working to correct mistakes that are
probably made frequently by small biotech companies with their first FDA
submission, and how Madison had sought help so the company could operate within
the FDA’s regulations and guidelines, the OCP’s reviewer might have been more
sympathetic to Madison’s plight. In my later experiences with auditors, and from
what I heard from the contract manufacturers I worked with, the FDA tends to be
more lenient with small and new biotechs (and contract manufacturers) as opposed to
large and experienced biotechs. While the quasi-apologetic cover letter approach I’ve
described earlier might benefit a small biotech with their first attempts at obtaining
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FDA approval, it would likely not work with an experienced biotech (who should
know what they are doing after working with the FDA so long) or a large biotech
(where the FDA likely expects these resource-laden companies to have FDA
specialists working for them).
Developmental work and testing section
In this section of the RFD, I believe the R&D group went too deeply into
Progenix’s development history. In particular, going into detail about how Progenix
was re-envisioning from a folk remedy involving a mushroom-based (Piptoporus
pulvinus) organic poultice was not something the reviewer really needed to know to
make a jurisdictional decision and may have been confusing to the reviewer because
it briefly brought up and then eliminated a biological component—and a possible
CBER primary jurisdiction. There was no need to convince the OCP reviewer that
Progenix was not a biological product or that primary jurisdiction should not be given
to CBER: it was obvious from the earlier sections discussing product description and
components that there were no biological components in Progenix.
For the safety and animal testing table presented in the “developmental work
and testing” section, R&D was careful to include only the safety and animal testing
research that had been conducted according to (ISO-based) good laboratory practices.
Contradicting our desire to present the FDA with only the controlled and regulated
research that had been done using Progenix, R&D chose to abandoned the
standardized ISO safety and animal test rating scales in favor of a pass/fail system
developed by Madison and potentially unique to the Progenix RFD. Using a nonstandard pass/fail system may have undermined the research’s credibility—and
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Madison’s as well. In hindsight, we should have used the established grading system
when we presented the study results for Progenix’s ISO-based research instead of
attempting to create our own system. Had the reviewer been concerned or suspicious
of our custom pass/fail scale, he or she may have asked Madison for more details or
copies of the safety and toxicology tests. Even though Madison could readily produce
the documents, I suspect such a request from the OCP reviewer would create a delay
(probably 1-3 weeks) in the review process. Based upon Madison’s expenditures at
the time, a 1-3 week delay might have easily resulted in $125,000 to $375,000 in
wasted operating costs for Madison.
Manufacturing information section
Although the “manufacturing information” section may not appear to be a
good place for making claims for the product jurisdiction desired by the sponsoring
company, this section can be used to make persuasive arguments in some instances.
With Progenix, R&D focused too much on how Progenix was made and neglected to
elaborate on where Progenix was being made. The contract manufacturer responsible
for coating and packaging Madison’s Progenix dressings was an FDA-registered and
inspected facility that used the same machines Progenix was made on to manufacture
other FDA-approved 510(k) medical devices. R&D should have highlighted the
contract manufacturer’s credential and capabilities, and creating a list of all the other
wound dressings made on these machines by this contract manufacturer. Additionally,
Madison’s RFD should have emphasized how all of these similar wound dressings
(each with their own twist on how their ointment was formulated and each made on
the same machines as Progenix) were classified as devices by the FDA.
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We should have also mentioned how the contract sterilizer was irradiating
Progenix dressings at 25-40 kilogray (kGγ) to ensure sterility, and how 25-40
kilogray (kGγ) is an industry standard for sterilizing wound dressings. In summary,
we overlooked a prime opportunity to present additional evidence that supported how
Progenix was being manufactured by established contract manufacturers that
specialized in medical device product manufacturing, not drug manufacturing.
Perhaps one explanation for why we overlooked this somewhat obvious
argument was because Madison was still working towards finalizing manufacturing
parameters and processes at these off-site locations. Our fixation on finalizing and
stabilizing Progenix’s manufacturing processes may have blinded us to this additional
argument for classifying Progenix as a medical device. Ideally, Madison should have
been much further along in creating a stabilized manufacturing process and the
accompanying process documentation required to support these processes by the time
we submitted Progenix’s RFD. This lack of refinement and process documentation
would later come back to haunt Madison, and I discuss the problems that arose from
poorly documented and hastily written processes in the next chapter.
Overall RFD revision
Earlier, for each section of the RFD, I discussed what I initially wrote for the
draft and then how the R&D collaborative group modified and contributed to
subsequent edits of each section. As the RFD evolved, and as new information
became available, we revised individual sections to support these changing focuses.
One thing we avoided doing was revisiting sections we believed to be “finished,”
meaning that everyone had agreed earlier on a section’s content and unless there
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needed to be a change to that section, we left it alone. As our arguments and strategies
shifted over time, while certain sections of the RFD did not, the language and style in
individual sections became disjointed. Much like an anthology with chapters written
by different authors comes across as having more than one voice, the sections within
the RFD began to separate.
To resolve this situation, I believe Madison’s R&D group should have
finished writing the last “needed” revision the RFD, put the document aside for a
couple days to establish some perspective, and then gone back and revised the entire
document from beginning to end to create a greater sense of cohesiveness. (If
Madison had obtained a former FDA reviewer to act as a consultant in a limited
capacity, this would have been an ideal opportunity to send the RFD to him or her for
review and comments—to bring in someone who was not heavily involved in the
RFD’s development and who had a better grasp of audience expectations.)
Unfortunately, R&D was unable to pause to gain perspective or obtain a review from
an outside consultant because of the Executives’ pressure to submit the RFD as
quickly as possible and due to Madison’s poor financial situation. My
recommendation for one final revision of the entire RFD prior to submitting it to the
OCP may be excessive though, as the OCP did grant Madison the desired device
PMOA for Progenix without question or comment on the RFD submission.
RFD submission reshapes Progenix’s marketing claims and strategies
In writing Progenix’s RFD, Madison had one goal: achieve primary
jurisdiction under CDRH as a 510(k) medical device equivalent so Progenix could be
approved as quickly and inexpensively as possible. R&D eventually achieved that
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short-term goal, but in the process we also inadvertently hindered Madison’s ability
to sell Progenix once it was later cleared for human use by CDRH. In defining
Progenix’s MOAs in the RFD, R&D also indirectly redefined the claims Madison
could publicly make about the product.
As a result of the MOA claims made in Progenix’s RFD, Madison had to
rewrite all of its former marketing materials, which largely made unsubstantiated drug
claims about accelerated healing and wound closure expectations. Marketing claims
for Progenix, after the RFD submission, were largely limited to the product’s three
MOAs: (1) protecting the wound, (2) moisturizing the wound, and (3) providing a
patented blend of citrate salts with unknown therapeutic effects. The revised
marketing materials focused on how Progenix helped to protect the wound and keep it
moisturized, but neither of these claims helped to distinguish Progenix from the
hundreds of other wound dressings with similar claims already firmly established in
the wound care market. Poor marketability was the price Madison paid for choosing
the quick-and-cheap route of a device PMOA and a follow-up 510(k) submission to
CDRH.
The Executives eventually tried to give the citrate salt components a name,
“Ingredient X,” and developed marketing materials that read “Progenix Wound
Dressings with Ingredient X technology.” Of course, none of the consumers knew
what Ingredient X was, what it did, or how it worked; and Madison could only make
intentionally vague statements such as “Ingredient X is a therapeutic, patented
combination of citrate salts,” which essentially made no claims at all and relied
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completely on the unknown mystique of Ingredient X to sell the product. None of
these marketing strategies were particularly effective in Madison’s later sales efforts.
Claims made in an RFD directly affect how a company can later market the
product. In fact, one of the FDA’s earliest functions was to help prevent “snake oil”
patent medicines, which were wildly popular in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
from making sweeping and unsubstantiated efficacy claims and thus undermining
FDA-approved drugs with substantiated efficacy and safety claims (Parisian 12,
Hawthorne 35-40, Hilts 23-27). (Unfortunately, many of Madison’s Executives had
backgrounds in multi-level marketing of nutritional/herbal/dietary supplements,
which can be rife with unsubstantiated claims similar to these earlier “snake oil”
patent medicines.) Because Madison positioned Progenix, in the RFD and later in a
510(k) submission, as being virtually identical to two predicate 510(k) medical device
wound dressings, Madison could not make any of the drug-based claims it used prior
to being evaluated by the FDA. These marketing changes went beyond hindering the
marketing and sales of Progenix: these limited claims also affected Madison’s ability
to sell shares in the company, because Madison’s Executives now had to tone down
their claims as to how Progenix worked and what it could be used for when talking
with potential investors.
Looking back on Progenix’s “modes of action” section, in an ideal situation,
the R&D group should have worked more closely with an Executive who was fully
responsible for Progenix’s marketing campaign. The R&D group was concerned
almost exclusively with ensuring that Progenix acquired a device PMOA and a
CDRH primary jurisdiction from the OCP, not how these MOA claims would later
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impact how Madison’s marketing of Progenix. (Frankly, R&D did not realize the
long-term sales implications that would result from the MOAs we developed. The
Executives responsible for marketing also failed to object to the MOAs included in
the final revision of the RFD and/or realize the long term marketing implications, as
they all had the opportunity to review and comment on the final version of the RFD
prior to its submission to the FDA—but there were no objections raised to the RFD’s
contents or language.)
If the R&D group and the Executives had been aware of the long-term sales
complications caused by the limited MOAs in the RFD, the Executives might have
been more willing to fund additional R&D research into the additional device-based
MOAs that would allow claims that would have been useful in Madison’s later efforts
to market Progenix. For instance, claims of “non-adherence,” “allows for wound
drainage,” and even “antibacterial” claims (because the polyethylene glycol in the
ointment is commonly used in soaps) could have been conducted in a few months at a
relatively low level of expense for the tests (excluding operating costs for the
company and lost revenue for this period of extended research). Had Madison taken
more time and money to research potentially unique MOAs, it may have been
possible to still obtain a device-based PMOA while still being able to make claims
similar to those of drugs; but conducting this research may also have placed Progenix
at a higher risk of being classified as a drug-based PMOA. However, with Madison’s
increasingly worsening financial situation and time running out on its patent, Madison
doggedly pursued the fastest and least expensive path through the FDA and to the
market.
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New opportunities for technical communication after an RFD submission
In the previous chapter, I detailed the conflicts between two cliques within
Madison—R&D and the Executives—and how failing to collaborate resulted in a
rejected QuickHeal 510(k) and mandated the Progenix RFD submission detailed
within this chapter. In the next chapter, I discuss the ramifications of the choices we
made in Progenix’s RFP and how, as the company’s technical communicator,
extensive new technical documentation challenges arose as a result of the OCP
assigning Progenix to CDRH for review, the need to write a Progenix 510(k)
submission for CDRH to approve (allowing Progenix to be marketed) after the RFD
submission’s success, and the plethora of supporting documentation that had to be
developed to meet the FDA’s requirements for manufacturing medical devices and
ensuring their quality control after the Progenix 510(k) was approved by CDRH.
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Chapter 5: Madison’s history after the RFD
submission
“In the business world, the rearview mirror is always clearer than the
windshield.”
— Warren Buffett

“Cake, and grief counseling, will be available at the end of the testing
period.”
— GLaDOS, “Portal”

Introduction
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first portion, I discuss the results
of Madison’s Progenix Request for Designation (RFD) submission and evaluate the
success of the submission. In the second section, I summarize the various events that
transpired at Madison Technologies after the Office of Combination Products (OCP)
classified Progenix as a combination product—a device with a secondary drug
component—with primary jurisdiction under CDER. After attaining FDA approval
for Progenix, a surprising amount of technical documentation was still required both
before and after Progenix’s commercial launch.
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RFD submission results and evaluation
It took 74 days to develop and then submit Madison’s RFD for Progenix.
While 74 days may seem an excessively long period of time to produce a 15-page
document, there were numerous other projects ongoing within R&D. (Much of the
delay in development was due to waiting for chemical analysis of several ointmentcoated wound dressing, similar to Progenix, that were previously approved as medical
devices by the FDA.) Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that company-critical
documents typically take much longer to develop than, for instance, an inter-office
memo or a routine 15-page internal report of little importance. Also, whereas
Madison took 74 days to collaboratively develop its 15-page RFD, consider how
Cross describes in “Conflict and Capitulation” how an insurance company allotted
approximately 35 days to collaboratively produce a two-page letter intended to
introduce a potentially contentious annual report, but ended up taking 77 days
developing a document that failed to address a large portion of its intended audience
(4).
Unfortunately, I did not maintain a record of how many total work hours went
into developing the final RFD, but I would estimate the amount of time to be roughly
120-160 hours. I probably spent 25% of the time (30-40 hours) developing the initial
draft and locating resources. The remaining time (80-130 hours) was spent
collectively by the R&D group collaborating with one another on rewording and
reorganizing the document (largely substantive editing).
Once completed, the RFD was submitted to the OCP for review. The OCP has
five days to notify the sponsor of the RFD’s receipt after it receives the document,
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and then 60 days to respond to the sponsor (“RFD Process”). If the OCP reviewer has
questions arising from the RFD or if the RFD fails to effectively communicate the
required information, then there will be additional back-and-forth communications—
and further delays in the OCP reviewer rendering a verdict as to which FDA agency
will receive primary jurisdiction. Because of the 60-day review period and the
potential for extending the review period even longer (or having an RFD submission
rejected or having primary jurisdiction given to an undesired FDA center), it
behooves a company to spend extra time developing an RFD and ensuring it is clear,
concise, accurate, and persuasive in arguing why the OCP reviewer should grant the
primary jurisdiction recommended by the sponsor.
For the Progenix RFD, the 74 days Madison’s R&D department spent
developing the RFD was time well spent. The OCP reviewer took 57 days (out of the
allowed 60 days) to respond, and Progenix was classified as a combination product
with a device-based primary mode of action with secondary drug-based effects.
Primary jurisdiction was given to the CDRH who could, if desired, consult with
CDER during Progenix’s review. This was the response Madison desired, though
R&D had hoped the OCP reviewer might declare the product to be merely a device,
not a device with a drug component.
Even though an RFD submission has only two possible outcomes—desired
classification or undesired classification—it is possible to make further assumptions
about how well or how poorly a submission performed by asking a few questions:
•

How many times did the OCP reviewer contact the sponsor for
clarification?
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•

How many questions did the OCP reviewer ask the sponsor while
processing the document?

•

How long beyond the initial response from the OCP reviewer did it take to
obtain classification?

The OCP reviewer had no questions regarding Progenix’s RFD, so there were
no additional delays with back-and-forth communications between Madison and the
OCP reviewer. Based upon the expeditious, no-questions-asked, no-additional delays
review of the RFD, I believe the Progenix RFD was a relatively ideal document from
both the OCP reviewer’s and Madison’s perspectives; however, it is also possible that
Progenix was not a particularly complex or complicated product in comparison to
what the OCP normally processes, thus making it easy for the OCP reviewer to
classify Progenix without the need for more detailed information and further
communication with Madison. More complex or potentially dangerous combination
products might require more back and forth negotiations between the sponsor and the
OCP reviewer.
In Chapter 3, I stated that Madison required approximately $500,000 per
month in operations costs. Having Progenix receive the desired “device containing a
drug” classification from the OCP with no back-and-forth communications, requests
for additional information, or other delays helped to keep Madison’s operation costs
down. With two months of development time writing the Progenix RFD, and an
additional two-month review process with the OCP, the total four-month delay to
Progenix’s eventual approval cost Madison approximately $2 million. However, $2
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million could have easily become $2.5-3.0 million or more had the OCP reviewer
required more information or if the RFD had been poorly written so as to create
confusion. (The cost of hiring a technical communications consultant for two months
to ensure a company’s RFD is easy to understand is more than justified by the
potential savings of $500,000-1,000,000 for a biotech company.) Furthermore, a $2
million investment in the Progenix RFD’s development was substantially more
appealing than the alternative possibility of Progenix being designated as a drug with
a device component instead of a device with a drug component. Had Madison
received a drug with a device component verdict with CDER taking the lead for
Progenix’s approval, the product would almost certainly have been abandoned due to
the extraordinarily prohibitive costs associated with the development of drug products
(see Table 1-1). With the OCP’s decision that Progenix was a device with a drug
component, and jurisdiction for Progenix’s review given to CDRH, Madison was now
clear to resubmit a revised Progenix 510(k) (substantially equivalent medical device)
submission to CDRH for review.

Madison’s history after Progenix’s FDA approval
Even after Madison successfully achieved a device primary mode of action
from the FDA, Madison was still unable to sell Progenix to the public and thus could
not yet generate any profits from sales. Before Progenix could be legally sold within
the US, Madison needed to overcome a number of manufacturing, marketing, and
regulatory obstacles—all of which involved copious amounts of technical
documentation. The timeline provided in Table 5-1 provides a quick overview of
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critical events for Madison over the five-year period occurring after the FDA’s review
of Progenix’s RFD submission, which are discussed in this chapter.

Table 5-1: Timeline for Madison Technologies post-RFD submission
response
Year
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Event
o Madison submits a revised 510(k) for Progenix to CDRH.
o Progenix is approved for sale in the US as a combination
product.
o Madison opens an executive office in Miami.
o Madison hastily develops a Quality System (QS).
o Marketing materials, packaging, and supporting literature
developed; and a sales force is hired.
o Progenix enters full-scale production and suffers from a 40%
defect rate.
o Madison’s R&D department loses over half its employees.
o Progenix receives an unfavorable reimbursement code.
o Madison’s sales representatives begin selling Progenix.
o Technical communicator promoted to head of manufacturing.
o Complete rewrite of QS initiated.
o Madison licenses Progenix to a Forbes 100 company to handle
sales, marketing, and distribution while Madison
manufactured and supplied Progenix.
o Progenix is rebranded and relaunched.
o Progenix product defect rate drops below 0.05%.
o Madison hires a new Executive in Miami to develop new
products and FDA submissions.
o Progenix re-launch fails to meet sales expectations.
o FDA rejects Madison’s new product 510(k) submission.
o Madison’s debt critically impairs the company’s ability to
manufacture Progenix and develop new products.
o ISO 13485 compliance attained.
o FDA audit of Madison’s QS reveals no findings.
o Madison Technologies enters bankruptcy.
o Fortune 100 company takes over Progenix product.
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Progenix is approved by the FDA
After the OCP ruled that Progenix was a combination product with a device
primary mode of action, Madison revised its original 510(k) submission and
resubmitted the document (this time as Progenix instead of QuickHeal) to CDRH.
The revised 510(k) submission was eventually approved, but the approval process did
not go as smoothly as the RFD’s processing. There were several back-and-forth
communications between the CDRH reviewer and Madison’s R&D division, and the
reviewer wanted Madison to conduct two additional safety tests on Progenix.
It is possible (and there are rumors to this effect circulating within industry)
that FDA’s reviewers will wait until they must respond to an FDA submission (90
days in the case of 510(k) submissions), and then intentionally ask a product’s
sponsor to conduct one or more inexpensive and redundant safety tests if the reviewer
is behind schedule and nearing the end of a review period. There may be some truth
to this rumor. The CDRH reviewer took almost the full 90 days allowed to respond to
Madison’s 510(k) submission, and he asked Madison to conduct an inexpensive and
innocuous safety test—almost identical to a safety test Madison had already
conducted and included in the 510(k) submission)—that would take a few weeks to
complete. Rather than argue with the reviewer that he was essentially making
Madison repeat an already-completed safety test included in the 510(k) submission,
Madison’s R&D department decided to simply do the safety testing exactly as
suggested by the reviewer. The test took less than $10K and 2-3 weeks of time to
complete, and Madison’s R&D group used that time to work on resolving other
questions the CDRH reviewer had.
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Although the Progenix 510(k) submission did not go as smoothly as the
Progenix RFD submission, Madison’s R&D division was able to complete all of the
reviewer’s requests and answer all of his questions. The FDA reviewer then approved
Progenix for sale in the US.
Madison’s executives relocate to Florida
Heady with the success of obtaining FDA approval for Progenix, and enjoying
the resulting influx of funding from venture capitalists and bank loans, the Executives
opened a new US office in Miami, Florida. All of Madison’s US-based executives
and most of their administrative assistants relocated to Miami within a few months.
The rest of the Support staff and R&D remained in the old Nashville office. The
Executives justified the relocation to employees and shareholders by claiming that
opening a new office in Miami for the company’s executive management would make
it easier for the company to entice new, high-profile executives needed to take the
company public with the highest possible price per share. Madison’s executives
claimed Nashville did not have as much appeal for high-level executives as Miami
did, and keeping the executives in Nashville would make it almost impossible to
bring in the new talent needed to take the company public. Despite the Executives’
claims about how it would be easier to attract new and renowned biotech executives
in Miami, Madison only hired one new executive while in Miami—a chemist with no
former biotech experience who had church-based networking ties to one of the
existing Executives.
As discussed earlier in chapter 3, communication between the Executives and
R&D had been poor when these two groups were physically separate onto different
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floors within the same building. When the Executives relocated to a new office that
placed nearly 1,000 miles of distance between themselves and the company’s R&D
employees, communication quality and frequency between these two groups
deteriorated even further.
In addition to the physical distance separating R&D and the Executives, the
two groups no longer shared a common goal of obtaining FDA approval for Progenix.
The Executives focused on marketing and financing while R&D focused research and
FDA compliance. Table 5-2 contrasts the difference between the Executives’ top
three goals and R&D’s top three goals. These diverging purposes and the physical
separation between the Executives and R&D may have lessened the perceived need
and urgency for the two groups to communicate with one another.

Table 5-2: Contrasting the main goals of the Executives and R&D
Executives’ primary goals
Sell shares and take out loans to fund
operations (a task made substantially
easier after obtaining FDA approval for
Progenix).
Prepare the company for an initial
public offering (IPO), allowing
Madison’s shares to be traded publicly
on the stock market and allowing
Madison’s initial shareholders to sell
their shares (supposedly at a profit) and
recover the money they invested before
the IPO.
Determine how to market Progenix in
the US to maximize sales and allow
Madison to become self-sufficient
instead of relying on selling shares and
taking out loans.

R&D’s primary goals
Create, implement, and stabilize largescale manufacturing and quality control
processes for Progenix that would meet
the FDA’s requirements.
Develop an extensive documentation
system for all the processes used to
manufacture and ensure the quality
control of products made by Madison,
ensuring that the documents and generated
forms met the FDA’s regulatory
requirements.
Acquire research grant funding to explore
the potential of other biotech products in
Madison’s pipeline without using
Madison’s financial resources.
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As illustrated in Table 5-2, the Executives were focused on the fiscal aspects
of supporting the company while R&D was focused on the technical aspects of
supporting the company’s products. Both the fiscal and technical aspects were critical
to the company. Without money, Madison would go bankrupt and cease to exist.
Without thoroughly documented manufacturing and quality control processes, the
FDA could arrest employees, force a complete product recall, revoke prior FDA
approvals, and shut Madison’s operations down. Separated by both physical distance
and differing priorities, communication between R&D and the Executives continued
to break down and hinder the realization of both groups’ long-term objectives of
supporting the company through product realization and sales.
Developing Madison’s Quality System
Despite Madison obtaining FDA approval to sell Progenix and the Executives
working on marketing strategies and materials, Progenix could not yet be sold in the
US. FDA approval is a major hurdle to overcome before selling a biotech product, but
the FDA also performs inspections on manufacturers to ensure that FDA-approved
products are being manufactured according to the FDA’s rigorous standards of
quality. Manufacturing processes must be well-controlled and well-documented, and
all process documentation and the records generated by following them must be
retained for the FDA’s review during periodic audits. Documented processes for all
of these procedures must be in place prior to manufacturing a product intended to be
sold to the public (Desroaches 15). However, in discussions I had with various small
biotech companies and manufacturers, it appears that many small biotech companies
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may bend the rules and use documentation that are very minimal and sometimes
inaccurate when conducting initial production runs. This practice allows small
biotechs to use initial production runs to refine the manufacturing processes and
process documentation while still potentially yielding product that might be sold to
the public, recovering some of the development and manufacturing costs.
Madison had manufactured Progenix earlier, in small runs of a few thousand
dressings, so the company could conduct research testing on the dressings, use them
in safety and toxicology studies used to support the Progenix 510(k), and show them
off to existing shareholders and potential investors. However, Madison made these
sample products without having adequately documented processes or records of
production. None of these sample dressings—all marked “NOT FOR HUMAN USE”
on their individual packages—could be sold to the public. Madison still needed to
refine, test, and document all the manufacturing processes prior to manufacturing
product intended for sale to and use by the public; but these small-scale test runs were
extremely useful in developing Madison’s draft process documentation.
These documented systems required by the FDA are referred to as quality
management systems (QMS) or quality systems (QS). A QS is a collection of
documents (often procedures, specifications, and forms) designed to promote
standardization, enhance quality control, record production data, and enhance the QS
in a cycle of continuous improvement over time and through use. The FDA requires
companies who manufacture medical devices, drugs, biologics, or combinations
thereof to have a QS in place prior to making product intended for sale to the public
(Desroches 7-18).
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According to Megan Haggerty of the FDA’s New England District Office, the
FDA conducts surprise inspections on biotech manufacturers “at least every two
years” (4). However, while at various contract manufacturing facilities, I noted that
their most recent FDA inspections typically occurred anywhere from one to five years
apart. Madison’s products, for example, did not undergo any kind of FDA inspection
for nearly 4 years. Rumor within the biotech industry is that the FDA typically
inspects the larger companies with multiple product lines far more frequently than
small companies with fewer product lines.
Based upon my discussions with biotech auditors from other companies who
had undergone FDA inspections as well as my own personal experience, during an
audit, the FDA inspector generally does a brief walkthrough inspection of where the
products (or product components) are made, what equipment is used to make the
products (and how the equipment is installed and serviced/calibrated), and how the
raw materials and finished products are stored. The rest of the inspection (usually 1-4
days) is spent scrutinizing the company's QS and its supporting documentation to
verify the following:
•

The company’s process documentation mirrors actions performed in
the manufacturing process.

•

The company is not making inappropriate and unapproved marketing
claims.

•

The people following the company’s procedures are properly trained
on these procedures and there is documentation of their individual
training.
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•

The documentation generated from these procedures (often completed
forms) are accurate, retrievable, and designate which trained
employee(s) conducted the actions being documented.

•

The company is properly handling and documenting situations when a
deviation from a procedure occurs, ensuring the quality, safety, and
efficacy of the product before allowing it to enter the market.

•

The company properly destroys any defective product or components
so it cannot accidentally enter the market.

My personal observations of the industry and discussions with seasoned
biotech manufacturers closely reflect what the FDA advocates to its field inspectors:
spending 2.5-7.5 days examining a company’s QS documentation (Desroches 11-12).
If an FDA inspector determines a company has failed to comply with its QS
(or doesn’t have one), and/or if the QS does not meet the FDA’s requirements, then
the company will receive one or more sanctions. According to Smart Consulting
Group (“Failing an FDA Inspection”), FDA sanctions can include the following:
•

Warning letters (which are made publicly available to shareholders,
physicians, patients, business partners, and competitors)

•

Fines (the largest of which was $1.3 billion against Pfizer (McKenzie))

•

Tougher FDA inspections in the future

•

Product recalls

•

Revocation of the FDA’s clearance to market a product

•

Criminal prosecution
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•

Confiscation and/or destruction of product and materials

•

Forced closings of manufacturing and storage facilities

•

Permanent disbarment (of companies and individuals) from being
involved in any part of future FDA submissions

Typical of the eternal struggle between the sales and production groups within
most companies (Rotemberg and Saloner 630-633), Madison’s executives (who
almost all had prior sales representative experience) pressured R&D to start
manufacturing Progenix immediately after its 510(k) was approved by CDRH so the
Executives could begin selling Progenix. However, R&D was able to convince the
Executives (by pointing out the numerous business and legal sanctions that would
befall them and the company) that Madison needed a QS prior to manufacturing
product intended for sale to and use by the public. To hasten Madison’s ability to
manufacture and sell Progenix, R&D asked to hire a consultant with experience
developing medical device quality systems. The Executives, having a similar goal of
wanting product produced as soon as possible, approved hiring the QS consultant—
but only on a part-time basis because of the expense involved ($150/hr). The
consultant estimated it would take approximately one year to develop a minimalist
QS for Madison on a part-time basis, but one year was deemed unacceptably long by
the Executives. The Executives wanted a QS within half a year (or less) so they could
start selling Progenix, but they refused to pay the consultant to work full-time to
accomplish this goal.
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Within the biotech industry, half a year is considered to be an extremely short
time to develop a customized QS ("Quality Information on ISO 9000"), and it was
likely a nearly impossible task for a part-time consultant to cobble together a QS in
the same amount of time. Cutting as many corners as possible due to the time
constraints imposed by the Executives, the consultant decided to boilerplate a QS he
developed for another company to serve as a template, but the other company
manufactured a different kind of medical device. The original QS (which Madison
used as a boilerplate) had been developed several years prior for a company with over
200 employees, with approximately 20 employees directly supporting the QS.
Madison, contrastingly, had only two employees (the Manufacturing Manager and the
R&D Manager) who would be supporting the QS. As a result, once the draft QS was
put into practice, it would immediately overwhelm the employees responsible for
maintaining it.
Complicating matters, the two employees who would be responsible for
maintaining Madison QS were not able to fully participate in the QS’s development:
they were both preoccupied trying to find raw material suppliers, find suitable
contract manufacturers, and establish processes for how Progenix could be mass
produced consistently. When the part-time QS consultant later attempted to document
the processes used to manufacture Progenix at facilities located 800 miles away from
Madison’s US office, he was forced to rely upon verbal descriptions and hand-drawn
sketches of the machines at the contract manufacturer’s site. (Contract manufacturers
typically do not allow photographs or videos of their machines and processes to be
taken, and Madison also had a “No Photographs Or Video” sign at its ointment
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manufacturing facility.) The Manufacturing Manager was the only employee who had
physically visited this distant contract manufacturer’s facilities and seen Progenix
sample runs being produced. The consultant was forced to write manufacturing
instructions for processes that had not yet been tested in full-scale production and that
he had never witnessed first-hand. Creating process documentation in such a short
time frame and under non-ideal conditions would later give rise to unavoidable
problems when the draft QS documents were finally put into use.
Progenix enters full-scale production
Predictably, the QS consultant’s attempt to write draft documentation
describing untested procedures he had never seen before yielded wildly inaccurate
and flawed process descriptions in Madison’s QS. With no user testing of the process
documentation prior to entering the first production run, Madison’s first attempt to
implement the QS documentation was an unmitigated disaster. The initial production
run was aborted during the start-up phase because it was almost immediately obvious
the documented processes did not reflect the machines’ and workers’ activities. Hasty
surface revisions were made by the Manufacturing Manager (the only employee
Madison sent to the manufacturing site) and the QS documents were used in
production again. Product was made this time, but everything had to be scrapped as it
became evident there were still critical errors in the documentation and the product
was not being manufactured consistently and within specifications. The documents
were hastily revised again, machine settings were modified, and production began a
third time. There were still significant problems in the documentation and
manufacturing process, but the Executives had became frustrated at the series of
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delays and costs in manufacturing what they hoped would be Madison’s first lot of
product they could sell. The Executives directly intervened, deemed the most recent
production run could undergo a 100% manual inspection to weed out defective
product, and thus be good enough for sale to the public. The Manufacturing Manager
was ordered to initiate the 100% inspection immediately instead of rejecting the third
production run as he initially intended. The Manufacturing Manager then enlisted me
to help during the labor-intensive 100% visual inspection on approximately 30,000
individual wound dressings, of which about 40% were rejected for being out of
specification or defective.
R&D staff attrition
A 40% rejection rate is indicative of how unstable Progenix’s production
process was and the magnitude of work that remained to be done to Madison’s draft,
boilerplated QS documentation. At this critical juncture, the Executives terminated
the QS consultant’s contract, claiming it was a cost-saving measure and his services
were no longer needed. The Executives believed R&D could finish what was left to
do with the QS. The two R&D employees responsible for developing the QS—the
R&D Manager and the Manufacturing Manager—had very little time to fix the
problems in the documentation because they were focused on physical processes that
still needed to be refined and stabilized. Even when no manufacturing was occurring,
the QS required that routine maintenance and monitoring to be done (i.e., cleaning the
area where product was stored, recording temperatures where the product was stored,
etc). These activities were largely neglected due to lack of time, lack of human
resources, and the more pressing problems. Furthermore, the maintenance procedures
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boilerplated from the QS the consultant developed for a larger company with a
different product were not directly applicable to Madison’s smaller facility. Not only
were required procedures being neglected, the written procedures could not even be
followed because Madison did not have the cleaning equipment or facilities described
in the documentation. The information architecture in the QS was in shambles,
procedures that were difficult to find were being overlooked, and there was no sense
of connectivity between procedures. For example, if an employee pulled the
procedure to mix ointment, there was no reference in the ointment mixing procedure
to how the tanks had to be cleaned before and after production, how the ointment
needed to be tested, or how the drum of ointment needed to be labeled and stored
until the test results came back in. Problems with Madison’s QS were arising faster
than they could be resolved.
Just as the Executives began to press for an additional production run, R&D’s
Regulatory Affairs Manager went to part-time status (10-20 hours per week) due to
his ailing wife and the R&D Manager resigned to take a job at another company. The
R&D Manager had always served as R&D’s point of contact with the Executives, and
no new leader was appointed for R&D. As a group, R&D became a leaderless
democracy with almost no communication between R&D and the Executives.
Madison’s remaining Manufacturing Manager became the only person in charge of
the rapidly collapsing QS, and he was the only R&D employee still supporting
Madison’s labyrinthine QS. With the QS nearing a point of collapse, the
Manufacturing Manager initiated another production run with the intent of building
up a surplus of product. Again, the product had to undergo a 100% inspection. I
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assisted the Manufacturing Manager in hand-inspecting every wound dressing, and
we again rejected nearly 40% of the resulting product—clear evidence there were still
major issues in the production process and documentation. Within four months after
this production run, the Manufacturing Manager had found another job and resigned
from Madison, leaving no one left to manufacture Progenix or maintain and repair the
neglected, dysfunctional QS. Fortunately, the Manufacturing Manager had also left a
large quantity of Progenix in the warehouse that the Executives felt was good enough
to be sold to the public.
Within half a year, Madison’s R&D department went from having four fulltime employees and a part-time consultant to having just one full-time employee (me,
the Technical Communications Manager) and one part-time employee (Regulatory
Affairs Manager). These resignations more than doubled the workload on the two
remaining R&D employees, and no new employees were hired to replace the departed
R&D employees or the consultant.
Progenix receives an unfavorable reimbursement code
Despite having a substantial amount of Progenix in the warehouse, not a
single box of Progenix had yet been sold because Madison needed to get a
reimbursement code—a code that would determine and standardize how much
insurance companies and Medicare/Medicaid would pay for Progenix. Madison’s
Executives attempted to obtain the highest possible reimbursement for Progenix from
the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS).
HCPCS establishes how much money is to be reimbursed (by
Medicare/Medicaid and insurance companies) per use of a medical device or service.
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The HCPCS-assigned reimbursement value is based on the classification of product
or service used, not the brand name of the medical device or the service provider’s
company (Straube). For instance, a Band-Aid brand bandage reimburses for the same
amount as a comparable generic adhesive bandage of the same size. Although
Progenix was a gauze dressing with an ointment, the Executives did not want
Progenix to be classified as a gauze dressing with an ointment.
Under HCPCS’s classification system, gauze dressings with an ointment
reimbursed for a little under $5 per dressing. However, a collagen dressing
reimbursed for $20 per dressing—four times more than a gauze dressing with an
ointment. After Madison stopped claiming Progenix was going to be a drug and
started claiming it was going to be a device, the Executives had stopped comparing
Progenix to Regranex (a topical ointment classified as a drug) and started comparing
Progenix to Promogran (a collagen wound dressing classified as a device). The
Executives assured Madison’s shareholders and venture capitalists that Progenix (a
gauze dressing with an ointment) would be reimbursed at about $20 per dressing, just
like Johnson & Johnson’s Promogran dressings. The resulting business model the
Executives developed for Madison depended upon Progenix obtaining the $20 per
dressing reimbursement that collagen dressings enjoyed; however, other than both
Progenix and Promogran both being wound dressings, their components were nothing
alike.
Madison’s Executives may have realized I was overwhelmed with taking on
all of the Manufacturing Manager’s responsibilities and learning Madison’s QS. They
hired a consultant to write the HCPCS submission. When the consultant came to the
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R&D office asking for information about the product’s composition, manufacturing,
and supporting research; I learned that Madison’s Executives had insisted Progenix
be positioned as a collagen dressing in the HCPCS submission, despite Progenix not
containing any collagen. In sharing documents with the consultant, I pointed out that
Progenix contained no collagen. However, the consultant complied with the
Executives’ wishes, wrote an HCPCS submission for Progenix that claimed it was
equivalent to a collagen dressing, and sent it in.
Unsurprisingly, when HCPCS reviewed the consultant’s application for
Progenix as a collagen dressing, the reviewer noticed Progenix had no collagen listed
as a raw material. The HCPCS reviewer rejected Madison’s request to have Progenix
classified as a collagen dressing, and instead assigned Progenix to the “gauze dressing
with saline” category (probably because the consultant extensively discussed the
patented citrate salt mixture contained in the ointment or perhaps as “punishment” for
having the audacity to try and classify a non-collagen dressing as a collagen
dressing). This decision meant Progenix would be reimbursed at a little over $2 per
dressing instead of the $20 per dressing Madison’s Executives desired.
The Executives fired the consultant and instructed R&D (at this time just the
Regulatory Affairs Manager and me) to appeal HCPCS’s classification of Progenix as
a “gauze dressing with saline,” trying to again obtain classification as a collagen
dressing with a $20 per dressing reimbursement. Faced with what R&D viewed as an
impossible task, we argued with the Executives that Progenix would never be
accepted as a collagen-based dressing because the dressing had absolutely no
collagen in it. R&D suggested trying to gain classification as an ointment coating
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gauze dressing instead, which would reimburse for a little under $5 per dressing.
Even though $5 was just one-fourth the reimbursement value the Executives wanted,
it was more than double what HCPCS had assigned Progenix after Madison’s
thwarted attempt at getting HCPCS to classify it as a collagen dressing.
The Executives reluctantly agreed with R&D’s plan, hoping to later argue
with HCPCS that Progenix merited a completely new and unique classification with a
substantially higher reimbursement value based upon its effectiveness in wound
healing (which there was still no credible research to support and no research being
conducted to support). R&D prepared a letter of appeal to HCPCS according to their
guidelines (“Requesting a Reconsideration of a Coding Verification Decision”),
argued that Progenix was a gauze dressing with an ointment coating and not a saline
dressing as previously classified by HCPCS, and was successful in obtaining the
“gauze dressing with an ointment” classification and higher reimbursement. The
following table (Table 5-3) briefly contrasts the major differences between the two
HCPCS submissions.
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Table 5-3: Contrasting the initial HCPCS submission for Progenix with
the subsequent appeal letter to HCPCS
Document
type
Purpose

Formal HCPCS submission
Establish Progenix as a collagen
dressing with a $20/dressing
reimbursement (despite Progenix
not containing collagen).

Approach

(1) Describe the Progenix dressing
material components and how the
dressing is to be used.
(2) List all components of the
Progenix dressing in a table.
(3) Argue that the gauze in
Progenix is equivalent to a
collagen dressing and thus merits a
collagen dressing reimbursement
classification.

How the
HCPCS
reviewer
likely
perceived
the
submission

(1) Progenix has no collagen
dressing in it and therefore cannot
be a collagen dressing.
(2) Madison provided no evidence
that Progenix performs as well as a
collagen dressing or is otherwise
comparable to a collagen dressing.
(3) Making an exception and
classifying Progenix as equivalent
to a collagen dressing would create
a precedent that most every
manufacturer of ointment/salinecoated gauze dressings could use
to appeal prior HCPCS
classifications.
(4) Because Madison’s HCPCS
submission also focused on the salt
components of the dressing, a
saline gauze dressing classification
is more justifiable than a collagen
dressing classification.
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HCPCS reimbursement decision
appeal letter
Appeal HCPCS’ classification of
Progenix as a saline dressing with
a $2/dressing reimbursement into
an ointment-coated dressing with
a $5/dressing reimbursement.
(1) Restate HCPCS’s earlier
classification of Progenix as a
saline dressing.
(2) List all components of the
Progenix dressing in a table.
(3) Compare and contrast
Progenix components and uses
with other ointment-coated
dressings the FDA considered to
be predicate devices and which
HCPCS classified as ointmentcoated dressings.
(1) HCPCS initially classified
Progenix as a saline dressing, but
Madison believes Progenix
should be classified as an
ointment-coated dressing.
(2) Progenix contains components
of a saline dressing (salts), but the
salts account for just 1% of the
ointment base coated onto the
dressing. From a material
component standpoint, Progenix
is more similar to an ointmentcoated dressing than a saline
dressing.
(3) Madison’s request that
HCPCS reclassify Progenix from
a saline dressing to an ointmentbased dressing is reasonable,
backed by evidence, and complies
with HCPCS’ existing dressing
classification system.

Even though Madison’s R&D group was successful in appealing HCPCS’s
initial decision and doubling the initial reimbursement value for Progenix dressings, a
$5 reimbursement per dressing was still just one-fourth of the reimbursement the
Executives had projected in Madison’s business plan. The lower-than-expected
reimbursement substantially pushed back the date when Madison would be able to
sustain itself on product sales instead of investments from venture capitalists,
shareholders, and bank loans—and the global economy was beginning to take a
downturn, making it harder to find investors and secure loans. These factors,
combined with the loss of most of R&D personnel, mandated that Madison halt the
development of all new products in the pipeline and focus on manufacturing and
selling Progenix. The Executives hired a small sales force of half a dozen people and
began marketing Progenix locally within Tennessee, hoping that Progenix’s
effectiveness over other products would be so readily apparent that word-of-mouth
would drive sales exponentially—despite there being no research to prove that
Progenix was even effective.
Transitioning from technical communications to manufacturing biotech
products
Shortly after the Manufacturing Manager resigned and grant-based research
projects were put on hold due to lack of funding and lack of R&D employees, the
Executives made me the new Manufacturing Manager and the Technical
Communications Manager position I previously held was eliminated. I had no
experience with the company’s manufacturing process, but the Executives knew I had
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taken a few years of undergraduate mechanical engineering courses, realized there
was a lot of documentation involved in manufacturing, and recognized I had
performed well as the company’s technical writer. In short, I was unqualified for the
position in terms of manufacturing experience, but Madison could not afford to hire a
new employee with the background they needed and simply had to make do with the
employee they had.
Fortunately the previous Manufacturing Manager had stockpiled a supply of
Progenix in the warehouse prior to departing and Madison’s newly assembled sales
force was not having great success in getting physicians to try and buy Progenix. This
lack of demand for a new production run gave me the opportunity to start studying
the QS and attempting to learn how the product was supposed to be made. After
several months of attempting to learn the QS, I decided the QS was hopelessly
dysfunctional and needed to be completely rewritten so the information architecture
and procedures were designed for use at Madison instead of the company it had
originally been designed for. (The QS revision is discussed in greater detail later in
this chapter.) Rewriting the QS would be a project that took me over two years to
complete. Simultaneously, as I rewrote the QS, I also had to oversee all aspects of
manufacturing—raw material acquisition, logistics, production processes,
sterilization, quality control inspections, warehousing, record keeping, training,
facility maintenance, etc.
An opportunity to test and revise the production QS occurred in mid 2007
with the introduction of new Progenix dressing sizes (designed to take advantage of
higher HCPCS reimbursement rates for larger dressing sizes). For three months, I

242

relocated to an out-of-state contract manufacturing facility and alternated between
learning how the machines worked, learning what the line workers did, revising the
process documentation within the QS, and then retraining the line workers on the new
instructions. As a result of these efforts, Progenix’s manufacturing defect rate
dropped from 40% of the product being defective to less than 1% of the product being
defective. But would a 1% defect rate be acceptable to the FDA or the public?
Although the manufacturing process had improved and stabilized substantially, there
was still much room for improvement.
Madison licenses Progenix to a Forbes 100 company
By mid 2007, the Executives realized their small sales force had not
effectively launched Progenix using the Executive’s sales-by-word-of-mouth strategy.
Initially I suspected the Executives’ sales strategy had failed; but I later heard a rumor
from a couple of sales representatives that larger biotech companies with competing
wound dressing products were blockading Progenix (and probably other new products
from their competitors) from the marketplace by threatening to revoke their company
discounts across multiple product lines if any local distributors started to carry
Progenix. (It is similar to the way you do not see Pepsi products in a Coca-Cola
vending machine.) The Executives began trying to partner with a large company with
well-established medical product lines, worldwide distributors, and a large sales force
in an attempt to break into the wound care market. By late 2007, Madison’s
Executives succeeded and licensed Progenix to a BigCo, Inc. (BigCo is a pseudonym
for a Forbes 100 company.) According to the contract between Madison and BigCo,
BigCo would take over all sales, marketing, and distribution activities while Madison
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would be responsible for all manufacturing processes and quality assurance. As a
result of this licensing agreement, Madison received a $2 million signing bonus and
was able to lay off all of Madison’s sales representatives—both of which helped to
relieve some of the pressure building up from Madison’s growing debt and mounting
operating costs.
Re-launching Progenix, improving the QS, and a new FDA submission
By early 2008, Madison’s focuses had shifted again. Madison’s R&D
employees (a part-time Regulatory Affairs Manager and me) were busy revising QS
documentation to support the recently re-branded Progenix. Production runs began
anew, and by now the product defect rate had further declined from just under 1% to
less than 0.05%—with many of the later production runs having zero defects. With
the most immediately critical parts of the QS (manufacturing) rewritten, focus shifted
towards rewriting the numerous supporting aspects of the QS (training, revision
control, supplier qualification and audits, maintenance, etc.).
As a result of the tremendous amount of work I had accomplished, and
because I had become a well-respected, primary technical point of contact for the
Forbes 100 company partner, and because there was considerable friction between
Madison’s Executive group and the BigCo (because Madison’s Executives had
promised things the company had not been able to deliver to BigCo), I was promoted
from Manufacturing Manager to Vice President of Manufacturing and Quality
Control. However, this promotion was a “title only” promotion, possibly to re-assure
BigCo that their product’s quality was under control. I was the only executive-level
employee not located in Miami, and I continued to be excluded from the majority of
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the Executives’ meetings unless they directly involved manufacturing or quality
control. In some instances, even when manufacturing or quality control were
involved, I was still excluded and simply given (often impossible to accomplish)
production schedules after the fact. (After I learned the Executives were promising
BigCo production delivery dates without discussing the dates with me, I attempted to
address this communication problem by supplying the Executives with flowcharts and
timelines that illustrated how long it took to manufacture product, Unfortunately,
these documents did not resolve the communication problem.)
Part of the reasoning for my exclusion from meetings with the Executives
(apart from frustrating them by pushing back delivery dates to what was realistic)
might have been because the Executives recognized R&D was too busy with
manufacturing and revising the QS to develop new products for Madison. The
Executives wanted to resume research and development activities to make Progenix
spin-off products and submit new FDA submissions, and they decided to hire a new
employee to serve as Vice President of R&D. Rather than assigning the new
Executive to oversee and/or work with the R&D department in Nashville (which now
did very little R&D work and almost exclusively focused on manufacturing, quality
control, and the QS), the newly hired Executive (who had no prior experience
developing medical devices or working with the FDA) worked in relative isolation
with the other Executives located in Miami.
The new vice president was tasked with one major project: develop a
collagen-based wound dressing that was a Progenix knock-off product (the same salt
components but added to a collagen dressing that could reimburse for $20/dressing)
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called Adavanca. (The Executives abandoned their earlier plan to create a new
HCPCS reimbursement code for Progenix, instead deciding it would be easier to
make a collagen wound dressing within HCPCS’ reimbursement structure.) I
suspected that once the higher-priced Adavanca was approved and entered large-scale
manufacturing, the less-profitable Progenix would be discontinued and the moreprofitable Adavanca would be promoted as being superior.
Progenix re-launch fails to meet sales expectations
Despite partnering with a Forbes 100 company with extensive experience with
biotech sales, marketing, and distribution networks, Progenix’s sales in 2008 and
2009 were far below what Madison’s executives had forecast. Although Progenix was
well-received by the physicians who tried it on their patients and there were
numerous anecdotal success stories as to how Progenix appeared to outperform
similar and more expensive wound care products, Progenix’s low cost appeared to be
hindering product sales. Sales representatives from BigCo received commissions
based on the total dollar value of their sales, not the total volume of sales. Because
Progenix was the least expensive of the advanced wound dressings in BigCo’s
product line, their sales representatives were reluctant to promote a new, inexpensive
product that would reduce the size of their sales commissions and be a harder sell
than older, established product lines that were more expensive but potentially less
effective. Because of the way BigCo rewarded its sales representatives, their sales
force spent most of their face-to-face time with physicians promoting BigCo’s more
expensive wound treatments, which ensured a larger commission for the sale
representatives.
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As Progenix’s sales consistently fell below what had been forecast, Madison
was unable to pay its debts in a timely manner. As Madison developed a history of
being difficult to extract payment from, relations with critical raw material vendors
began declining in late 2008. By early 2009, most vendors refused to do business with
Madison until prior debts were paid and/or cash was paid in advance.
Madison is crippled by its unpaid and growing debts
As Madison continued its downward spiral into debt, the company’s ability to
manufacture Progenix became compromised. By mid 2009, as raw materials in
storage were depleted, Progenix’s production capabilities ground to a halt. Unable to
obtain new raw materials or contract manufacturing services from critical vendors
Madison owed money to and could not pay, Madison began missing Progenix
delivery dates. Rather than reveal the underlying financial problems to its licensing
partner, Madison instead began pushing production dates back further and further.
Inevitably, Progenix went on backorder. BigCo became incensed as their new product
line went on backorder during its first year launch onto the market. Madison could
not affort to manufacture Progenix, so there was no Progenix to sell to BigCo: BigCo
received no Progenix, so could not pay Madison.
Madison, in terms of manufacturing, had been immobilized by its mounting
debt. Madison’s best hope for survival was that the FDA would approve Adavancia,
which the new Vice President of R&D in Miami had submitted earlier to CDRH as a
510(k). BigCo was interested in buying the rights to Adavancia if it gained FDA
approval, and the licensing bonus would enable Madison to resume manufacturing
efforts.
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Adavanca’s 510(k) submission is rejected by the FDA
Adavanca was a direct knock-off of Progenix. The citrate salts, instead of
being added to an ointment that was coated onto a gauze, would be mixed into a
collagen “soup” and then formed into dressings. HCPCS would likely approve these
collagen dressings for a $20/dressing reimbursement, resolving a number of sales and
marketing issues with Progenix. Madison’s Executives assumed Adavancia’s
approval was all but guaranteed FDA, speculating that FDA approval would be
attained by Fall of 2009.
Adavanca’s 510(k) was written independently by Madison’s newest Vice
President of R&D in Miami, not by the remaining two members of Madison’s R&D
group who had been successful earlier with the Progenix RFD and 510(k) submission.
Adavanca’s 510(k) was never reviewed by me (the company’s only technical
communicator) or the Regulatory Affairs Manager. The Vice President of R&D (in
Miami) was solely responsible for writing the Adavanca 510(k) submission, and he
was a PhD-level chemist, not a technical communicator, and had never previously
submitted a 510(k). R&D supplied the new Executive with copies of Progenix’s RFD
and 510(k) submissions to use as a boilerplate for Adavanca’s 510(k) submission,
but—for reasons unknown to me—the new Executive opted to not use Progenix’s
earlier FDA documents as a model. Instead, the new Executive, with his substantial
chemistry background, centered the focus of Adavanca’s 510(k) submission towards
discussing the chemistry of the drug components, toxicology of the drug components,
and potential therapeutic effects of the chemical components—instead of focusing on
the physical aspects of Adavancia. (Recall that 510(k) submissions are for physical
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devices and that drug submissions are for chemical compounds.) All of these lengthy
digressions within the 510(k) submission stressed and drew attention to Adavanca’s
drug components, proposed future therapeutic drug claims to the FDA reviewer
(despite there still being no testing or proof of any of these theoretical therapeutic
claims), and undermined the premise that Adavanca was a medical device that
achieved its primary mode of action through physical means.
Unsurprisingly, the CDRH reviewer rejected Adavanca as a medical device
and claimed it was a drug, not a medical device (or even a combination product).
Several appeals were made by the Miami office to the FDA, and, as I was
preoccupied with manufacturing and quality control issues, no technical
communicator was included in the preparation or review of these appeals. The FDA
was unmoved by the appeals.
Although not involving a technical communicator in the Adavanca 510(k)
development process and subsequent appeals to the FDA may have reduced the
development time and cost to submit these documents, the omission of a technical
communicator may also have hindered the effectiveness of the documentation.
Ultimately, failing to include a technical communicator in Adavanca’s development
process may have cost Madison far more time and money than the company could
afford to lose.
Madison did not have the time, money, or personnel required to seek FDA
approval for Adavanca as a drug, so the product was abandoned. The Executives’
hope of gaining a few million dollars from licensing Adavanca to the Forbes 100
company and gaining some relief from Madison’s mounting debts evaporated. The
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Executives’ only remaining hope for keeping Madison from going bankrupt was to
find investors willing to put several millions of dollars into a fledgling company that
had already burned through nearly $70 million over a decade of time, but the global
economy was showing signs of a recession and few people were interested in
investing in such a speculative, troubled business during a tumultuous fiscal climate.
Madison’s QS attains ISO 13485 certification
I halted Progenix’s production when we ran out of a critical raw material and
it became obvious that Madison would not be able to obtain critical supplies until a
large infusion of money came in from investors or another loan. I then turned R&D’s
focus towards completing the QS revisions and achieving ISO 13485 compliance—a
goal the Executives had told BigCo Madison would complete in early 2009 but which
had been an impossible-to-meet deadline. I knew through phone discussions with my
contacts at BigCo that BigCo’s management was losing faith in the Executives, but
gaining ISO 13485 certification might help Madison save face with BigCo. The
Executives had previously authorized R&D to have an ISO certification auditor
inspect Madison’s revised QS to determine if the quality system met ISO 13485
requirements. After completing the remaining major revisions to the QS, the ISO
certification auditor came to insect the documentation. The review of Madison’s QS
was successful, and Madison’s QS was awarded ISO 13485 certification—and
indication that Madison’s QS had finally matured and should withstand an FDA
audit.
BigCo was pleased to learn that Madison’s QS had attained ISO 13485
certification, thus helping to ensure that the Progenix product Madison had supplied
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to them was made to a high degree of quality and would therefore likely survive an
FDA inspection without incurring an embarrassing recall. The goodwill that
Madison’s ISO 13485 certification brought was short-lived though, as BigCo
becoming increasingly irritated at production delays that were causing backorders.
Lawyers from both companies began joining in on conference calls between the two
companies, and BigCo began pointing out the numerous breaches of contract
Madison had committed and BigCo, according to the contract between the two
companies, had a contractual right to copy Madison’s QS and take over all aspects of
Progenix’s production process if Madison was incapable of delivering product in a
timely manner. Madison’s lawyer threatened back that BigCo failed to sell as much
product as they had forecast earlier. Legal posturing between the two companies
continued to escalate as Madison continued to miss production dates for Progenix.
FDA audit of Madison’s QS reveals no findings
Two months after obtaining ISO 13485 certification, the FDA conducted a
surprise inspection at Madison’s primary contract manufacturer. As part of the
inspection, the FDA auditor spent a full day reviewing Progenix’s manufacturing
process and all the accompanying QS documentation—including past production
records. The FDA auditor cited no major or minor findings, instead making only
optional suggestions for further improvements. In two years, Madison had gone from
potentially facing a complete product recall, shutdown of Madison’s manufacturing
facilities, loss of Progenix’s FDA approval, and possible legal sanctions to easily
passing an FDA audit. This accomplishment would have been impossible if
Madison’s QS documentation had not been completely rewritten.
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Madison enters bankruptcy
One week after the FDA inspection, on a Friday afternoon in early December
2009, the Executives emailed all of Madison employees to inform them they were
being laid off effective at the end of business that day. Two weeks later and with over
$20 million in debt, Madison filed for bankruptcy. By 2010, all of Madison’s assets
were liquidated to pay creditors. The shareholders lost their investments.
Fortune 100 company takes over Progenix product line
In early 2010, BigCo declared Madison to be in breach of contract, acquired a
copy of Madison’s QS, and assumed control over all aspects of manufacturing,
marketing, distributing, and selling Progenix. Although Madison collapsed just prior
to 2010, Progenix—as of this dissertation’s completion in early 2011—is still being
manufactured and sold in the US by BigCo.

Conclusion
Obtaining FDA approval for a biotech product typically increases the
company’s valuation, especially for a small biotech. However, as I have shown in this
chapter, FDA approval does not guarantee the success of a company or its product in
the marketplace. FDA approval can be withdrawn if a company fails to implement a
functional quality system that meets or exceeds the standards required by the FDA.
(See Table 1-1 for FDA post-approval regulatory requirement references.) Key to the
survival of a product is its profitability. It is critical to take into account government
agencies (like Medicare and Medicaid) and reimbursement strategies prior to
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investing the considerable resources required to attain FDA approval, create and
stabilize a manufacturing and quality control process, and write a voluminous quality
system documentation supporting a product.
Technical communicators can—and probably should—play an important role
in the development of new FDA products, particularly in small start-up biotech
companies. Following is a list of the various kinds of documentation I helped to
develop for Madison over the course of my employment, and each is an area that
could benefit from the inclusion of a technical communicator.
•

Business plans

•

Website content/design

•

Investor relations materials (newsletters, letters, annual reports, voting
forms, emails, PowerPoint presentations)

•

Press releases

•

Scientific/technical reports

•

Research grants

•

FDA submissions

•

Medicare/Medicaid reimbursements

•

Manufacturing instructions

•

Technical specification reference materials

•

Training manuals

•

Quality systems

253

At Madison, whenever a technical communicator was not involved in the
development of written materials, there were significant problems—frequently with
failure to analyze the audience. Shareholder newsletters were largely bulleted lists
riddled with grammatical errors. Presentations about a new product, made to
scientists at the FDA, focused on the company’s business plan, the economics of
healthcare in the US, and small-scale anecdotes of the product’s use in Europe.
Product was made with instructions that did not accurately describe the process,
without sufficient production records, without specifications, and with inadequately
documented quality control testing. FDA submissions for medical devices fixated on
chemical (drug) components. Reimbursement submissions requested that Medicare
and Medicaid should revise their existing reimbursement structures to accommodate
Madison’s product. Scientific studies were conducted with poorly developed
protocols and no data collection forms, undermining the veracity of expensive and
time-consuming testing with human subjects.
I certainly cannot claim that technical communicators are a “magic bullet”
solution for biotech companies either, as I also made serious mistakes—frequently
due to my own inexperience with new genres of documents and lack of resources and
examples to work from. For example, when an Executive asked me to submit a grant
(which I had never done before) for a complete clinical trial in seven workdays—and
Madison had no study protocol and had not yet located a primary investigator—the
grant was such a disaster that one of the grant reviewers called me up alert me the
grant had been rejected and to direct me towards online resources to help me in
developing future grants. I had never written a research grant before, did not realize
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how much time was needed to develop much of the background material, and did not
recognize that I was being given bad advice from Madison’s management (who also
had no experience writing research grants) when they said to submit the grant even if
it was missing critical information. Later, as I learned more about grant writing, I
wrote three grants that brought in $2.1 million in research funding.
The QuickHeal 510(k) submission, which prompted the FDA to push
Madison’s product into a combination device classification, was likewise disastrous
because I was also unfamiliar with what a medical device submission should look
like, appropriate language for the document, and the FDA’s expectations for new
medical devices. The FOIA requests I used to secure prior examples of 510(k)
submissions were all submitted prior to the 1997 FDA Modernization Act, and not
indicative of what the FDA expected in 2004. However, the subsequent Progenix
RFD submission and the Progenix 510(k) were both successful.
When I began revising Madison’s quality system documentation, my
inexperience prompted me to rewrite some procedures four, six, or even eight times
before I was satisfied they were correct. As I gained two years of experience and a
better understanding of quality systems and Madison’s processes, one or two
revisions were often sufficient to produce excellent documents that could pass the
scrutiny of an FDA audit while streamlining and linking critical processes to one
another.
A technical communicator with no prior biotech experience is obviously going
to be less effective than a technical communicator with prior biotech experience.
However, given time, examples to learn from, and opportunities to acquire more
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knowledge, most technical communicators can probably become invaluable members
of a biotech company’s documentation efforts and simultaneously act as knowledge
managers coordinating the efforts of one or more groups within a company (Wick
515-529).
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Chapter 6: Ethics, the FDA and Industry,
and Technical Communicators

“Principle is okay up to a certain point, but principle doesn’t do any
good if you lose.”
—Dick Cheney, White House Chief of Staff

“This isn't about people: it’s about money. ‘Money before people.’ It’s
the company’s motto, engraved right there on the lobby floor. It just looks
more heroic in Latin.”
— Veronica Palmer, “Better Off Ted”

Chapter overview
Technical communicators often act as bridges between the companies they
work for and the consumers who purchase goods and services provided by these
companies. As a consequence of this “mediator” or “information broker” role they
often occupy, technical communicators need to be sensitive to both the accuracy of
the information they convey and how the information is conveyed. In the biotech
industry, the health and lives of consumers may depend upon biotech companies'
employees behaving ethically. Therefore, technical communicators working in the
biotech industry must strive to strike a balance between aiding the company they
work for while simultaneously considering the needs of their audience—be it a single
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FDA reviewer evaluating a technical document explaining the purpose and safety of a
new biotech product or millions of consumers reading marketing materials or
instructions for using a new medical product.
By sharing some of my personal experiences from working at a small biotech
company, I hope to provide other technical communicators with some insight into the
ethical dilemmas and situations that may arise in similar situations. To accomplish
my goal, it is first necessary to present an abbreviated history of how the biotech
industry and the FDA are inextricably entwined with one another--and the consumers
who use these healthcare products. Next, expanding on the RFD submission
presented and discussed in chapter 4 of this dissertation, I examine the ethical
situations and explain the choices I made in the development of Progenix’s RFD
submission. Finally, drawing upon Madison’s history presented in chapters 3 and 5, I
discuss a few of the biotech-related ethical problems I encountered prior to and after
the Progenix RFD submission.

Ethics, Industry, and the FDA
In this section, I begin by presenting two timelines. Table 6-1 provides a
history of American medicine leading up to the formation of the FDA. Table 6-2
highlights key events that occurred after the formation of the FDA. These milestones
show how the FDA was shaped and evolved over time in response to the biotech
industry, public opinion, and politics. Next, I examine a role-playing experiment that
illustrates how prior instances of unethical corporate behavior in the biotech sector
may be indicative of ongoing unethical corporate behavior in the biotech industry—
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possibly due to the dynamics of group-think in a corporate environment. In
concluding this first section of the chapter, I present some research findings that
underscore how unethical practices are still prevalent within the biotech industry—
and may have spilled over into the biotech-FDA relationship and the FDA itself. In
such a murky environment, technical communicators may find it difficult to voice
their ethical concerns, and they may find it even more difficult to have their ethical
concerns addressed by their employers.
Timeline #1: America before the FDA
The history and evolution of the FDA and how it governs biotechnology
companies does not begin with the formation of the FDA in 1906. Rather, America’s
medical history begins with Native American folk medicine and shamanism. The first
European colonists brought early western medicine—largely rooted in flawed
concepts of medicine established in ancient Greece—to America. Homeopathy and
home remedies were prevalent because it would be centuries before scientific,
evidence-based medicine came into practice. Also, early settlers often did not have
easy access to the same medical opportunities readily available to people living in
Europe, where population centers and means of distribution provided greater
prevalence and access to physicians and medicinal compounds. This situation would
change as the United States grew and developed, creating the need, opportunity, and
infrastructure needed to develop, distribute, and market healthcare products and
services. The following timeline (Table 6-1) provides a brief overview of the
evolution of medicine in America and a summary of the events that led to the creation
of a regulatory body designed to help protect consumers from fraudulent and
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dangerous practices that became more and more common as an unregulated, freemarket, “libertarianesque” biotech industry arose.

Table 6-1: Pre-history of the FDA
Date
Pre1607
1607

Event
Native Americans treat the sick by using a combination of folklore
medicine and shamanism (Eliade 215-258).
Jamestown, Virginia established. Of the 103 men who arrived in
1607, there were no doctors. Two men claimed the title of surgeon by
their names but not as their occupations. One listed his occupation as
“gentleman” and the other “labourer” (Shiflett). At the time, surgeons
were considered to be beneath physicians and surgery was still
condemned by the Catholic Church (“Jamestown Adventure”).
1700s As printed materials and literacy became more common, the second
most common books in American households (after The Bible) were
instructional cookbooks that included information for compounding
homeopathic remedies for common ailments (“Feeding America”).
1734 John Tennet’s “Every Man His Own Doctor: or, The Poor Planters’
Physician” becomes the first American domestic medicine manual. It
was “...design'd for those who can't afford to dye by the Hand of a
Doctor” and to take advantage of freely obtainable American plants
and animals useful in making folklore remedies (Waugh).
Early As urban centers became more prevalent in America, city dwellers
1800s without access to herb gardens began relying on pre-made compounds
made at apothecaries or sold as patent medicines. Former domestic
chores were becoming commercial commodities (Hawthorne 35-36).
1820 To combat dilution and adulteration in drugs and raw materials used
to compound drugs, the U.S. Pharmacopeia (USP)—a non-profit,
non-government organization—was formed to establish standards of
purity for compounds commonly used to make medicines (Parisian
11). USP-grade materials failed to become popular until government
enforcement, in the form of the FDA, later came into being. The USP
still exists today and USP-grade materials are the gold standard for
most compounding in the food and drug industries.
1840 The U.S. Postal Service implements low-cost bulk mailing (junk mail)
primarily as a result of political lobbyists with financial ties to patent
medicines. Patent medicine makers pioneered mass marketing.
“Claude Hopkins, one of the premier ad writers of the nineteenth
century, said that copywriting for medicines was the supreme test of a
writer’s ability, because ‘medicines were worthless merchandise until
a demand was created’ [by the ad’s writer]” (Hilts 24-26).
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Table 6-1 (continued)
Date Event
1846 America’s lack of food and drug regulations makes it a dumping
ground for substandard wares from overseas. Jacob Bell, a member of
the British Parliament, stated that the popular phrase “good enough
for America” was used to describe foods and medicines that were
expired, rotted, adulterated, or otherwise considered unsuitable for use
by British citizens (Hawthorne 28).
1848 Tainted food and medicine are blamed for numerous US soldier
deaths in the 1846-1848 Mexican-American War. Congress passes the
first federal law designed to ensure safe food and medicine. The law
was not effectively enforced (because inspectors were political
appointees and prone to bribery) and individual states began passing
and enforcing their own laws, with varying levels of success
(Hawthorne 27-31).
1862 The US Dept. of Agriculture (USDA) is formed. Within the USDA,
the Division of Chemistry (later renamed the Bureau of Chemistry)
was formed to test the purity of food and medicine (“Food and Safety
Inspection Service”). The USDA’s Bureau of Chemistry is the FDA’s
progenitor (Hilts 31).
1870- Early Gilded Age (Industrial Revolution) in America. Advances in
1880 chemistry result in new medicinal compounds and preservatives that
are not tested for safety or efficacy prior to becoming available to the
public. Lack of purity standards and unfamiliarity with new
compounds cause confusion among pharmacists and physicians.
Previously, localized production and use of products helped to keep
manufacturers honest; but railroads enabled manufacturers to distance
themselves from customers, which encouraged cheating consumers by
deceptive packaging and diluting product purity (Hilts 35-37).
1883 Dr. Harvey W. Wiley is appointed head of the USDA’s Bureau of
Chemistry. Wiley begins exposing adulteration in packaged foods and
medicines during an era described as being “the most shameless in
American history” (Hilts 18). Wiley’s warnings to Congress and
recommendations for stricter regulations were not yet acted upon,
partially because many politicians had close ties with the industries
that were adulterating foods and medicines (Hawthorne 36-39).
1890- Progressive Era. Progressives pushed for reform and the use of the
1920 scientific method in determining more efficient forms of government,
industry, education, and medicine (Tyack).
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Table 6-1 (continued)
Date Event
1898 Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, a Progressive, serving with
the Rough Riders in the second Spanish-American War, wrote how
the poor quality of the medical supplies and canned food provided by
the US Army to his men caused 90% of his men to be incapacitated,
how his starving troops had to be ordered to eat the US rations, and
how his soldiers coveted the Spanish soldiers’ rations (Roosevelt).
1901 Theodore Roosevelt becomes President of the United States.
1902 Dr. Wiley of the Bureau of Chemistry convinces Congress to fund the
“Poison Squad,” a group of healthy male USDA employees who
volunteered to ingest commonly used new food preservatives, in
steadily increasing doses, to determine their safety (Hilts 39-40).
1905 Samuel Adams, in a series of 11 articles published in Collier’s
Weekly, exposes patent medicines as being fraudulent and damaging
to people’s health. Sales of patent medicines continue.
1906 Upton Sinclair, a Progressive, publishes The Jungle, a novel he hoped
would show the poverty and poor conditions in the American working
class. Readers instead focus on chapter 9, which describes the filthy
conditions in a meat rendering factory—and how workers sometimes
fell into the vats, died, and were rendered into lard to be sent out for
human consumption (Sinclair 140-141).
1906 Spurred by Sinclair’s descriptions in The Jungle and Adam’s articles
in Collier’s Weekly, American citizens begin writing en mass to
President Roosevelt expressing concern, anxiety, and fear about the
quality of America’s food and medicine. Roosevelt, with his Rough
Riders experiences in 1989, sympathizes. Roosevelt invites Sinclair to
the White House and the pair decide to conduct inspections on meat
processing plants. They are horrified by the filthy conditions at the
business despite the plant’s management being tipped off to the
“surprise inspection” several days in advance (Hawthorne 50-52).

In Early America, colonists had to be self-reliant in providing their own food,
shelter, and medical care. The local nature of family-to-family trade, bartering with
food and medicine and services, served as its own source of quality control. As
industry, mass manufacturing, corporations, and improved means of transportation
and distribution allowed for products to be shipped beyond local markets, quality
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control tended to decline. In a “free market” economy without government-imposed
standards or regulations, honest businesses were undercut by dishonest businesses,
often forcing the honest businesses to adopt the practices of the dishonest businesses
or go out of business. Regulation was needed to ensure minimum quality standards
and to prevent a downward spiral of unethical practices by citizens and corporations
fueled by unfettered capitalism.

Table 6-2: History of the FDA
Date
1906

1911

1912
1927

1930
1937

Event
President Roosevelt passed the “Pure Food and Drug Act” (also
known as the “Wiley Act”), to be enforced by Dr. Wiley’s Bureau of
Chemistry. The Act made it illegal to manufacture food or drugs that
were adulterated and/or misbranded. Manufacturers who produced
adulterated/misbranded food or drugs could be fined and jailed, and
their product could be confiscated. Dr. Wiley focused on foods
instead of drugs, feeling the most public good would come from
enforcing food-based requirements (Swann).
In U.S. v. Johnson, the Supreme Court ruled that the 1906 law
prohibited only false and misleading statements about the ingredients
or a drug’s identity, but the 1906 law did not prohibit manufacturers
from making false therapeutic claims.
Dr. Wiley resigned from the Bureau of Chemistry. With Wiley gone,
the Bureau begins focusing more on drug regulation (Swann).
The Caustic Poison Act, designed to protect children from being
injured by poisons, leads to the creation of the Food, Drug, and
Insecticide Administration (FDIA).
FDIA is shortened to FDA and begins absorbing functions previously
conducted by the Bureau of Chemistry.
The Massengill Company created “Elixir Sulfanilamide” (an
antibiotic) for children using an untested, sweet-tasting solvent—that
was toxic. 107 children died slow deaths from kidney failure.
Massengill refused to recall the product, claimed the company did
nothing wrong, and was not legally required to recall or warn
consumers because of the U.S. v. Johnson ruling. The FDA was able
to confiscate the product on a misbranding technicality—“elixir”
meant that a product contained alcohol and Massengill’s elixir
contained no alcohol—just poison (Hilts 89-92).
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Table 6-2 (continued)
Date Event
1938 Public outrage over the Massengill Massacre, cosmetics that blinded
consumers, and general lack of safety testing and consumer protection
led to Congress passing the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938.
The FDA is finally given regulatory authority to stop the use of
known poisons, but the burden of proof still fell upon the FDA and
not the companies marketing drugs or foods that contained toxic
materials (Parisian 15-17).
1943 The Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Dotterweich, determined that the
responsible officials, as well as the corporation itself, may be
prosecuted for criminal acts—and that the responsible officials within
a company may be prosecuted even if they did not intend to violate
the law or were unaware of the violations (“Agency History”).
1949 The FDA published its first guidance documents, helping industry to
comply with increasingly complex regulations (“Agency History”).
1950 In Alberty Food Products Co. v. U.S., the court of appeals ruled that
the directions for use on a drug label must include the purpose or
intended use (Parisian 17).
1951 The Durham-Humphrey Amendment defined which (dangerous
and/or addictive) drugs cannot be dispensed from a pharmacy without
a prescription, limiting Americans’ ability to purchase and selfmedicate with drugs as they deemed suitable (Meadows).
1953 The FDA is required to inspect manufacturing and processing
facilities and provide businesses with reports detailing any discovered
deficiencies (Parisian 18).
1960- Richardson-Merrell acquired the rights to market thalidomide in the
1962 US from Chemie Grünenthal. Merrell had no prior experience with
drugs, performed flawed safety testing, and implemented large-scale
(but poorly conducted) human trials designed more towards advance
marketing and gathering positive opinions from physicians than
conducting a scientific study. Because thalidomide was already being
used extensively in western European countries, Merrell was surprised
when Frances Kelsey, a newly hired FDA reviewer assigned to
thalidomide’s submission, stalled the drug’s approval by demanding
more safety testing and dismissing Merrell’s poorly conducted
research. Eventually, thalidomide was linked to about 8,000 birth
defects and 5,000-7,000 infant deaths in Europe, in comparison to 17
birth defects and 10-20 deaths in the US (Hilts 144-161).
1962 The Kefauver-Harris Drug Act, passed unanimously by the House and
Senate in response to a narrowly avoided thalidomide disaster in the
US, required that drug manufacturers demonstrate safety and efficacy
prior to marketing new drug compounds (Hilts 161-165).
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Table 6-2 (continued)
Date Event
1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act required that consumer products be
honestly and informatively labeled, and the FDA is given
responsibility for enforcing the Act (Parisian 21).
1966 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is passed, but the FDA (and
numerous other federal agencies) largely ignores requests (Hilts 197).
1970 The court of appeals, in Upjohn v. Finch, ruled that commercial
success does not constitute product safety or efficacy (Hornecker 2728).
1971- The A. H. Robins (AHR) company’s Dalkon Shield was an
1974 intrauterine contraceptive device that AHR knew to cause
complications, including severe infections and infertility. AHR
aggressively marketed the product despite their knowledge of the
harm it caused. The FDA discovered the device’s problems and halted
the distribution of the Shield. For the next 10 years, AHR did not
inform the device’s users of the dangers until AHR’s corporate
insurance provider dropped AHR’s corporate liability coverage
(Salinger 243-245).
1976 The Medical Device Amendment was passed to ensure that certain
new medical devices, like the Dalkon Shield, underwent safety testing
prior to being sold to the public. Device manufacturers were also
required to register with the FDA, implement quality control
procedures, and submit to FDA inspections (Parisian 23).
1981 The various bureaus within the FDA responsible for medical devices
were merged into the Center for Devices and Radiologic Health
(CDRH) (Parisian 23).
1983 The Orphan Drug Act is passed, creating a variety of incentives for
drug companies to develop products for diseases and conditions that
affect less than 200,000 people, thus encouraging the development of
drugs that might not otherwise be profitable (Hilts 242).
1987 The Center for Drugs and Biologics was split into the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (CDER) and the Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research (CBER) (Parisian 26).
1989 Some generic drug companies seemed to consistently beat their
competitors through the FDA approval process. An investigation
revealed that forty corporate employees were involved in bribing five
FDA employees to expedite certain companies’ drug reviews (Lex 50,
Parisian 28-30).
1992 The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) required all companies
submitting a drug or biologic to pay a fee—ranging from $142,870 to
$285,740—to the FDA to review the submission (Parisian 30-31).
These fees led to criticisms about the FDA “merchandising” the
review process and hindering small businesses with steep review fees.
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Table 6-2 (continued)
Date Event
1997 The FDA Modernization Act (FDAMA) was implemented to
modernize, reform, update, and streamline the regulation of all FDAregulated products (Parisian 31-32).
2002 The Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA)
required sponsors of medical devices to pay a fee for having CDRH
submissions reviewed. Additionally, MDUFMA updated requirements
and regulations for reviewing medical products and created the Office
of Combination Products was formed (“What we do: History”).
2003 The Office of Combination Products (OCP) begins assigning new
products with more than one mode of action to CBER, CDER, or
CDRH for review.

The FDA has existed for over 100 years and, over that period of time, has
drastically changed in both power and function. Almost all of the major changes that
defined how the FDA operated were typically in reaction to one or more businesses
acting within the constraints of law, but outside of what the rest of American society
deemed to be ethical, socially responsible behavior. To better understand how a
biotech company—and a biotech company’s employees—might be tempted to act
unethically, we need to look at a past example of when a biotech company
intentionally kept a potentially harmful drug on the market, and then how a roleplaying experiment repeatedly replicated the situation with almost identical results.
An unethical classroom activity
From 1957 to 1970, the Upjohn Company sold Panalba, a combination of two
generic antibiotics. Panalba accounted for 12% of Upjohn’s profits. As research with
Panalba was performed outside of Upjohn’s company and as patients and physicians
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reported problems with Panalba, both the FDA and the National Academy of
Sciences began to claim the drug was not healthy for patients and potentially
dangerous (Hilts 338). Upjohn already knew there were safety problems with Panalba
before it went on the market; however, once on the market, the FDA became
concerned over the public research findings and growing number of adverse events
associated with Panalba’s use (Hilts 338). The FDA began work towards banning
Panalba, but knew it would be swifter to approach Upjohn, express their concerns,
and ask Upjohn to stop distributing the product before the ban was enacted. The FDA
presented Upjohn with the steadily growing number of research findings and adverse
event reports and urged Upjohn to willingly pull Panalba off the market before the
FDA’s ban went through. Upjohn, even when faced by the FDA wielding a growing
body of evidence that Panalba was harmful, responded by encouraging their
salespeople to tell physicians that Panalba’s two-in-one antibiotic was superior to
competing products that had only one antibiotic and to aggressively push for more
Panalba sales. Each additional month Upjohn could keep Panalba on the market
before the FDA banned the drug would generate approximately one million dollars in
revenue for the company (Hilts 388). Upjohn’s lawyers even went so far as to take the
FDA to court to further delay Panalba from being pulled off the market (Hutt). After
the drug was banned in the US, Upjohn fought (without results) to have Panalba’s ban
lifted so sales could start anew. Meanwhile, Upjohn began selling Panalba overseas
(where it had not been banned yet) under a different name so foreign doctors would
be less likely to recognize the FDA had banned the drug in the US (Mintz).
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After reading about Upjohn’s executives’ behavior in Mintz’s Science
magazine article, Scott Armstrong, a professor teaching business management
courses at the University of Pennsylvania, wondered how his students would react if
they found themselves in a similar situation—and this served as the basis of a series
of in-class experiments (Armstrong 185-213). Armstrong informed his first class of
business students about the events that unfolded with Upjohn, Panalba, and the FDA.
After the tale was completed, Armstrong then asked the class if Upjohn’s
management acted in a manner that was socially responsible: 97% of his students said
Upjohn had not been socially responsible and 3% abstained from commenting. Using
a second class of business students, Armstrong decided to present the information in a
more realistic manner rather than a retrospective manner. He broke the class into
groups and told them they were to roleplay being members of a pharmaceutical
company’s board of directors—and come to a decision as a group. Armstrong then
presented the students with information about the company they worked for, the
company’s profits, the product being sold, and the research data coming in from both
the FDA and the National Academy of Science that indicated that one of the
company’s products appeared to be occasionally harming patients. Armstrong gave
his students five possible courses of action they could take, ranging from the most
socially responsible option (immediate recall and destruction of the product) to the
least socially responsible option (continue aggressively marketing the drug while
taking legal, political, and other actions to thwart the FDA from pulling the
company’s drug off the market and damaging profits). To Armstrong’s surprise, 79%
of the groups opted to do exactly what Upjohn’s executives had done—the least
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socially responsible and least ethical of the options, but the option that would yield
the most profit. Armstrong repeated the experiment with a third class, this time
providing the students with additional hard evidence: that Panalba was directly
responsible for killing 12 people. Even with this new information, 75% of the groups
still chose the same path as Upjohn’s board of directors. Armstrong repeated the
experiment 91 times, in 10 countries, with 23 different experimenters and
approximately 2,000 subjects. Armstrong found that if the “board of directors” for
Upjohn contained no outsiders and specific details of harm were not given, there was
a 76% likelihood the groups would choose the least socially responsible option—and
not a single group chose the most socially responsible option (Hilts 341).
Summarizing Armstrong’s experiments, it seems that individuals acting
independently typically make socially responsible choices; however, when
individuals are formed into groups and placed within a business context where they
are responsible for poor fiscal performance, they become prone to making socially
irresponsible choices. In a documentary, “The Corporation,” which examines the
origin and evolution of corporations as business entities, Noam Chomsky offered the
following commentary that may explain the behavior Armstrong observed when
individuals formed groups to make decisions for a business:

[From a legal perspective,] corporations were given the rights of immortal
persons. But then special kinds of persons: persons who had no moral
conscience. These are a special kind of persons, which are designed by law, to
be concerned only for their stockholders… not the community or the work
force or whatever…. When you look at a corporation, just like when you look
at a slave owner, you want to distinguish between the institution and the
individual. So slavery, … or other forms of tyranny, are inherently monstrous.
But the individuals participating in them may be the nicest guys you could
imagine: benevolent, friendly, nice to their children, even nice to their slaves,
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caring about other people.… As individuals they may be anything. In their
institutional role, they're monsters because the institution is monstrous.

Armstrong’s experiment, combined with Chomsky’s comments about how the
actions of an institution are not necessarily a reflection of the individuals functioning
within an institution, indicate that the ethics of individuals, when acting as employees
of a larger biotech corporation, may be suppressed as individuals adopt to the “will”
of a potentially amoral corporate entity with a motivation that is almost entirely
profit-centric. It is possible the corporate entity might be perceived by the employees
as a superior focused predominantly on fiscal performance. (Executives and board
members must still answer to a corporation’s shareholders, and therefore would also
be influenced by this profit motive and the desire to “serve” the corporation and its
shareholders.) In such a situation, employees might feel they must follow the
corporation’s directive to make money, regardless of the societal and/or
environmental costs—or the employee’s personal ethics.
Stanley Milgram’s famous psychology experiment, which tested if volunteers
would do harm or possibly kill another person when ordered to do so by an authority
figure, also appears to support the rationalizations that may have occurred with
Upjohn’s executives and Armstrong’s students—provided we assume Upjohn’s
executives and Armstrong’s students viewed the corporate entity (or possibly
shareholders) as being their superior. While a meta-analysis of Milgram’s experiment
revealed that 61-66% of people would harm another human they had briefly met and
could hear when they were delivering harmful shocks to (Blass 969-978), Upjohn’s
executives and Armstrong’s students lacked that immediate feedback (screams and
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pleadings from the victims to stop the experiment). Unlike in Milgram’s experiment,
there is no immediate and negative response to authorizing the continued marketing
of a pharmaceutical product: time separates the cause and the effect, lessening the
connection between the two. It is easier to make a harmful product, give it to
someone else to sell, and have that product affect someone you don’t know and may
never hear about than it is to press a button to shock someone and experience (hear)
the direct consequences of that action. The greater the detachment, the easier it
apparently becomes to cause harm to others. Lack of immediate negative feedback
may also explain why students in Armstrong’s experiments were 10-15% more likely,
in comparison to the subjects in Milgram’s experiment, to take actions that could
harm or kill people.
Ethics and statistical data
Although the results of Armstrong’s classroom biotech company ethics
experiment may be sobering, recent research into ethical problems at the FDA and
within the biotech industry is equally disturbing. In 2006, the Union of Concerned
Scientists published the results of a survey given to 5,918 FDA scientists. The survey
results, presented in “Voices of Scientists at FDA,” provide eye-opening insight into
the potential magnitude of the ethical dilemmas scientists and reviewers may be
quietly wrestling with while working at the FDA to ensure the safety and efficacy of
biotech products intended for use by the public.
•

18% of FDA scientists claim they were asked, for non-scientific reasons, to
inappropriately exclude or alter technical information and/or conclusions in
FDA scientific/technical documents (2).
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•

26% of FDA scientists feel the FDA's decision makers (supervisors) expect
FDA scientists (underlings) to provide "incomplete, inaccurate, or
misleading information" (2) when pressured to do so.

•

36% of FDA scientists fear retaliation if they express their concerns about
how the FDA operates to their supervisors or other FDA employees (2).

•

50% of FDA scientists claim to know of instances where nongovernmental interests (advocacy groups) have inappropriately intruded
into the FDA's decisions and/or policies (2).

•

60% of FDA scientists claim to know of cases where commercial interests
inappropriately intruded into the FDA's product determinations or actions
(2).

•

61% of FDA scientists claim to know of cases where politicians
inappropriately intruded into the FDA's product determinations or actions
(2).

•

70% of FDA scientists do not believe the FDA has sufficient resources to
adequately protect the public's health (3).

As the findings from this survey of FDA reviewers and scientists indicate,
there may be substantial problems with unethical behavior inside the FDA. How does
the corporate sector compare with the FDA, and what kind of support or resources
might a technical communicator with an ethical concern have access to while working
for a biotech company?
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Public approval of pharmaceutical companies plummeted from 80% (in 1997)
to just 13% (in 2004) of Americans believing the pharmaceutical industry is
“generally honest and trustworthy” (Lenzer 621). This massive decline in the public’s
perception of pharmaceutical companies being honest and trustworthy could be due to
a sudden increase in unethical behavior and practices in the biotech industries, but the
decline could also be attributed to a number of other factors: the resurgence in
popularity for homeopathic/alternative medicines, American’s frustrations with the
rising cost of health care, greater interest in medicine in general, or the ease with
which negative information can now be spread over the internet.
Regardless of the perception or cause of unethical conduct, if there has been a
substantial increase in unethical conduct within the biotech industry, it likely extends
into these companies’ technical communications and directly affects or involves
technical communicators. Unfortunately, when working for biotech firms, technical
communicators may quickly discover there is little or no support for resolving ethical
situations related to the documentation they may be producing.
Finegold and Moser’s 2006 survey of biotech companies, asking about ethics
and steps the companies had taken to address ethical issues, revealed the following
about how biotech companies attempted to promote ethical behavior among
employees and resolve ethical problems that arose on the job (285-290):
•

100% of companies had (or planned to establish) written ethical guidelines
in either the company’s mission statement or a separate corporate code of
ethics.
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•

57% of biotech companies offered their employees training/workshops in
ethics.

•

28% of biotech companies had a designated on-staff person with whom
employees could confidentially discuss company-related ethical problems.

•

21% of biotech companies established an ethics committee.

As disappointing as the results from Finegold and Moser’s survey may seem,
it is possible the reality is even worse. Even though biotech firms conduct quality
control inspections on each lot of product produced (because the FDA requires it),
only 40% of the biotech firms with established ethics programs attempted to assess
whether their ethics programs were working (Finegold and Moser 289). Also, the
results from Finegold and Moser’s survey may be biased to favor companies that
have taken steps to act ethically. Even though the ethics survey was presented to 100
biotech companies, only 29 responded—and companies that had taken few or no
steps to promote ethical behavior from within their companies would probably be less
likely to respond to a survey where their performance appeared to be sub-par or
accepting of unethical behavior (290). Embarrassment, fear of the results being
leaked to the public (and potentially creating legal problems and bad publicity), and
fear of fostering a negative impression of the biotech industry as a whole may have
prompted some of the non-responding companies to disregard the ethics survey, so
the number of biotech companies that have actively integrated some form of ethical
awareness, training, or conflict resolution is likely less than the percentages presented
in the survey.
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As one might expect, large (>1,500 employees) and publicly traded companies
were more likely to have measures in place to address ethical issues than small (<100
employees) and private companies (Finegold and Moser 286). These findings indicate
that technical communicators working for small, private biotech companies may face
serious challenges in voicing their ethical concerns and having their ethical concerns
addressed. For instance, Madison (a small, private biotech) had no ethics
training/workshops, no ethics committee, no formal means of addressing employees’
ethical concerns, and no member on the board of directors with a background in
ethics.
Large biotech companies may have different priorities than small biotech
companies, and these different priorities may make it easier for technical
communicators to address ethical issues that arise on the job. All of the companies
who returned surveys to Finegold and Moser claimed the primary advantage of
focusing on ethical issues within their company was to ensure FDA regulatory
compliance (286). However, there was some diversity in the second-most important
advantage of focusing on ethical issues: for large biotech companies it was enhancing
the corporation’s public image, and for small biotech companies it was enhancing
shareholder value (286). (The profit-minded motivations of small biotechs may lead
to them acting unethically more frequently than large biotechs.) The reason for this
divergence might be that larger companies often have numerous product lines and are
less likely to allow risk-taking with one of their numerous product line, as the risk
taken with one product might endanger the entire company’s product lines; whereas
smaller companies with just one or two product lines might be driven out of business
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completely by an adverse FDA audit, product recall, or public scandal. Overall, both
small and large biotechs certainly need to be concerned about ethical behavior, but
neither may be doing enough to ensure that employees are given training in ethical
behavior and provided with a means of resolving ethical concerns addressed without
fear of repercussions.
Biotechs that become financially distressed may experience a jump in
unethical behavior. A report from the 2009 National Business Ethics Survey revealed
that larger companies (>500 employees) experienced a 3% increase in employee
misconduct when these large companies encounter financial distress and take costcutting measures: contrastingly, smaller companies (<500 employees) experience a
19% increase in employee misconduct when these small company encounter financial
distress and take cost-cutting measures—over six times what was observed in larger
companies (2-3).
Technical communicators working for small biotechs in financial distress
should therefore be acutely aware of what they write and what they are asked to write,
but these same technical communicators may also find it difficult to bring any
emerging ethical concerns to management (as there is typically little or no support for
small biotech employees seeking to resolve an ethical dilemma)—not to mention the
personal risk involved in attempting to resolve ethical issues (especially those
spawned by upper management) in a small company that is actively engaged in
downsizing its employees. Large biotech companies, which are more concerned about
public image and more likely to have a means of addressing ethical concerns (when
compared to small biotech companies), may make it easier for technical
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communicators to express any ethical concerns that arise. Having a means of
resolving ethical problems may be one explanation as to why large biotech companies
have roughly five times fewer instances of unethical behavior during periods of
financial hardship than small biotech companies.
Although the biotech industry claims the most commonly occurring ethical
issue within their companies is employee misconduct, the second through sixth most
commonly occurring ethical issues were (in order of reported prevalence) conduct of
clinical trials, sales practices, marketing practices, corporate governance, and
regulatory strategy. Technical communicators may be directly or tangentially
involved in creating supporting materials for all of these activities identified as being
ethical problem areas within the biotech industry. Reports, forms, and
instructions/protocols are needed to conduct clinical trials; training materials are
needed to ensure consistency in what sales representatives discuss; marketing
materials need to be written, edited, and designed; and corporate governance and
regulatory strategies are largely expressed via documented policies and procedures.
Without adequate support mechanisms in-house for addressing technical
communicators’ ethical concerns, technical communicators may need to rely heavily
upon FDA regulations, the company’s own quality system documentation and
procedures, and trends in industry practice in order to assess any emerging ethical
concerns.
So far in this chapter, I have covered how our concept of medicine changed as
America grew, how corruption was prevalent prior to the FDA’s existence and the
implementation and enforcement of regulations, how the FDA changed over a century
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of existence, how biotech corporations (with groups of people subordinating
themselves to the authority of the corporate entity) may inadvertently foster unethical
behavior, and how biotech companies (especially small, private firms) typically
provide very little ethics training or support for employees experiencing an ethical
crisis. In the latter sections of this chapter, I share some of the ethical situations that
arose during my employment at Madison—a small, private biotech firm.

Ethical situations during the RFD submission’s development
While developing the Progenix Request for Designation (RFD) for Madison, I
encountered four major ethical issues: (1) the Executives’ desire to use political
pressure against the FDA, (2) changing the company’s name and the product’s name,
(3) exclusion of research from the RFD, and (4) Madison’s research and development
(R&D) group partially excluding the Executives from the RFD development process.
Pressuring the FDA reviewer
In chapter 3 I discussed how the rift between Madison’s Executives and its
R&D group was widened after the CDRH reviewer rejected Madison’s first medical
device submission (for QuickHeal) and recommended that Madison submit its
product to the OCP to assess whether it needed to be classified as being primarily a
device or primarily a drug. The R&D group wanted to follow the FDA reviewer’s
advice and submit an RFD to the OCP, but the Executives wanted to use their
political connections to pressure the CDRH reviewer into rescinding his opinion and
approving QuickHeal as a 510(k) medical device—or have the CDRH reviewer’s
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opinion over-ruled by a superior at the FDA. After a heated debate, R&D was given
permission to develop an RFD and the Executives planned to look into the possibility
of using political leverage against the FDA.
Although I knew that the Executives had personal connections to several local
and state politicians, that Madison provided campaign finance contributions to these
politicians, and that several of these politicians were also shareholders in Madison;
I—and the rest of the R&D group—doubted that Madison’s political connections
would have the political clout to sway the FDA’s earlier decision. R&D’s largest
concern was that any attempts Madison’s Executives made to sway the FDA’s hand
via political machinations would either fail or fail and cause backlash against
Madison. R&D viewed the FDA as a group of scientists who would not be moved by
political pressure; however, I later discovered the FDA is subject to political pressure.
For instance, the head of the FDA is a politically appointed position, and thus the
FDA can be influenced by political machinations from the top down (Hawthorn 209232).
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a Union of Concerned Scientists’ survey
revealed that 61% of FDA scientists knew of an instance where one or more
politicians had inappropriately intruded into the FDA’s product determination or
actions (2). Also, a PricewaterhouseCoopers’ study, “A survey of the working
relationship between the life sciences industry and FDA,” found the FDA changed its
position during a review process 40% of the time in 2006 and 63% of the time by
2010 (7). It is possible these shifting positions in the review process are indicative of
external influences affecting the FDA reviewers, though it is also possible the
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increase in position changes could be due to increasingly more complicated review
processes and the ever-growing level of scrutiny given to FDA submissions. Between
1979 and 2000, large firms were twice as likely as small firms to have their drugs
reviewed within 15 months of submission; however, this disparity could be
attributable to larger firms having more resources and greater familiarity with the
FDA’s expectations, not the large firms having deeper coffers and greater political
influence than small firms (Hawthorn 162-163).
While working on the Progenix RFD submission, R&D never heard anything
else about the Executives following through with their verbalized contemplation of
using political connections to sway the FDA’s decisions regarding Madison’s
submission. R&D simply assumed the Executives either abandoned their idea of
using political influence to sway the FDA, or they explored the possibility and came
to the realization that using Madison’s political connections against the FDA would
be ineffectual or damaging. However, just because the R&D group never learned of
the Executives’ following through on their plan to politically influence the FDA does
not mean it never happened or wasn’t successful. Madison’s Executives might have
quietly and successfully pursued a political option, and they might have had some
degree of influence in Progenix’s success with its RFD and subsequent 510(k)
submission. Although there is the possibility that Progenix’s success with its RFD
and 510(k) were due to political machinations, I believe it is unlikely—especially
because Madison’s later Adavancia 510(k) submission failed.
To my knowledge, the Executives never pursued using their political
connections to pressure the FDA, but the fact they even verbalized the suggestion was
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enough to cause R&D to be concerned about the ethics of this suggested course of
action. Collectively, in addition to believing that using political pressure on the FDA
would be ineffectual, the R&D group also believed that using political pressure
against the FDA was unethical and perverted what R&D believed should be an
objective review process. Had there been any evidence the Executives were actively
pursuing political avenues while R&D was developing the RFD, then a significant
ethical issue could have emerged. R&D was very cognizant of how the FDA can
impose sanctions against companies. In particular members of R&D were concerned
about how the FDA can disbar individuals (such as the members of R&D involved in
developing Madison’s submission) from participating in the development of ongoing
and future FDA submissions, and how Madison’s management’s actions—should
they occur—might harm R&D employees’ abilities to find future employment in the
biotech industry. In addition to potentially jeopardizing the R&D’s future
employability, the R&D employees viewed the use of political pressure as a means of
undermining the scientific review process, and thus an undermining of scientific
principles. The R&D group reasoned that if the scientific aspect of the FDA review
could be circumvented by using political clout, then there was little need for
companies to have R&D departments or to conduct scientific research. R&D believed
that if Madison could make the FDA bend to the Executives’ will, then it would be
impossible for Madison’s R&D division to conduct unbiased scientific research
because the Executives could then accuse the company’s R&D division of being less
flexible than the FDA’s scientists and that science was secondary to political
influence when it came to the FDA approving new products. If such a tone were
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established at Madison, with the Executives able to override and rewrite any research
or findings coming out of Madison’s R&D group, then there would be little point in
conducting any research at all.
Renaming the company and the product
In this section, I address what might initially be perceived as an action with
questionable ethics behind it: changing the company’s name to de-emphasize drugs
and changing the product’s name to de-emphasize implied drug-like claims.
When I was reviewing the RFD, I noticed the company’s name, “Madison
Pharmaceuticals,” implied that Madison dealt with only pharmaceuticals (drugs). In
the RFD, where we were building arguments and assembling evidence that supported
Progenix being classified as having a device primary mode of action instead of a drug
primary mode of action, the “Pharmaceuticals” in the company’s name directly
undermined our device claims. I recommended that the Executives change the
company’s name from “Madison Pharmaceuticals” (which implied Madison only
made pharmaceuticals) to something that did not imply that Madison made only
drugs.
Recall from Chapter 3 that Madison had previously obtained approval to
market another product, Epigenix, in Europe. Epigenix had been approved as a
medical device (even though the Executives had intended for it to be approved as a
drug), so the name “Madison Pharmaceuticals” was, if anything, misleading for a
company that produced only a device. Simply put, Madison Pharmaceuticals selling
only a medical device is the equivalent of a business called “Bob’s Used Cars” selling
only motorcycles.
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The Executives changed the company’s name to “Madison Technologies,”
which was a far more accurate description. Changing Madison’s name was something
that needed to be done because it was not an accurate representation of what the
company did. The same could be said for the “QuickHeal” name Madison ascribed to
its first US product.
The Executives, who had no prior experience developing or marketing FDAregulated products, gave the “QuickHeal” name to the US product long before
Madison began undertaking the process of a formal FDA submission. The Executives
developed some marketing materials and trademarked the name and image, and they
likely believed that “QuickHeal” was a good name for a product that they intended to
provide faster healing. However, during the Pre-IND meeting, the FDA
recommended changing the products name because Madison had no research
supporting the faster healing—or even the healing—that QuickHeal’s name implied.
When Madison renamed QuickHeal to Progenix, we essentially did what the FDA
recommended: remove the unsubstantiated claims implied by the product’s name.
Although there were good reasons for renaming QuickHeal to Progenix and
Madison Pharmaceuticals to Madison Technologies, it does look a little questionable
and perhaps even unethical on the surface. To avoid even the appearance of being
unethical, R&D wanted to make it clear to the OCP reviewer that Madison had
changed both the company’s name and its product’s name, which is why the RFD’s
cover letter contained the following sentence:

Please note that our company and product names have changed since our
earlier 510(k) submission: Madison Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is now Madison
Technologies, Inc. and QuickHeal is now Progenix.
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By placing that sentence in the RFD’s cover letter, we hoped to show the
reviewer we were being upfront about the company’s and product’s name changes—
and to prevent confusion if the reviewer had been expecting an RFD from Madison
Pharmaceuticals for QuickHeal. Also, it demonstrated Madison now understood the
importance of not making drug claims in company or product names.
Excluding research from the RFD
In Chapter 3, I discussed how Madison launched its first product, Epigenix, in
Europe, where it is faster and easier to obtain regulatory approval in comparison to
the US. In developing Progenix for the US market, Madison made a minor
formulation change to the ointment. Although Epigenix and Progenix were nearly
identical products, they were not perfectly identical products.
While assembling the Progenix RFD, R&D’s collaborative group opted to
exclude (1) the human trials undertaken with Epigenix in Europe, (2) safety testing
conducted on Epigenix in Europe, and (3) early-stage developmental research in the
U.S. While it might initially appear unethical to exclude this information when the
OCP’s RFD guidance document has a section for “developmental work and testing,”
R&D felt that much of Madison’s prior research needed to be excluded because—
from a chemical composition perspective—Progenix was not Epigenix.
R&D also excluded the European clinical trials with Epigenix from the
Progenix RFD because of both the formulation difference and the very poor quality of
the research conducted in Europe: protocols were not followed, there was no
consistency, and individual patient data was often incomplete or lost. R&D believed
these factors, taken individually, were sufficient for the FDA reviewer to dismiss the
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studies outright. Taken collectively, R&D felt the studies would undermine
Madison’s credibility and its ethos in the Progenix RFD. Furthermore, in the
European trials, there did not appear to be any adverse events caused by Epigenix’s
use. Had there been evidence of one or more adverse events in such a small
population (less than about 100 people overall in the various studies), then I believe
Madison’s R&D group would be obligated to disclose the negative evidence that
occurred with the use of a product that was closely related to Progenix—regardless of
how poorly the European research had been conducted.
In a situation similar to how the Epigenix clinical trials were not relevant to
Progenix’s RFD submission, R&D also deemed Epigenix’s European safety testing
was not relevant to Progenix’s RFD. The European protocols for safety testing were
not identical to the FDA’s expectations, and Epigenix’s formulation was slightly
different from Progenix. Instead of attempting to justify European safety tests and
standards to the FDA, Madison’s R&D department used a contract research facility to
conduct safety testing on Progenix using the laboratory standards required by the
FDA. Also, there was no evidence from Epigenix’s safety testing that indicated there
was a safety concern with the product. Because R&D conducted the tests required by
the FDA on Progenix alone, and because there had been no safety issues uncovered in
Epigenix’s earlier safety testing, we felt justified in excluding the European tests
associated with Epigenix from the Progenix RFD.
Prior to Epigenix undergoing safety testing, Madison had an archive of earlystage developmental research (much of it related to patent development) that
eventually led to Epigenix’s formulation. Much of this research was of an exploratory
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and speculative nature and completely unrelated to Progenix’s purpose as a wound
dressing. (e.g., “Does this compound kill the AIDS virus?” and “Does this compound
cure certain kinds of cancers?”) Again, there was nothing in the exploratory research
to indicate there were safety concerns, so R&D opted to exclude this antiquated
research from the Progenix RFD.
Much of the “weeding out” process that Madison underwent in presenting its
research to the FDA can be compared to processes that technical communicators use
in developing documents. When technical communicators create a new document,
they first brainstorm, outline, and/or draft what will later be revised and presented as
the final version. The audience (outside of academic, training, or litigation scenarios)
is rarely ever provided access to the previous versions of the final product, and this
practice is not seen as being unethical. Much like technical communicators do no
typically share early-stage drafts or text they deleted during the revision process with
their clients, technical communicators should ensure that FDA reviewers are given
only research that is relevant to the product in an FDA submission.
Partially excluding the Executives from the RFD process
In chapter 3, I discussed the myriad tensions between the Executives and
R&D, how the Executives were more inclined to use political pressure on the FDA
than submit an RFD, and how one Executive (who had no formal scientific education
beyond high school and who was not an advocate of preparing an RFD submission)
appointed himself to oversee R&D’s development of the company’s RFD. Although I
was careful to include the Executive when emailing the numerous drafts resulting
from R&D’s collaborative efforts in developing he RFD, R&D collectively took no
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steps to actively include the Executive in the physical discussions, debates, and
meetings that prompted these revisions. While excluding the Executive from
collaborative revisions preserved the working dynamics already established in the
R&D department and made it easier for the R&D employees to assemble the RFD,
was it ethical for R&D to exclude the Executive from these meetings?
I believe we acted ethically because we did send all revisions of the RFD to
the Executive, and I suspect that was all (or more than) the Executive expected. (In
fact, he may have been surprised at how many revisions R&D made to the document.)
However, I cannot help but feel that R&D missed an opportunity to establish a
working relationship with a member of the Executives. Even though the Executive
contributed nothing to the RFD’s development during these meetings or in his one
emailed comment, he would have seen the level of complexity involved in developing
a highly technical document and perhaps gained a greater understanding of the work
the R&D group performed and the problems we regularly grappled with. In return,
R&D might have gained a greater appreciation of the fiscal challenges the Executives
faced and fostered a better relationship between the R&D group and this one member
of the Executives. Had R&D been able to procure an ally among the Executives, the
Executive might have been able to work towards establishing better communication
between the Executives and R&D, thus allowing Madison to better communicate and
operate more effectively.
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Ethical situations before and after the RFD submission’s
development
A number of ethical dilemmas arose during my employment at Madison, not
just during the RFD’s development. In this section, I discuss two ethical quandaries I
faced before the RFD’s submission: (1) raising money through shareholder
communications, and (2) human trials conducted in third world countries. After the
RFD submission, the two largest ethics-related situations I observed involved (1)
Progenix’s reimbursement, and (2) using the quality system as a means of enforcing
ethical corporate behavior.
Before the RFD: Raising money and shareholder communications
When I began consulting for Madison—prior to being hired full time and
better understanding the business model, corporate culture, corporate history, and
internal operations—I developed shareholder newsletters for the company. To
develop these public relations materials, I would interview one or more of the
Executives and ask what news they wanted to include in the newsletter. I took notes
as they explained various ongoing projects and progress, then I used these notes to
compile a newsletter. I then submitted the newsletter to the Executives for their
review, suggestions, and approval. Generally, only minor edits or clarifications were
required before the newsletter was published and mailed to all of Madison’s
shareholders. After writing about four or five newsletters for Madison over the course
of a year, I began to notice a lack of continuity in the events documented in the
newsletters. When I pressed the Executives for more information or progress updates
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from stories in prior newsletters, I was often told the projects had been terminated or
were on hold indefinitely—and I was not to mention anything about the situation in
the newsletters, even if the prior story included an anticipated completion date that
had passed. Instead of following up on old articles, the Executives wanted the
company’s newsletter to focus mostly on communicating new projects to the
shareholders. Contrastingly, several large-scale articles (especially the various clinical
trials) were essentially being repeated in each newsletter: these articles discussed the
importance of the trials, theorized about results, and always ended with a statement
that the studies were “still ongoing.”
Madison’s newsletters held a lot of promise and hope for its numerous
shareholders who otherwise might not have heard anything about the company’s
activities, and the newsletters helped to prevent shareholders from calling the office
and asking to talk with one of the Executives to determine what the company was
doing. However, I slowly came to realize the information being communicated from
the Executives—through the newsletter I produced—to the shareholders was highly
speculative: it was more wishful thinking than a plausible future reality.
Dombrowski, in Ethics in Technical Communication, claims it is not
uncommon for technical communicators to produce documentation supporting
“technical reality that simply [does] not exist” (191) and “represent[ing] technical
information in relation to projections and expectations” (229). Providing information
about a prospective future is not necessarily an unethical practice; however, it does
become an ethical issue if the technical communicator begins to suspect that the
future expectations being shared with the reader are simply unrealistic or nothing
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more than wishful thinking—especially if the technical communicator is using a more
definitive tone and language (e.g., using “it will” instead of “it might”) in
communicating unlikely-to-occur future situations to an audience (Dombrowski 191).
The situation described by Dombrowski, I came to realize, was the situation I
found myself in when developing Madison’s newsletters. After each new newsletter
was printed and shipped to shareholders, Madison experienced a fresh influx of
capital from the sale of shares in the company as existing investors added to their
positions and shared their “inside scoop” with friends and family looking to invest in
a startup business with a great deal of promise. Although I initially believed that
Madison had the potential to be a very profitable company; the more time I spent
working at Madison, the more I realized how much of what the Executives
communicated to the shareholders was wishful thinking instead of a plausible future.
As I began to recognize the highly speculative nature of the information I was being
provided to craft into the company’s newsletters, I began to feel like I was spreading
misinformation and false hope to the shareholders. Unfortunately, Madison had no
internal means of addressing ethical issues, so I had to find a way to press the
Executives to temper the claims they wanted me to communicate in the company’s
newsletters—and not lose my consulting job in the process.
Initially, I attempted to address the situation by asking the Executives to
provide follow-up information to earlier newsletter articles and claims. To do this, I
armed myself with copies of prior newsletters when the Executives asked me to craft
new newsletters. I used these older newsletters to point out past claims and suggest
following up on these articles so there would be greater continuity and a
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demonstration of progress. My suggestion was not well-received by the Executives
because follow-up to these articles tended to reveal that no progress had been made or
the project had been abandoned—often due to failed business negotiations or the
realization that what initially appeared to be a promising business opportunity was not
promising at all once the finer details were examined. Communicating failed business
ventures and failed profit opportunities to shareholders would likely undermine the
shareholders’ faith in the company’s leadership and the safety of their investments,
thus curtailing the dual-purpose of the shareholder newsletters: (1) to raise money,
and (2) to appease existing shareholders looking for reassurance they had invested
wisely. Blocked by the Executives, I began searching for other ways of signaling to
shareholders that the information in the newsletters was speculative and not
guaranteed to happen.
In reviewing press releases from publicly traded biotech companies, I noticed
that many contained a “forward looking statements” disclaimer, which served to alert
investors (and potential investors) that these press releases contained information that
was speculating about the companies’ futures. Additionally, because these forward
looking statement disclaimers were almost uniformly found in publicly traded
companies’ press releases (and other shareholder materials), I suspected they also
served a legal purpose: protecting the companies from lawsuits. I printed out several
of these press releases, highlighted the statements, and took them to Madison’s
attorney (one of the Executives) to express my desire to include this forward-looking
statement in Madison’s future newsletters so as to provide legal protection to the
company. My “protect the company” approach was well received by the attorney-
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Executive, and he supported my recommendation to begin including the statement in
all of Madison’s newsletters—as well as all other public relations and business
documents. From then on, Madison’s newsletters (and annual reports, business plans,
press releases, etc.) carried this caution that the information being communicated was
speculative—thereby casting a shadow of doubt over news that otherwise kept
providing a sunny, positive outlook for the company’s future.
I still continued to bring prior newsletters whenever I met with Executives to
develop new newsletters, but I was never successful in getting them to tone down the
claims in the newsletter. After Progenix received FDA approval and the Executives
relocated to Florida, and as manufacturing and rewriting the company’s quality
system consumed all my time, the task of writing the newsletters was given to a sales
manager in Florida. The constantly positive tone of the newsletter never changed with
the new author, but the forward-looking statement was always included in the
newsletter and all other shareholder documents. similar to what Cross noted in his
“Conflict and Capitulation” article, Madison’s Executives used the company
newsletter to communicate information they wanted, but largely neglected the needs
of the intended audience. Cross, in “Conflict and Capitulation,” noted similar
behavior at an insurance company when the executives used an executive letter to
create a success story about the company, which neglected to address a large portion
of the audience: policy holders whose rates were going up to support this success.
Before the RFD: Human trials in Third World countries
Clinical trials are critical in determining a biotech product’s efficacy. It is
commonplace for US companies to seek new product approvals overseas, where less
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stringent and costly regulations allow products to enter the market faster than in
America (“European approval of new biotech drugs outpaces US approval”). It has
also become more commonplace for US-based biotechs to conduct clinical trials
overseas rather than in the US, because there is a far more relaxed approach to human
research conducted outside of America and the FDA’s jurisdiction (Hawthorne 162163). But does the FDA accept research conducted in less stringent countries?
According to Dr. Suzanne Parisian, a former Chief Medical Officer for
CDRH, the FDA “accepts all ‘human data’ [provided it meets the FDA’s standards]
generated in non US sites in terms of the support for safety…. However, it is at the
discretion of the FDA… whether non US data may be acceptable as scientific
evidence for ‘effectiveness’” (561). Tests for effectiveness typically require human
clinical trials, so the rigor of an overseas trial determines its acceptability to the FDA.
Parisian provides a list of the 10 most common pitfalls of clinical
investigations (562), which I present in Table 6-3, along with whether or not
Madison’s Epigenix clinical trials suffered from these pitfalls.
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Table 6-3: Top 10 clinical trial pitfalls and Madison’s European clinical
trials
Parisian’s top 10 clinical trial pitfalls
1. Loss of clinical investigation’
subject data.
2. Failure of clinical investigators to
adhere to approved investigation
protocol.
3. Inappropriate clinical investigation
monitor selection.
4. Failure to document [product]
changes that have occurred during
clinical investigation.
5. Failure of clinical investigators to
adhere to approved protocol’s subject
inclusion and exclusion criteria.
6. Failure to remember that the object
of conducting a clinical investigation
for FDA is to get a commercially
successful product onto the U.S.
market.
7. Assuming anything about the status
of your clinical investigation and the
FDA’s opinions and future actions
that is not in writing as part of the
official application administrative
record.
8. Failure to provide competent
statistical support for the clinical
investigation.
9. Faulty statistical documentation for
the clinical investigation.
10. Delay in working with FDA
reviewers… for developing patient
and/or user labeling; potential post
market studies that may be required,
including creation of patient
registries, which may be necessary
for application closure following the
product’s approval.

Madison’s European clinical trials
Probably 60-80% of the subjects had at least
some data missing from their records.
Madison’s investigators frequently deviated
from established protocols, typically by using
other products in combination with Epigenix.
Madison’s clinical trials were minimally
monitored by Executives with no clinical
trial experience/background.
Epigenix’s formulation changed midway
through the studies, but no distinction was
made between which patients were using the
old or new versions.
Probably 10-20% of the subjects included in
Madison’s European clinical studies did not
meet the original protocols’
inclusion/exclusion criteria.
Madison intended to use the European
clinical trial data in a later FDA submission
but took no steps to integrate FDA
requirements into its European clinical trials.
Not applicable.

Madison’s European trials were designed
without a statistician and were not designed
to yield statistically significant data.
Madison had no statistical documentation for
its clinical investigations.
Not applicable. I do not know what, if any,
documentation was provided to the patients
in the European studies or if post-market
studies were required or performed. (I
suspect they were not required or performed.)
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Madison, in conducting its European clinical trials, fell into nearly every
single clinical trial pitfall Parisian listed. Failing to meet FDA standards and
expectations is probably commonplace for studies conducted outside of the US,
especially when the studies are not designed in advance specifically for later use as
clinical evidence for the FDA.
As Madison’s initial attempt to present QuickHeal to the FDA drew nearer,
the company began examining the possibility of conducting a clinical trial in the US.
Similar to the approach used previously in the European clinical trials, Madison first
sought out a well-known wound care specialist in the US, hired him as a consultant,
and tasked him with developing a clinical trial to be conducted in the US. However,
unlike the European physicians, this US physician had substantial prior experienced
conducting clinical trials that met the FDA’s standards. The protocol he developed
was far more thorough and rigorous than the European protocols I had seen. I worked
with the physician to edit and format the study protocols he drafted, and I also aided
in developing the informed consent materials and information packages for doctors,
nurses, and patients involved in the trial to help ensure compliance. Unlike the openlabel, uncontrolled, non-randomized approach used in Madison’s European trials; the
US clinical trial was based around a blinded, randomized protocol with a control
dressing and deigned with the intention of yield a statistically significant difference
between Progenix and the control dressing.
As the US study’s design evolved, the Executives learned how much time and
money would be required. Looking to cut cost and time, the Executives intervened
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and limited the study to only 50 patients instead of slightly over 200—a decision
based on finances as opposed to statistics and attaining statistical significance. To
save even more money, the Executives began working to hold the QuickHeal clinical
trial in a Brazilian medical facility instead of multiple US medical facilities. Instead
of allowing the physician who developed the study protocols to oversee Madison’s
new clinical trial and ensure the physicians in Brazil adhered to study protocols, one
of the Executives volunteered to oversee the study—and bragged how he was the
most qualified Executive because he was the only employee in the company who was
fluent in Spanish. (Of course, Brazilians speak Portuguese.) R&D began suspecting
the proposed Brazilian trial would also fail to yield any usable data in terms of an
FDA submission, though it might be suitable for gaining clearance to market the
product in Brazil.
Taking clinical trials to third world countries (or second world countries in
Brazil’s case) is becoming more commonplace, and might be useful to quickly
establish a new biotech product’s efficacy and safety. In 2007, a survey of the 20
largest US pharmaceutical companies revealed that over half of their clinical study
sites were located outside of America (Glickman, McHutchison, and Peterson 817818). Pharmaceutical companies are attracted to third world countries because it is
substantially less expensive to conduct clinical trials in second and third world
countries. For example, conducting a clinical trial in a top-tier hospital in India costs
about one-tenth what it would cost to conduct the same clinical trial in a second-tier
hospital in America (Glickman, McHutchison, and Peterson 818). The drastic
difference in cost could be attributable to a wide range of factors: reduced medical
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and hospitalization costs, lower labor costs, fewer litigation cases per patient, less
regulatory oversight, and disparities in quality of care. There is also a potential lack of
transparency in how clinical research is conducted in different countries, as standards
of medical care and ethics varies from culture to culture. For instance, in an article
from the Journal of Medical Ethics that examined 670 clinical trials conducted in
developing countries, only 56% of these trials had oversight conducted by a local
medical review board or health ministry (Hyder 68-72). Another study examining
clinical trials in China revealed that 90% of clinical trials were conducted using
protocols that had not undergone an ethics review, and 82% of these clinical trials
provided insufficient or no informed consent to patients enrolled in the studies
(Glickman, McHutchison, and Peterson 818-820).
“[Companies] often approach their clinical investigators with a sense of
gratitude or even awe… [which has often] resulted in the investigator being allowed
to deviate significantly… [from] approved protocols without adequate
documentation… [and] the sponsor is the one ultimately ‘left holding the bag’”
(Parisian 572). When there is no ethical review of clinical protocols, poor oversight of
clinical investigators, and patients are given little or no informed consent, it creates an
environment where there is potential for high-risk experimentation on unwilling or
unknowing subjects—essentially a potential repetition of the Tuskegee experiments
conducted in the US (Angell 848-849).
Based upon what I observed with Madison’s poorly planned, inadequately
managed, and inconsistently documented clinical trials conducted in Europe, I was
concerned about what would happen with the documentation I had helped to develop
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for what was initially to be a clinical trial conducted in the US, but which was being
radically and quickly altered by Madison’s management for use in another country.
How would the materials be translated? Would the clinicians be able to correctly and
consistently follow the translated protocols? Would the Executive overseeing the
study be able to make sense of and enforce the written protocols despite cross-cultural
obstacles and language barriers? Would the data be recorded consistently on the
provided forms and were the physicians accustomed to filling out these types of
forms? Would the completed data be archived so it would not be lost? Did additional
procedures need to be developed to accommodate how medicine was practiced in
Brazil? Would the study data be usable at the conclusion of the study?
I feared the pending clinical trial in Brazil would fail because of inexperienced
managerial oversight, language and cultural barriers, lack of control, and disregard of
statistical significance. I was so focused on how terrible the data emerging from the
clinical trial would probably be and how there needed to be additional changes to the
documentation that I neglected to consider the ethical problems involved—the
welfare of the patients’ who would be involved in the clinical trial. My oversight
echoes what Richard Ohmann cautions about in English in America: writers who
focus—and are taught to focus—on objectivity and problem solving may distance
themselves from the human component and the writer’s social responsibilities (206).
Researchers, and technical communicators assisting researchers in developing
research documentation, may become so engrossed with the research and research
design that the human subjects become secondary thoughts.
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Ultimately, Madison’s attempt to conduct clinical trials in Brazil was thwarted
by two things: cultural disparities and the FDA’s recommendation to recast
QuickHeal as a device instead of a drug. Madison’s Spanish-speaking Executive took
a trip to Brazil to negotiate with the hospital and physicians who would be conducting
the clinical trial. Upon returning, he was clearly frustrated by how everyone he
needed to negotiate with in Brazil arrived late—if not very late—to the meetings he
had scheduled for them to attend. In the Executive’s post-trip communications with
the consultants in Brazil, his phone calls, emails, and faxes were often not returned in
a timely manner. To address this, the Executive ordered his assistant to phone, fax,
and email each communication to the people in Brazil, ensuring he had a paper trail
that he had contacted them by every possible means and his communications could
not be accidentally overlooked. This strategy of making a lot of “noise” (shouting?)
when Madison’s US office contacted the consultants in Brazil probably came across
as rude and disrespectful—and it also proved to be ineffective. Eventually, no one
from Brazil would return any of the Executives’ communications, possibly coming to
the conclusion that the price of working with Madison was not sufficiently
compensated by the money being offered to conduct Madison’s clinical trials.
Coinciding with the cessation of communication with the consultants in
BRazil, Madison had a Pre-IND meeting with the FDA to discuss QuickHeal. During
the meeting, the FDA suggestion Madison pursue FDA approval for QuickHeal as a
510(k) medical device instead of a drug, and a 510(k) medical device does not need to
have clinical trial data in order to be approved. The proposed clinical trial in Brazil
thus ended before an agreement to conduct a clinical trial in Brazil was finalized.
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When I was developing the materials for the clinical trial, the only real ethical
issue I focused on was ensuring the participants’ informed consent forms clearly
informed them of their rights as a participant in the study. Otherwise, I was mostly
focused on making sure the processes and procedures described in the protocols were
logical, well-explained, and actionable—facilitating compliance among the
physicians and nurses and minimizing opportunities for deviations from the protocols.
As I began writing this chapter on ethics, I realized I was so focused on maintaining
the purity of the experimental design and the generated data that I neglected to
consider how the design of the study might affect the patient. For instance, would it
be ethical to use a placebo in the control group when there was a commonly used
treatment available instead? Using the placebo instead of a treatment with the control
group could yield data that showed a greater disparity between the placebo and the
product being tested, but is it ethical to deny a control group standard care treatment
if that option was available at the hospital where the clinical trial was being held?
And what happens after the study is completed? Would patients who had almost
healed be given additional product to complete the healing process, or would they be
cut off abruptly from medical care when the study was completed?
Had I been more cognizant of these issues, I might have been able to lobby for
them and include them in both the study protocols and the patients’ information
packets. By looking beyond the immediate, research/business-centric purpose of
documentation required to conduct clinical trials, technical communicators involved
in the development of clinical trial protocols and informed consent packages can be
advocates for ethical corporate behavior and social responsibility.
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After the RFD: Progenix’s reimbursement
In Chapter 5, I discussed how the Executives hired a reimbursement
consultant to submit documentation claiming Progenix (a dressing with no collagen in
it) should be reimbursed as a collagen dressing (at $20 per dressing). When the
consultant sought technical information about Progenix from Madison’s R&D group,
we alerted her that there was no collagen in Progenix dressings. She claimed the
Executives wanted her to try and get a collagen dressing reimbursement, and she did
precisely what the Executives wanted despite the evidence that their decision was
fundamentally flawed and almost certainly would fail.
The collagen reimbursement submission was rejected, the consultant was
fired, and the Executives ordered R&D to appeal the ruling by again claiming that
Progenix should be classified as a collagen dressing reimbursed at $20/dressing. R&D
objected and successfully persuaded the Executives to allow R&D to appeal by
positioning Progenix as an ointment-coated dressing with a $5 per dressing
reimbursement. R&D’s appeal was successful, but the reimbursement rate was onefourth what Madison’s management communicated to shareholders in newsletters,
business plans, and annual reports.
Unfortunately, I was not privy to the negotiations between the reimbursement
consultant and Madison’s Executive group, what they told her, or what she promised
them. As a consultant with no investment or ties to the company, she might have
simply done what she had been told to do, even though she knew it would almost
certainly fail, because she was billing the company whether the project succeeded or
not. Would it be ethical for a consultant to accept a job when the consultant knew the
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outcome of the project would almost certainly end in failure, and what should a
technical communicator do if placed in a similar situation?
Consulting work should always begin with a discussion of the goals and scope
of the project. However, clients who hire consultants sometimes have a poor
understanding of the scope involved in achieving these goals—they just know they
need help. Because the client may not realize the scope of the work, they may not be
able to accurately communicate the goals of a project or critical information needed
to complete a project successfully. In situations where the client cannot articulate
what they need or where the client has a poor grasp of what needs to be done,
technical communication consultants need to ask probing questions (and perhaps even
sign a confidentiality agreement) so they can speak to SMEs in the company who
might have a better grasp of the finer details or critical information that the manager
hiring the consultant might lack.
Probably the best course of action is to postpone agreeing to provide
consulting services until the scope of the work is clear and clearly defined in a
contract. Not only does this help to ensure the technical communicator is able to meet
the client’s needs, it also helps to prevent potential client dissatisfaction and litigation
over perceived contractual obligations. If the scope of the work and the clients’
expectations are defined at the beginning, and any reservations are addressed, then
consulting-based ethical problems can be better avoided.
However, if the technical communicator has informed the client that the
consulting project will almost certainly fail, and the client insists on pursuing the
project anyway, should the technical communicator accept the job knowing that
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failure is the most probably result? If a company’s management chooses to ignore the
advice offered by a consultant, is it ethical to continue work on a project that will
fail? In the world of consulting, if one consultant declines a job there is usually
another willing to accept.
Personally, I have found myself in situations where I was asked to serve as a
consultant for a project that would most likely fail and be detrimental to the client.
(The client wanted me to review a subcontractor’s quality control documentation to
detect flaws so she could build a lawsuit against the subcontractor and break a
contract with the other company.) I explained to the manager why the project would
likely fail (the subcontractor was the only company able to supply her company with
a unique service and she had already accepted and sold product from the
subcontractor, indicating she had no issues with quality control earlier) and suggested
an alternative (renegotiate the contract with the subcontractor using her attorney) that
did not require my services. Although I lost a consulting job, I aided the client
because the owner listened to my advice. (And she promised to call me back in the
future if she had additional consulting work.) Had the company’s owner listened to
my advice and decide she still wanted to pursue the original course of action, I would
attempt to document my low expectations for the success of the project as part of our
contractual agreement, then proceed with doing the requested work desired. If a
business owner chooses to make a poor decision even after they have been informed
of the consequences, they either know something the consultant does not or tend to
make poor business decisions.
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After the RFD: Shortcuts and the Quality System
In Chapter 5, I discussed a substantial documentation problem that took
slightly over two years for me to resolve: Madison’s dysfunctional quality system
(QS). A QS is a large body of stand-alone processes that should, in theory, interact
with one another. For instance, the standard operating procedure (SOP) for making a
product should also include or reference the following SOPs (and this is not an allinclusive list):
•

SOP for training employees on procedures.

•

SOP for cleaning and maintaining the area where production occurs.

•

SOP for cleaning a machine before and after use.

•

SOP for ensuring the correct raw materials are used.

•

SOP for performing quality assurance tests on finished product.

•

SOP for ensuring the product meets given specifications.

•

SOP for labeling and storing finished product.

•

SOP for archiving all manufacturing records.

•

Specifications for raw materials to be used in production.

•

Specifications for the final product.

As can be surmised from this brief list of documents, quality systems can be
very lengthy and complicated. Madison’s original QS filled an entire 4-inch binder to
the point of overflowing. Unfortunately, Madison’s QS was derived from another
company’s QS—a company that had far more employees and which made a
completely different product with completely different procedures. When the original
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QS was hastily modified for use at Madison, the information architecture that
functioned at the original company collapsed as the various procedures were hastily
modified for Madison’s purposes. Policies and procedures became divorced from one
another and there were no indicators that once SOP #1 (e.g., ordering a raw material)
was completed, SOP #2 (e.g., verifying the correct raw material was received) and
SOP #3 (e.g., properly labeling and storing the raw material in a designated and
secured area) needed to be performed and documented. Madison’s original QS was a
confusing collection of disconnected draft-stage procedures, and it was about as
functional as a dictionary with randomly ordered definitions.
Shortly after Madison licensed its Progenix product to BigCo (a Fortune 100
company), I was tasked with overseeing a new production run (with all new
packaging and artwork) for them—the largest production run the company had ever
attempted to date. Management wanted to expedite the production run and impress its
new partner, and I was given a number of strong suggestions from the Executives on
how to take a variety of shortcuts to cut down on production times. I manufactured
the product as instructed, using the documents in the original QS, and I documented
the numerous deviations at the end of the production form where there was a space
for “notes.”
Weeks after the product had shipped, in reviewing the production
documentation, Madison’s Regulatory Affairs Manager spotted my production notes
and asked why I had not completed the SOP for handling deviations. The document I
had did not reference a procedure for handling deviations and I had never seen one in
the QS. We both searched through the QS and discovered the SOP for handling
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deviations had never been ported over from the source QS: Madison had no
procedure for handling deviations, yet a review of the production records revealed
that nearly every prior production run was rife with deviations. The Regulatory
Affairs Manager said an SOP for handling deviations was a commonly used
document within a QS and that its absence from Madison’s QS underscored how
there was still a great deal of work left to be done in bringing Madison’s QS up to
par. To resolve the problem, I wrote a modular SOP for conducting deviations that
captured what the deviation was, why the deviation was being made, what the
potential and worst case risks involved with the deviation might be, what steps
Madison would take to protect against these risks, and which executive-level
employee authorized the deviations. (In an amusing yet necessary follow-up, I then
used the SOP for deviations to document that we had deviated from an SOP and
failed to document the deviation because we had no SOP for deviation.)
As Madison’s financial troubles continued to mount, Madison’s Executives
wanted to take more and more shortcuts in the production processes. The new SOP
for deviations accommodated these requests easily. Eventually, I was asked to skip
steps and make exceptions in the manufacturing process that I believed might result
in harm to consumers who used the product; however, the Executives might not have
been aware of the problems their recommended shortcuts might cause. Rather than
object to these potentially harmful shortcuts and engage in debates with the
Executives, I was able to use the SOP for deviations to write a deviation report that
clearly indicated there were significant, potentially life-threatening risks associated
with the deviations. I then brought this “smoking gun” document to an Executive to
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authorize the activity and verbally discussed the possible consequences to ensure he
did not sign the document without reading it. After reading it, the Executive opted to
not sign the document because of the legal consequences to the company and himself.
The potentially dangerous shortcuts were dropped.
As Madison teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, the QS (combined with the
resulting fear of FDA audits, sanctions, and prosecution) was the only thing
preventing Madison from releasing poor quality and potentially dangerous product to
the public. As the purpose of a QS is to ensure the consistency and quality of a
product, the documentation system fulfilled its function even in a time of extreme
duress and widespread questionable ethical activities within the company. Consumers
were protected as Madison fought for survival.
In Armstrong’s experiments replicating the Upjohn company’s choice to
continue marketing Panalba despite the danger to consumers, he noticed that groups
of people working together in a corporate setting were far more likely to make
socially irresponsible choices than individuals acting alone (Armstrong 185-213). By
writing Madison’s QS so it required just one of Madison’s executives to take personal
responsibility for the potentially dangerous deviations the Executives decided as a
group to make, I was able to force a single Executive to stop and consider the
ramifications of the group’s recommendations to himself, the company, and the
consumer. The SOP for handling deviations also alleviated the power-imbalance that
existed between myself and my superiors who had been ordering me to perform
activities I was not always comfortable doing. The Executives realized that the FDA
was more powerful than they were, and the QS Madison’s R&D department
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implemented acted as an extension of the FDA’s presence within the company.
Similarly, other technical communicators, in crafting a QS, can develop a system of
checks and balances designed to create paper trails and assign responsibility for any
deviations or shortcuts, thus helping to prevent unethical (or illegal) behavior and
requiring management to consider the personal repercussions of their actions rather
than foisting the ethical problem (and potential legal implications) off upon their
subordinate employees.
Based on my experiences, I would suggest that technical communicators
heighten their sensitivity to ethical dilemmas if they work for a biotech company—
especially if the biotech company is experiencing financial hardships. When a
company is fighting for its continued existence, acts of desperation and higher risk
activities seem to be more likely to occur. If a biotech’s management begins
pressuring underlings to take shortcuts to save time and money, and the company has
a well-crafted quality system, sensible shortcuts can be accommodated. Contrastingly,
if the shortcuts could endanger product quality and/or be dangerous to consumers, the
quality system’s procedures can act as a formal means of removing the power
imbalance between management and rank-and-file employees.
In Ethics in Technical Communication, in discussing the Challenger shuttle
disaster, Dombrowski mentions that having safety procedures in place does not
guarantee they will be followed if an organization’s culture is used to ignoring or
trivializing them. Contrastingly, if there are no safety procedures in existence (such as
Madison initially had no procedures for handling deviations), it becomes very easy to
ignore safety procedures altogether.
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Technical communicators participating in the development, revision, or
maintenance of a quality system’s documentation can integrate procedures that help
prevent illegal or unethical activities by ensuring that deviations from normal
procedures are detailed, justified, documented, and authorized by a superior within
the company who has sufficient clout to halt or belay activities until the ethics and/or
legality of the proposed deviations are discussed. Not only does a well-developed
quality system help to protect consumers (and employees ordered to do something
they feel is unethical), it also provides a second chance for management to reconsider
a decision and to protect themselves in the event they were pressured into making a
snap decision without understanding the details and consequences of their hastily
given orders.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented a brief overview of Early America and
medicine, the rise of American corporations and patent medicines, and how unethical
behavior brought about the birth of the FDA as a government body meant to regulate
the foods and drugs commercially available to people living in the US. I also shared
some of the ethical dilemmas I faced before, during, and after developing the
Progenix RFD for Madison.
Circular dynamics of the FDA, Industry, and Politicians
From a historical perspective, the FDA can be viewed as a government agency
designed to turn what should be ethical and socially responsible business practices

309

into regulations backed and enforced by laws. The intent of these regulations is to
protect the public’s health, but they also help to prevent dishonest, corner-cutting
businesses from driving more reputable biotechs out of business. However, the
FDA’s power is granted by the U.S. Congress, politicians are influenced by industry
(through lobbyists and campaign contributions), and industry is regulated by the
FDA. The relationship between the FDA, Industry, and Congress is circular (Fig. 61).

Legal empowerment
and establishment of
the FDA’s operating
budget
FDA
Congress

Regulatory
authority over
industry
Industry

Campaign
contributions
and lobbyists

Figure 6-1: Relationships among the FDA, Industry, and Congress

In addition to protecting the public from disreputable business practices, the
FDA must also strive to find a balance between safety and the public’s demand for
new medicines. When AIDS came into the spotlight during the 1980s, a plethora of
new drugs designed to combat AIDS began undergoing testing. There was a public
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outcry for the FDA to allow AIDS victims to use these unproven drugs because there
were seemingly no other opportunities for hope. The public wanted “any drug with
any possibility [to] get on the market” (Hawthorne 53); but the FDA—knowing that
most initially promising drugs later turn out to be ineffective or harmful when
subjected to rigorous scientific studies and diseases with no cure tend to bring about
snake oil salesmen and similar hucksters who prey upon the desperate—was reluctant
to allow untested new products onto the market. Eventually, bowing to the growing
need, public and political outcry, and a growing black market of AIDS drugs being
imported from other countries, the FDA implemented a compromise “treatment IND”
program, where patients in danger of dying and with no other treatment options could
gain access to drugs in the human clinical trial phase (Hawthorne 53-55).
Some drugs are, by default, politically powderkegs. Plan B, an emergency
contraceptive drug, prompted both Republican and Democrat politicians to try and
influence the FDA’s approval of the drug (Hilts 213), but the FDA is supposed to be
an agency that makes it decisions based upon scientific evidence and not social or
political agendas. Although Plan B was approved for use in the US, pro-life critics are
quick to point out that approving a drug designed to exterminate a human life runs
contrary to the FDA’s mission statement: the “FDA is responsible for protecting the
public health by assuring the safety, efficacy and security of human and veterinary
drugs…” (“What We Do”).
Biotech corporations and social responsibility
In “The Corporation,” Chomski’s criticism of corporate institutional ethics is
especially scathing; but corporations may be a necessity when it comes to developing
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and obtaining FDA clearance to market biotech products in the US. Incorporating
allows a business to pool vast resources from a large number of investors rather than
requiring an individual, family, or small group of people to heavily invest resources
into risky ventures. The imposing time and fiscal requirements for obtaining FDA
approval (see Table 1-1) essentially require that all drug, biologic, or combination
products (with one or more drug and/or biologic components) be developed by
corporations—or perhaps extraordinarily wealthy individuals with several hundred
millions of dollars to fund research and operations for half a decade or more. Medical
devices might be the only remaining biotech products that “common” multimillionaires can pursue without the need to incorporate a business to raise operating
capital. As a result of these resource demands, technical communicators working
within the biotech industry will almost certainly be working for corporations and not
family-owned businesses.
Although corporations are not unethical or amoral entities by default,
Armstrong’s research certainly indicates that management groups within biotech
corporations may be prone to making socially irresponsible decisions in the pursuit of
greater profit for shareholders and to further the corporation’s agenda (185-213).
Because Armstrong observed that groups (when placed in a role-playing situation
where they were making decisions for a biotech company) were more prone to
making socially irresponsible decisions than individuals acting on their own (338341), technical communicators who encounter ethical problems while working for a
biotech company may want to approach a single individual/superior to discuss the
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situation rather than bring the concern up at a meeting where a larger group is present
and there is probably less likelihood of the group acting ethically.
Shareholder communications and raising operating capital
Corporations, especially early-stage biotech companies, are typically funded
by the sale of shares to investors. Technical communicators can be of great assistance
in developing materials provided to potential and existing investors, but technical
communicators working within these companies must also take care to temper the
company’s desire to raise capital with reasonably realistic expectations. Technical
communicators need to balance keeping an upbeat and positive tone that helps
reassure shareholders about their investments while providing information that is
plausible and accurate—especially if it is speculating on future developments.
Providing overly speculative and overly positive (mis)information may result in
investors forming unrealistic expectations the company will find difficult or
impossible to achieve (like what happened with Madison when the company claimed
it would receive a $20/per dressing reimbursement and ended up with a $5/per
dressing reimbursement), and may deprive people of money they might have used
elsewhere realistic (such as how Madison’s investors lost their money when the
company went bankrupt) had the contents of the biotech company’s communications
been more realistic.
Truthful and accurate statements
After the FDA clears a prescription drug for sale on the US market, the new
prescription drug is classified as an “ethical drug” (Grabowski 360-361). The term
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“ethical drug” implies that the FDA (and arbiter of what is and is not acceptable for
biotech products sold in the US), in its review, found the drug to be ethical for human
use. Because FDA reviewers rely upon companies to submit documentation that is
truthful, accurate, and with no material facts omitted; technical communicators must
ensure the submissions they help produce meet the FDA’s expectations. The FDA
cannot effectively assess if a drug is ethical if the documentation supplied to the FDA
is unethical.
One of the many way the FDA helps to ensure ethical behavior in the
submission process is by making sponsors submit a written pledge. 510(k)
submissions require the inclusion of a “Truthful and Accurate Statement,” as either a
form or as a part of the cover letter, which must be signed by the person taking
responsibility for the 510(k) submission’s contents (“How to Prepare a Traditional
510(k)”). Although the OCP’s RFD guidance document (see Appendix A) does not
require the inclusion of a “Truthful and Accurate Statement” in a RFD submission’s
documentation, a technical communicator should still adhere to the ethical standards
required for 510(k) submissions when developing an RFD or other FDA submission.
Using quality systems as a means of enforcing ethical behavior
One means of preventing unethical practices from occurring in a biotech
company is the development of a rigorous quality system, an the FDA requires all
biotech manufacturers to have a quality system that complies with specific
regulations. (See Table 1-1 for relevant CFR references.) A quality system should
clearly define all of a product’s specifications, tolerances, raw materials,
manufacturing equipment, manufacturing processes, testing procedures, training
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records, production records, and numerous other factors that ensure product complies
with FDA requirements. Having these detailed procedures ensures the production of
detailed paper trails and signatures of those who authorized activities at every stage of
production. The FDA reviews this information for regulatory compliance during an
audit. Because the FDA has greater authority than a company’s management, the
quality system can be used as a means for underling employees to question the
judgment of managers who have asked their employees to perform actions that could
result in FDA sanctions or litigation.
The SOP for deviating from normal procedures is a particularly useful
procedure that, if written well, can be an effective means of curtailing illegal or
unethical actions. A good SOP for documenting deviations should ask the following
questions whenever any person within a company, regardless of their placement on an
organizational chart, orders a deviation from standard procedures:
•

What is the deviation being made?

•

Why is the deviation being made?

•

What are the potential risks (worst-case scenarios) for the deviation?

•

What actions must and will be taken to ensure no worst-case scenarios
occur?

•

Who is responsible for authorizing the deviation?

Technical communicators participating in the development, revision, or
maintenance of a quality system’s documentation can help to codify ethical behavior
into a biotech’s practices, ensuring that instances of unethical or illegal activity leave
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a “smoking gun” paper trail for FDA reviewers to uncover during a later audit or in
the event one of the biotech employees whistle-blows to prevent a superior from
releasing dangerous products into commerce.
Manipulating the media
Technical communicators developing marketing materials and press releases
for biotechs may need to consider their ethical responsibilities when producing
materials that may later be used in news reports produced for mass consumption by
the general public. Even though the FDA requires biotech companies to not make
unsubstantiated and unapproved product claims, many companies may be
circumventing these regulations by manipulating the media. According to Donald
Gould—author of “What is an Ethical Drug?”—the biotech industry will often hold
press conferences and send out news releases immediately after FDA approval is
obtained, but sometimes intentionally delay the development and/or release of
“official” informational materials developed in-house (and thus subject to FDA
regulation and sanctions). While it is not illegal for news reporters to misconstrue or
misreport complex information, often sensationalizing a new biotech product’s
effectiveness in treating a disease or medical condition, it is not legal for the biotech
company to make or publish these same unsubstantiated claims in their promotional
documents and marketing ads. (Whenever the local news media wrote an article on
Madison, reporters typically included speculative and exaggerated claims interwoven
with reality.) By intentionally delaying the release of the company’s official
information packages with limited claims, physicians and their patients are first
exposed to the typically far more exciting and promising claims being made by the
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news media (Gould 364). Technical communicators who work in or with a biotech’s
marketing department need to consider the ethics involved in the manipulations
Gould describes—factoring in how common the practice is, how it is legal, and how
the nature and risks involved with off-label use of the product might impact
consumers’ health.
Guiding ethical principles at the FDA, guiding principles for technical
communicators
Technical communicators who work for companies may sometimes find
themselves in situations where they must strive to seek an ethical balance between
helping to further the goals of the companies they work for and protecting the
consumers who use their companies’ products. Howard Cohen, a policy-maker for the
FDA, said the following about the FDA’s role as guardian of the US public’s health:

There would always come a point where you just think of who it affects… you
think about your spouse, or your kid, or your mother. At some point you sort
of make this mental test of what you are doing. If this is going to be used on
my mother… I want to be careful. I don’t want it tied up [in FDA reviews and
of safety and efficacy] forever, either. But you have to get away from
ideology, and apply this sort of commonsense test. That guided us [in making
decisions regarding how the FDA operates]. (Hilts 327)

While working at Madison, whenever an ethical quandary arose, I frequently
used the “would I give this to a member of my family to use?” litmus test to guide my
actions. Although simplistic, this approach helped me in writing procedures,
conducting research, and establishing specifications designed to ensure that only
high-quality product was released from Madison to the public. By extension, other
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technical communicators might also benefit from this practice when faced with
ethical situations—whether they work in the biotech industry or not.
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Chapter 7: Observations and Conclusions

“The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the
human mind to correlate all its contents.”
— H. P. Lovecraft, “The Call of Cthulhu”

Introduction
This study documents my personal experiences acting as a small biotech
company’s sole technical communicator during its attempt at obtaining U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) clearance for Progenix, a hybridization of a drug and a
medical device. The purpose of this research is to provide insight into the roles, tasks,
and ethical quandaries I faced as a technical communicator crafting Progenix’s
Request For Designation (RFD) submission, a combination product-specific
document reviewed by the Office of Combination Products (OCP)—and which other
technical communicators might face in the future. The OCP, a new office within the
FDA, was formed in 2002 and began reviewing RFDs in 2003. RFDs are likely the
rarest of FDA product submission: the OCP reviewed fewer than 800 RFD
submissions between 2003 and 2008. (See Table 7-2.)
RFD submissions might be of particular interest to technical communicators
because their authors must consider the functions of not just the OCP, but three
additional centers within the FDA that approve or reject every new drug, biologic,
medical device or combination product that enters the US healthcare market. These
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three FDA centers are the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), the
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), and the Center for Devices
and Radiological Health (CDRH). Examining the development of an RFD submission
for a combination product can probably provide insight into how other, substantially
larger FDA submissions for stand-alone biologic, drug, and device products are
developed.
There is also a need for more research about writing FDA submissions. There
is currently very little information in the literature examining the roles of technical
communicators involved in developing FDA submissions, and there is no research
exploring the experiences of a technical communicator and the development an RFD
submission. Although the primary focus of my research is on the development of
Progenix’s RFD, the events that influenced the RFD’s development and the
subsequent ways the RFD’s language affected Progenix’s subsequent manufacturing
and marketing considerations provides valuable insight for future writers of RFDs.
As Progenix evolved from a documented concept into a physical product, my
role within the company shifted from acting as the company’s sole technical
communicator (working on Progenix’s FDA submissions) into serving as the
company’s vice president of manufacturing and quality control (which largely
involved revising and creating process documentation). By sharing retrospections and
observations about the tasks I undertook within a small biotech, other technical
communicators can learn from my experiences, gain insight into the complexities and
challenges of developing materials for FDA-regulated products, and apply this
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information towards future research centered upon writing FDA submissions (and
related documentation).
Although good science is a must in an FDA submission, so is good writing.
FDA reviewers who are forced to review poorly written submissions may become
frustrated, creating a situation where the reviewer/gatekeeper becomes hostile
towards the product and/or company. A former head of the FDA instructed reviewers
to reject any confusing and poorly written product submission rather than waste
valuable time trying to decipher what the sponsor was attempting to communicate
(Hilts 168). Additionally, a recent poll of FDA reviewers found that these reviewers
considered 21% of submissions they reviewed to be of poor quality and only 7% of
excellent quality (Hilts 315). The biotech industry would be well-advised to consider
adding technical communicators (preferably with a background in engineering,
biology, and/or chemistry) to their companies to help ensure their FDA submissions
are of the highest quality.
In Chapter 2, I posed the following question as the primary research goal for
this dissertation: “How might technical communication practices and practitioners be
of use in the development of FDA submissions, and what challenges might technical
communicators face in creating FDA submissions?” In this final chapter, I summarize
a number of possible answers to this question.

Business advice and the future of the OCP and RFDs
Technical communicators can establish their value by relating their work to
the bottom line (Blain and Lincoln 11), and technical communicators will have to
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prove their worth if they want to be hired at a biotech and aid in the development of
FDA submissions. There have been several studies undertaken to demonstrate how
technical communicators helped to save companies money by comparing the value
added by revising old processes or documentation to be more functional and userfriendly (Hackos; Mead; Reddish; Spencer and Yates). Unfortunately there is no way
to do a before-and-after comparison with Madison Technologies’ RFD in terms of
value added: there was only one RFD submission and thus no way to compare its
performance against a second RFD submission from Madison.
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, Madison’s R&D group (with a technical
communicator coordinating the collaborative writing efforts) was successful in
developing a 510(k) medical device submission that obtained FDA approval.
Contrastingly, Madison’s lead research scientist later developed a second 510(k) for
Adavancia (a knock-off of Progenix) without the assistance of a technical
communicator, and the FDA rejected this 510(k) submission. It is generally more
difficult to accomplish a task for the first time than to repeat a prior success, so it
should have been easier for Adavancia to obtain FDA approval than the earlier
Progenix submission. The only substantial differences between these two 510(k)
submissions was that the successful submission had a technical communicator
working with a collaborative group and the unsuccessful submission was developed
without the assistance of a technical communicator or a collaborative group.
Adavancia’s rejection by the FDA—which directly contributed to Madison’s
bankruptcy—might have been avoidable if a technical communicator had been
involved in the submission’s development. It is possible that adding a technical
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communicator to a biotech company’s payroll might result in substantial financial
gains for the company and an advantage over competitors.
In the following two sections, I revisit and expand Table 1-1, based upon my
experiences at Madison, to include new business-related information about RFDs. I
also examine the OCP’s activities between 2003 and 2008 and speculate on how the
OCP has integrated into the FDA and the future of RFD submissions in general.
Updating Table 1-1 to include business-related information about RFDs
Throughout this dissertation I have frequently referenced Table 1-1, which I
compiled to provide a comparison of the differences among drug, biologic, and
device FDA submissions. Based upon my experiences at Madison, I have expanded
the original table to include an additional column containing information about
Request For Designation (RFD) submissions. (See Table 7-1.)
Although the costs and development times for drug, biologic, device, and
RFD submissions may seem substantial, technical communicators working for
biotechs could help to decrease a company’s overall approval costs and times. Small
biotechs with little or no FDA experience (like Madison was) are probably the most
likely culprits in sending poor-quality submissions to the FDA; and the process of
being rejected and then needing to rewrite a submission may result in operational
costs and delays that could cause the company to fail. Investing in the skills of a
technical communicator with prior experience developing materials for the FDA
could save larger biotechs money and may prevent the collapse of small start-up
biotechs with no prior FDA experience.
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Table 7-1: Comparison of FDA medical product development times,
costs, and success rates—including RFD submissions

Development
cost
(in millions)

Total
development
time (in years)
Probability of
successfully
gaining FDA
clearance†††††
Approvals/year
Post-approval
regulation

Reviewing
agency
1
2
3
4
5

6

New
biological
product†

New
drug
product
(IND) †
$8021

No data††

Medical devices
New device Generic
(PMA)
device
(510(k))
2
$110
$22

12.53

11.53

3.252

1.652

21%1

30%4

No data
available†††

95%2

195
21
C.F.R.
Parts
210 and
211
CDER

125
98735, ††††
21 C.F.R. 21 C.F.R. Part 820
Parts 600680

CBER

CDRH

Request for
Designation
(RFD)
Drug PMOA:
$20.7-34.46
Biologic
PMOA:
No data7
Device
PMOA:
$1.5-2.58
0.25 to 0.429

N/A
See Table 6210
13111
As per the
OCP’s
designation
of primary
jurisdiction12
OCP

DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski.
Lawyer, Andrew, Gjaja, and Schweizer.
Reichert.
DiMasi and Grabowski.
Moses, Dorsey, Matheson, and Their. Averages derived from the number of
approvals between 1998 (after the implementation of the FDA Modernization
Act of 1997) and 2004 and rounded to the nearest whole number.
In Chapter 1 I extrapolated how drug development costs can exceed upwards
of $275,000 per day of delay based upon research by DiMasi, Hansen, and
Grabowski. A delay of 3-5 months could thus result in a loss of $33.5-50.2
million for a product with a drug PMOA.
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7

8

9

10

11

12

†

††

†††

††††

†††††

I have no data available for the biologic PMOA products, but based upon the
similarities between drug and biologic development costs, I assume the
expense would be about the same or slightly less than drug PMOA products.
Based upon Madison’s operational costs of roughly $0.5 million per month, a
delay of 3-5 months would incur expenses of $1.5-2.5 million for a product
with a device PMOA. (Note that this is potentially more costly than a generic
510(k) medical device submission.)
In Chapter 3 I explained how Madison’s R&D group estimated 1-2 months of
RFD development time, 2 months of review time by the OCP, and an
additional month if the OCP had questions about the RFD submission. Our
estimate of 3-5 month’s development time proved to be a fairly accurate
assessment.
The OCP does not determine FDA approval for a product: it merely assigns
primary jurisdiction to CBER, CDER, or CDRH. See also Table 6-2, which
shows the volume of RFDs processed at the OCP and the frequency of which
agency is granted primary jurisdiction over combination products.
Between 2003 and 2008, the OCP processed 785 RFDs, for an average of 131
(130.83) RFDs processed per year.
Currently, when the OCP designated CBER, CDER, or CDRH as having
primary jurisdiction over a combination product, the combination product
must meet the post-approval regulatory standards for the agency granted
primary jurisdiction ("Early Development Considerations for Innovative
Combination Products”). However, the FDA is in the process of altering postapproval requirements so that the constituent components are regulated by
their relevant agency (“Proposed Rules” 48424).
The table includes new and generic devices, but only new drugs and new
biologics (no generics) as these are not relevant to this dissertation and data is
not readily available.
Because biologics encompass an extremely broad range of products, it’s
misleading to provide an average cost, and no data on price ranges are readily
available to the public.
PMAs require more safety and efficacy testing (and thus more costs) than
510(k) submissions (which are generics of existing devices), so it can be
assumed that the chances of a PMA gaining FDA approval are less than the
95% success rate of 510(k) submissions but likely greater than the 21% and
32% success rates of drugs and biologics (respectively).
No data available to differentiate the number of approved 510(k) devices from
the number of approved PMA devices between 1998-2004, but the bulk of
approvals would obviously be attributable to the cheaper, easier to approve
510(k) devices.
Success rate is based upon products that already passed safety and efficacy
testing prior to entering this phase of FDA approval, so overall beginning-toend success rates are much lower—possibly even 1/5th of the figures listed on
this table (Helms, Helms, and Kessler 6).
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The Office of Combination Product’s past and future roles within the FDA
Currently, FDA submissions initially go to CBER, CDER, and CDRH based
solely upon what a sponsor believes their product is and which agency they believe
should review it. CBER, CDER, and CDRH reviewers who suspect a submission they
received from a sponsor may be a combination product can redirect the sponsor to the
OCP. The OCP can then determine (with the aid of an RFD submitted from the
sponsor) the primary mode of action (PMOA) and which agency—CBER, CDER, or
CDRH—will have primary jurisdiction in the review process and which agencies may
be consulted for the review.
When I first began working on Madison’s Progenix RFD, I speculated that the
OCP might later be repurposed from its existing role within the FDA into a more
proactive product sorting and classification role. I thought the OCP might eventually
receive all incoming FDA submissions (combination products or not) and assign
these submissions to the appropriate center—CBER, CDER, CDRH, or a
combination of these centers with one being designated the arbitrator for any intercenter collaboration. If that were to occur, then RFDs might become a smaller,
introductory-type document included with every FDA submission—or a section
integrated into the beginning of every FDA submission. However, my initial
assumption appears to be incorrect. The “FY 2008 OCP Performance Report” shows
the number of RFD submissions has been in a state of decline, with the OCP
processing just 22 RFDs in 2008 and, on average, just 131 RFDs per year between
2003 and 2008.
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In Table 7-2, I present six years of data obtained from the OCP’s annual
performance review, which shows the number and assignment of RFD submissions
(as well as processing times) the OCP processed between 2003 and 2008.

Table 7-2: OCP assignment of primary jurisdictions, 2003-2008
20031 20042 20053
Total RFDs reviewed
13
248
231
CBER primary jurisdiction
2
36
35
CDER primary jurisdiction
3
112
102
CDRH primary jurisdiction
8
100
94
Review Fastest
18
11
18
time
Slowest
48
59
59
(days)
Median
41
31
44
1
FDA, “FY 2003 OCP Performance Report”
2
FDA, “FY 2004 OCP Performance Report”
3
FDA, “FY 2005 OCP Performance Report”
4
FDA, “FY 2006 OCP Performance Report”
5
FDA, “FY 2007 OCP Performance Report”
6
FDA, “FY 2008 OCP Performance Report”

20064
239
35
104
96
12
60
32

20075
32
3
10
19
12
60
32

20086
22
2
14
6
36
60
59

Total
785
113
345
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In 2003, there were few RFD submissions, and this could be attributable to the
newness of the OCP and FDA employees and industry being unfamiliar with the
OCP’s existence and purpose. By 2004, the number of RFDs processed by the OCP
increased nearly twenty times what was processed in 2003. The total number of RFD
submissions peaked in 2004, with the number of RFDs in 2005 and 2006 being
roughly equivalent to 2004 levels. Curiously, in 2007 and 2008, RFD submissions
dropped nearly ten-fold from the 2004-2006 highs. My suspicion is that the recent
decline in the number of RFD submissions is due to one or more of the following
factors:
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•

Potentially undocumented changes in how the FDA’s reviewers at CBER,
CDER, and CDRH internally handle submissions that might be classified
as combination products.

•

Potential changes in the socio-political dynamics and/or work environment
within the OCP, and/or the FDA could be minimizing or phasing out the
OCP’s role.

•

Potential decrease in research and development work in the biotech
industry due to a recession occurring in the US, which means biotech
companies might be scaling back the development of new products due to
funding issues.

•

Industry may have become more aware of combination products, RFDs,
and the OCP; resulting in more careful use of language and claims in their
FDA submissions so as to avoid having products redirected and stalled by a
potentially unnecessary OCP review.

From an industry perspective, the best possible RFD submission is the RFD
submission that never needs to be written. Writing and submitting and RFD can
potentially cost between $1.5-34.4 million and result in a delay of three to six months
(see Table 7-1). If care is taken in wording a company’s initial FDA submission to
CBER, CDER, or CDRH; many companies may be able to avoid an otherwise
unnecessary RFD filing requirement. Had Madison’s initial 510(k) filing excluded
drug language and claims, I believe the CDRH reviewer would never have diverted
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Madison to the OCP, completely negating the need for an RFD submission and a
revision of the original 510(k).

Ethical considerations for technical communicators working
for biotechs
In the past few decades, the public’s opinion of biotech companies’
trustworthiness has plummeted (Lenzer 621). Milgram’s experiments demonstrated
how people tend to act in an unethical manner when ordered by a superior to do
something harmful to another person (Blass 969-978). Similar experiments show how
the profit motive, when combined with groups of people, can over-ride the normally
socially responsible actions of individuals (Armstrong 185-213). Armstrong’s and
Milgram’s research indicate that “good people will behave badly as they perform
their expected roles” (Hilts 342). In “The Corporation,” Chomski claims the
corporations people work for are equivalent amoral individuals, singularly profitminded, and placed in a position of superiority above all the company’s employees.
The corporation exists for the corporation’s sake, not the employees or the
consumers. Despite the monumental advancements in medical science and medical
research over the past century, “the logic of ‘profit alone’ that dominated the
companies in the nineteenth century dominates them [and their employees] today”
(Hilts 343).
Technical communicators working at biotech companies are just as
susceptible to the temptation of “profit alone” unethical behavior as every other
company employee; however, technical communicators are typically in a position
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where they might be called upon to develop and broadcast information that is not
truthful or accurate. If these communications encompass a product’s safety, usage,
efficacy, or marketing; the information developed by a technical communicator may
affect the health and lives of millions of people. One way technical communicators
may be able to help promote ethical behavior among themselves and their fellow
employees is if they can participate in the development, revision, and organization of
the documented processes and procedures found within a biotech company’s quality
system.

Quality systems and technical communicators
Device, drug, and biological manufacturers are required by the FDA to have a
collection of documents detailing how their products are made, including production
records for each lot of product. These documents are referred to as a quality system
(QS), which is a system design to ensure that only quality product is manufactured
and released to the market.
Although the development and use of a quality system for biotech companies
was not the focus of my research, this topic appears fruitful for future technical
communication-based research and merits additional discussion in this final chapter.
In this section, I briefly discuss (1) how technical communicators can use a QS to
help promote and enforce ethical behavior, and (2) how technical communicators
assisting in the development and maintenance of a biotech’s QS can help increase
efficiency and reduce costs.
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Enforcing ethical behavior through a quality system’s documentation
One way technical communicators can help promote ethical behavior in a
biotech company—both in themselves and in their fellow employees—is by
developing procedures that standardizes processes known to produce quality
products. Any deviation from these procedures might yield poor-quality product.
While it is tempting to simply forbid any deviations from established procedures and
to reject any product made where one or more activities deviated from documented
procedures, technical communicators writing or revising a QS for a biotech company
must always maintain a balance between regulatory compliance and system
functionality (Rupel 1-5). Based upon my experiences manufacturing FDA-approved
medical devices for a small company and developing the documentation used to
support these various manufacturing processes, things often do not go according to
documented plans.
Companies in a state of financial crisis might be willing to take risks in the
manufacturing process to save time and money. Having good procedures—and good
procedures for deviating from established procedures—can help ensure accountability
and ethical, socially responsible behavior. In particular, by creating process
documentation that requires one person (rather than a committee or no one) to
authorize and take responsibility for deviating from well-defined and documented
procedures proven to yield quality products, technical communicators can confront
the profit-minded group-think that appears to encourage socially irresponsible
decision-making within the upper echelons of biotech companies (Armstrong 185213).
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QS documentation is also an excellent means of removing disparities in
power. Milgram observed that people will often do unethical things if ordered to do
so by an authority figure (Blass 969-978) indicates that. Contrastingly, a company’s
QS acts as an extension of the FDA’s auditors because it creates paper trails detailing
who authorized or performed specific activities. Therefore, written procedures within
a QS, an extension of the FDA, will be seen as having authority over the company
and the individuals within a company. Regardless of whether an employee works in a
factory warehouse or if the employee is president, CEO, and owner of the company,
everyone is subordinate to the QS and the FDA. Quality systems can thus be used as a
proactive means of enforcing ethical corporate behavior by removing power
imbalances among employees and by ensuring individuals (not groups) are held
responsible for risky or unethical actions.
Increasing the value and efficiency of a quality system
According to “Quality Management System Trends in Life-Sciences,” 69% of
biotech companies view document management as the most important aspect of their
QS. Despite the importance of document management, many small companies (less
than 200 employees) experience difficulties in implementing their first QS: it usually
takes one or more years of use for a newly implemented QS to become mature,
refined, and functional (Graham 40-42). These small companies may not be using
technical communicators to assist in the design and development of their quality
systems’ documentation. By failing to employ technical communicators experienced
with process documentation, information design, and usability; small biotech
companies may be making more mistakes, creating unnecessary waste, and causing
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more inefficiency than necessary. “A technical writer is… an excellent person to
document a quality management program. Doing so requires excellent organizational
skills, attention to detail, an understanding of business processes, exceptional
information-gathering skills, and an ability to translate researched information into
useable documents” (Biochuk).
Based upon my experiences rewriting Madison’s quality system, one of the
best solutions for developing a documented quality process for maintaining FDA
regulatory compliance is to pair a technical communicator (preferably with some
engineering, chemistry or quality control background) with a regulatory specialist
SME (or someone familiar with FDA or ISO regulations). If possible, place these two
people in the same office or in adjacent offices to facilitate communication and
expedite the quality system’s refinement. Also, if the technical communicator and/or
the regulatory specialist are not the people performing the processes to be
documented, the technical communicator needs to be granted access to the people
responsible for performing these processes and the locations these activities occur in
so as to better understand the processes being documented and to identify how to
make the documented processes as efficient and user-friendly as possible.

Observations and advice for developing FDA submissions
Much of the experiences I had developing the Progenix RFD were later
applicable to the development of Progenix’s 510(k) submission. Likewise, my
exposure to how the FDA handles RFDs and 510(k)s provided me insight into other
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forms of documentation—such as quality systems—reviewed by the FDA. In the
following sections, I share some of the insight I gained from my experiences.
Guidelines for FDA submissions
In 1949 (43 years after its inception in 1906), the FDA began publishing
guidance documentation for industry: it was becoming difficult for companies to keep
track of all the FDA’s regulatory requirements and to submit documentation that met
the FDA’s expectations (“Agency History”). Since 1949, the regulatory burden has
continued to grow in volume and scope. Even the FDA occasionally becomes
overwhelmed by its own red tape and periodically revises rules and regulations to
streamline its processes (Whitmore 29-30).
The FDA’s guidance documents, even ones labeled as being “draft”
documents, can be immeasurably useful in condensing need-to-know and hard-to-find
information from the intimidating and immense Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
These guides, in addition to helping regulatory affairs SMEs locate critical
information, also provide a glimpse into how reviewers typically expect submissions
to be organized and what information to include. “You want the review process to be
relatively cookie-cutter. If [the FDA reviewers] have to shift gears [to get used to a
strange type font or numbering system] it will be less efficient” (Hawthorne 96).
Contrastingly, the FDA’s guidance documents can never serve as step-by-step, formlike instructions that encompass the full range of variations and unique issues that
might arise during a product’s submission (Whitmore 30). Each FDA submission is
as unique as the product it was written to represent. Even generics have subtle
variations in their manufacturing processes, suppliers, inert ingredients, and
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specifications that uniquely distinguish them from the original product. Submission
authors must be dynamic and flexible in developing and arranging the content of
these documents as the circumstances demand. For example, Madison’s decision to
deviate from the RFD’s guidelines (to include an integrated cover letter that provided
both a brief introduction and clarified name changes to the product and company)
appears to have been an appropriate and warranted departure from the typical RFD
submission.
Much like all concepts cannot be effectively communicated via the fiveparagraph theme format frequently promoted in America’s grade schools, technical
communicators involved in writing RFD submissions may be useful in finding new
ways to organize and present information that falls outside of the standard format
presented in the OCP’s RFD guidance document (see Appendix A)—and guidance
documents for other types of FDA submissions.
Avoid writing unnecessary RFDs by using product-appropriate language and
claims
RFDs require time, money, and human resources to produce; therefore, the
best possible RFD is the one that never needs to be written. In Chapter 3 I discussed
Madison’s early history and how the company’s management wanted to pursue a drug
approval initially. After meeting with the FDA, Madison began pursuing a device
approval, as advised by the FDA, but failed to realize the importance of removing
drug-related marketing claims from the device submission. This oversight probably
resulted in Madison’s redirection towards the OCP and necessitated the development
of an RFD. Had Madison met with the FDA sooner to discuss the product’s concept,
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and had Madison secured a consultant with prior experience developing FDA
submissions, Madison might have been able to avoid writing an RFD and a second
510(k) submission to amend the first—saving one or more million dollars and nearly
a year’s worth of delays.
Madison' is not alone in making these kinds of blunders. According to
PricewaterhouseCooper’s “Improving America’s Health V” report, industry typically
does not take advantage of holding pre-submission meetings with the FDA, and the
FDA does not actively encourage these meetings. “Survey results indicate that
communication between FDA and industry falls short on both sides... [and that] more
frequent, open, and clear communication could benefit both sides” (Swanick 3). Even
though the biotech industry wants the FDA to be more specific in its requirements for
product submissions, the biotech industry (and especially start-up biotechs with no
prior interactions with the FDA) may be unaware of many of the programs the FDA
already offers to assist industry.
Unfortunately, discovering all of the potentially useful programs the FDA has
to offer may be difficult due to the sheer volume of information produced by the FDA
and the difficulties involved in organizing and retrieving relevant information among
all the non-relevant information. By 1999, the FDA’s website had “over 30,000
documents, many of which have been developed to flesh out federal laws and FDA
regulations…, guidelines,… and regulatory compliance” (Harnack 13). It is therefore
imperative that biotechs who are unfamiliar with their audience (the FDA) seek out
consultants who are familiar with the language and audience expectations.
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The importance of defining responsibilities and authority in collaborative FDA
submissions and projects
Because FDA submissions draw upon multiple areas of specialized
knowledge (i.e., engineering, biology, chemistry, marketing, toxicology, etc.), it is
highly unlikely a single individual will possess all the necessary skill sets required to
produce an entire FDA submission—much less the time and equipment to perform all
the requisite tests and research. As a result, modern FDA submissions are almost
always collaboratively produced technical documents. Successful management of a
collaborative project requires good communication skills and intra-group cooperation
that might not normally be a part of how a company operates on a day-to-day basis.
Overcoming these hurdles can be troublesome, but failing to address them may
jeopardize a company’s FDA submissions.
Seasoned technical communicators tend to excel at extracting information
from SMEs and synthesizing complex content taken from various sources into a
cohesive unit. Despite these skills, a technical communicator assigned to a
collaborative project will be less effective if viewed as a “glorified secretary” or a
person who proofreads documents for typos—a stereotype many technical
communicators have faced in the past and still occasionally face in the present. If a
technical communicator is to be effective in coordinating SMEs and rewriting
documents into a single, cohesive FDA submission, the technical communicator
needs to have some level of authority either as part of his or her job title, or publicly
acknowledged authority by the lead manager over the project. The Alteon company
did precisely that: the company’s medical writer worked directly for the company’s
337

CEO while coordinating and retrieving information from over 20 SMEs (Hawthorne
100-101). Additionally, technical communicators who become experienced in an area
and exhibit competent organizational and people skills may prove to be effective
information managers, serving in supervisory positions within a company (Wick 515529), much like I came to do when later promoted to a vice president position at
Madison during the latter stages of developing the company’s QS.
Single sourcing in FDA submissions (and quality systems)
Although I did not use single sourcing in developing Progenix’s 15-page RFD
or its subsequent 510(k) that exceeded 100 pages in length, single sourcing might be
of value in larger drug and biologic submissions, potentially saving time in making
universal edits that affect multiple documents and/or sections within these documents.
Single sourcing also holds a great deal of promise for rapidly updating the
quality systems required in manufacturing medical devices, biologics, drugs, and
combination products—but only in certain situations. When developing Madison’s
QS, I did not use single sourcing because of three obstacles: time constraints, training
and software, and regulatory concerns. When I was not overseeing manufacturing
activities or conducting research, I was rewriting documentation for critically flawed
processes: my focus was on correcting these problems as opposed to streamlining
mass changes in a stabile system that simply needed refinement. Madison’s budget
constraints and short-handed staffing prohibited the time, training, and planning
required to successfully implement a functional single sourcing environment. Lastly,
ISO 13485 requires version control tracking of documents, and I was uncertain that
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single sourcing software would comply with Madison’s existing version control
system or FDA requirements for a quality system.
Instead of using single sourcing, I designed modular templates that functioned
as front matter for all procedures. These modular templates were absent from the
initial QS. Implementing templates helped to save time, and the templates were better
suited to addressing Madison’s more immediate and pressing documentation needs.
Ultimately, single sourcing is probably not useful for a small startup biotech company
with an immature QS or a small FDA submission like or an RFD or a 510(k);
however, single sourcing might be very useful in biotech companies with a mature
QS and in the development of the largest FDA submissions: drugs, biologicals, or
combination products with a PMOA of a drug or a biological.
Electronic submissions
While I was attending the 2007 AdvaMed seminar titled 510(k) Submissions
101: “THE COURSE” for Regulatory Affairs Professionals for Preparing a 510(k), a
CDRH 510(k) reviewer panel member informed the participants that it was pointless
to put a 510(k) submission into an expensive, pretty binder: the reviewer will never
see it. After a 510(k) submission arrives at the FDA, it goes to a mailroom where it is
removed from the binder and then placed in a new, color-coded binder that adheres to
an in-house document management system used by the FDA. The original binders are
discarded. But how does the FDA handle electronic documents?
According to the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, the
Government Paperwork Elimination Act allows for electronic communications with
federal agencies—including the FDA. However, the FDA still requires hardcopy (and
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often several hardcopies) in addition to an electronic submission. For instance,
according to the FDA’s guidance document “How to Prepare a Traditional 510(k),”
with 510(k) submissions, the sponsor is normally supposed to submit two hard
copies; but the sponsor may submit just one hardcopy if the company also submits an
electronic copy.
There is no data publicly available to determine if reviewers prefer reading
hardcopy or electronic texts, but in my conversations with CDRH reviewers at the
2007 Advamed seminar, they all expressed excitement about electronic submissions
and the potential utility of hypertext to aid in navigating extremely large documents.
Undoubtedly, CDER and CBER reviewers, who must review substantially larger
submissions with thousands of pages of documentation in a single submission, would
share similar or greater enthusiasm for electronic texts. Technical communicators are
often experienced in developing hyperlinked documents, organizing for hypertext
reading, and developing content designed for hypertext-enabled documents. These
proficiencies make technical communicators particular useful to biotechs seeking to
transition their FDA submission process towards digital documentation and
hypermedia. In the future (or possibly even the present), technical communicators
may also begin integrating interactive multimedia within digital submissions to
demonstrate complex concepts that are easier for FDA reviewers to visualize than to
describe with text.
Trending communication data
Necessity is the mother if invention. As biotech companies see a need for
technical communication-based research (as well as a means of benefiting from this
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research), they will begin conducting more research. For example, the biotech
industry has already discovered the value of trending the contents of FDA warning
letters resulting from FDA audits. These warning letters are a matter of public record
and readily available online at the FDA’s website. By reviewing FDA warning letters,
biotechs have been able to gain insight into what businesses and products the FDA is
currently auditing, as well as what areas (manufacturing records, shelf life testing,
environmental control, raw material sourcing, etc.) the FDA’s inspectors seem to be
focusing on (Church and Mahoney 1-5). Mining these warning letters for inspection
trends helps to alert biotechs as to what areas of their quality system and
manufacturing processes may be vulnerable in the event of an audit, providing
companies with the opportunity to improve these areas prior to a surprise visit from
an FDA audit team.
Technical communicators as problem solvers and managers
Technical communicators spend a great deal of time learning systems and
products by gathering, reviewing, and re-organizing information. With all this
information being studied and reviewed, technical communicators may often find
themselves in a position where they can provide innovative solutions to existing
problems. If technical communicators gain a reputation for being problem solvers, not
just editors or documentation specialists, the discipline could gain additional prestige
and industry utility. Technical communicators who demonstrate the ability to
innovate and resolve existing problems could see their roles expand into managing
people and projects, not just managing documentation and documentation projects
(Bekins and Williams 287-295). Additionally, in large-scale collaborative efforts
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(such as developing an FDA submission for a biological, device, or drug), technical
communicators might prove to be highly useful acting as information managers in a
supervisor-level role (Wick 515-529). At Madison, my role within the company
transitioned from a documentation specialist to that of an executive-level problem
solving information manager after I learned the company’s systems sufficiently
enough to begin offering solutions to complex problems that could be resolved
through better process documentation.

Areas for future research
Although I have provided new insights into the challenges and opportunities
facing technical communicators who developing materials to support an FDA
submission, this dissertation is still rather limited in its overall scope. I participated in
bringing only one new medical product from one biotech company through the
FDA’s new product approval gauntlet, so my insights may be short-sighted or biased
due to my sample size of one. The preliminary findings I have presented in this
dissertation could be broadened and expanded upon by future technical
communication research into the following areas:
•

Comparison of biologic, device, drug, and/or combination product
submissions—possibly via a review of FOIA requests used to obtain a crosssection of FDA submissions for products that have different modes of action
(drug-based, device-based, and biologic-based) but a similar intended product
use (such as wound closure).
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•

Examination of how FDA submissions are developed in larger and more
mature biotechs (with greater FDA experience) in comparison to smaller and
less mature startup biotechs (with little or no FDA experience).

•

Development, management, and evolution of quality systems in biotech
companies—particularly in the areas of using single sourcing, document
design, and information architecture to promote usability and FDA regulatory
compliance.

•

Surveys of technical communicators working within biotechs to better
understand where technical communicators are being employed within
biotechs (e.g., marketing, website development, instructions for use,
packaging and label design, etc.), education levels, professional backgrounds,
and industry trends that could be useful in developing new academic courses
in medical writing.

It is safe to assume that a technical writer can improve the quality of an RFD
submission’s documentation, a larger FDA submission’s documentation, and
ultimately the QS documentation governing all aspects of manufacturing and
marketing a newly approved (or existing) biotech product. In summation, a technical
communicator—especially an interdisciplinary technical communicator with some
engineering, chemistry, biology, and/or marketing in their background and some prior
experience with FDA submissions—would likely prove to be a beneficial and costeffective addition for a biotech company of almost any size.
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Appendix C: Progenix RFD
Notes to this Appendix
The sample RFD presented in this appendix has had numerous alterations made to it
in order to protect proprietary and company confidential materials. In particular, I
have changed the names of the company and individuals within this sample RFD.
Additionally, I have changed the raw materials and formulation of the Progenix
product, so manufacturing the product described herein will not yield the equivalent
to the product that was cleared for human use by the FDA.
No one should attempt to create and/or use the product described in this Appendix.
The product, as described in this appendix, does not exist, has never undergone safety
or animal testing, and has not been approved by the FDA for human use.
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